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Abstract 
 
The concept of ‘creativity’ has in recent years gained significant currency in 
spatial governance, particularly as a form of urban redevelopment. Looking at 
three case cities in Taiwan and China, this thesis aims to answer how creativity 
is incorporated in urban redevelopment schemes and what the deployment of 
creative strategies means in practice, particularly in marginal urban space. 
While all the case cities have in recent years adopted a variety of ‘creative city 
policies’, they retain a vastly different capacity and style of governance, as well 
as different configurations of state and non-state actors participating in the 
production of creative space, resulting in local transformations of related 
policies. 
 
Given that the norms and articulation of urban planning involve mechanisms of 
state control and management, while creativity is often understood as 
individual or grassroots practice, the research analyses the different 
approaches to the production of creative spaces along the state-society ledger, 
between the commonalities of the macro level and the contingent complexity of 
the micro level of politics. Using an ethnographic approach, eight creative areas 
in Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Beijing were analysed, adding to our understanding 
of how global policy discourses are localized based on differences in the 
organizational capacity of the state and non-state actors involved. Moreover, 
the emphasis on non-state actors has provided new insights into tactics of 
avoidance, persuasion and integration vis-à-vis the state. The resulting 
typology, differentiating corporative, entrepreneurial and normative approaches 
to creative space production, helps frame our understanding of how creativity 
is operationalised, as well as providing a comparative look at the Taiwanese 
and Chinese state’s style of governing.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Creativity in the City 
 
During my fieldwork in Taiwan and China, I realised my movements were being 
closely followed – by a giant rubber duck. The artwork by Dutch artist Florentijn 
Hofman sometimes followed, sometimes anticipated my movement, having 
appeared in Kaohsiung, in Xiamen, in Taipei and in Beijing. The floating fowl 
was greeted everywhere by large crowds of curious citizens and, perhaps more 
curiously, the clamour of approval from city officials. In Taiwan, the competition 
between various cities reached such proportions that three ducks had been 
commissioned on the island. Although two deflated and one had to be dragged 
ashore during a typhoon, the yellow duck attracted millions of visitors and 
illustrates a readiness of the host cities to engage with public art on a far 
grander scale. Comical as the anecdote seems, it also underlines the radical 
shift in urban policy towards the deployment of art, culture, and creativity as 
tools of economic and spatial transformation.  
 
Starting with New York and London, the sight of dedicated ‘creative spaces’ 
and artsy neighbourhoods has become commonplace in major cities around 
the globe, including the urban centres of China and Taiwan. Although art has 
long been associated with the urban setting, there is something quite different 
about the ways these spaces have been produced; while art is typically 
understood as the creative output of more or less talented individuals, the 
emergence of creative neighbourhoods, zones or districts has occurred against 
the backdrop of a re-evaluation of art as creativity. This elusive term has 
infiltrated the language of business, education, (un)employment and 
bureaucracy, and became the adjective of preference to concepts such as 
‘lifestyle’, ‘living’ or ‘work’ in conjunction to their redefinition within a post-
industrial society.  
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Arguably, this concept has nowhere gained more currency than in the field of 
urban governance, where it manifests itself both on the theoretical level of 
thinking about the city (most notably through the ‘creative city’ discourse), as 
well as physically as art- and culture-led interventions into urban space. While 
much has been written concerning the role of creativity in the city, the 
discussion is largely influenced by the prescriptive social engineering of 
Richard Florida’s work on the ‘creative class’ (2002, 2003), and the ‘creative 
city’ policy toolkits of Charles Landry (2008), resulting in a field of policy 
influenced by a remarkably narrow set of canonical works. The cases in China 
and Taiwan, apart from being a suitable comparative pair due to their cultural 
and linguistic heritage, are also characterised by the coherence of the creative 
city discourse upon which the use of creativity in urban (re)development is 
based and justified. An expectation arising from this commonality would be one 
of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which has 
throughout been an assumption with which the research has had to contend.  
 
Another common feature of creative space is without doubt the transposition of 
culture and art into the realm of the economic, introducing the market as a 
mechanism for evaluating the success of such spaces. It is through this re-
evaluation that the use of culture as creativity in urban redevelopment has been 
made possible, opening the doors for a range of urban forms such as the 
adaptive reuse of abandoned industrial infrastructure, the reuse of dilapidated 
historic buildings, or even art-led urbanization of formerly rural areas. 
Simultaneously however, the use of art and culture as a legitimizing tool for 
controversial redevelopment projects calls for a deeper investigation of how 
creative space supplants marginal, economically underutilised spaces often 
occupied by disenfranchised groups. Marginal areas are locations where a ‘rent 
gap’ exists, making their redevelopment profitable. While the vast majority of 
such areas are demolished and rebuilt, those that are preserved in one way or 
another (either as a physical or a social space) are increasingly being done so 
through the use of creative or culture-led redevelopment. In comparing state 
and social capacities of Taiwan and China, such redevelopments aid as a case 
study of differentiating power arrangements between professional groups, 
activists, residents’ organizations and the various organs of the state. 
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Somewhat vague as a concept, the ‘creative spaces’ that make up the case 
studies of this research cannot easily be grouped into one neat urban form, nor 
should they be. Beneath the seeming commonalities of creative space policies 
adopted by cities large and small, there nevertheless exists a great variety of 
such spaces, from galleries, studios, artist villages, creative industry clusters 
and even whole creative neighbourhoods and towns. The variety of spaces is 
further matched by a variety of actors involved in the production of creative 
spaces: central and local governments, public and private institutions, state-
owned and private enterprises, planners and artists, architects and residents, 
professional associations and loose affiliations of stakeholders. Lastly, there 
exists a great variety of ways of operationalizing creativity in the city, which 
suggest a contingent complexity not easily amenable to theory-building or 
categorization.  
 
Taking into account both the commonalities such as the discourse on 
creativity, marketization, and the need to address large and complex 
constellations of stakeholders, the puzzle that presented itself can be 
formulated as the following question: 
"How is it that two regimes with broadly similar approaches to urban 
space produce such a variety of ways in which creativity is 
operationalised?" 
 
From this basic research puzzle, I proceeded to examine not only the policies 
and plans pertaining to their production, but to experience, observe and 
document the ways in which these creative spaces came to be, the ways in 
which some of them were extinguished, as well as the ways in which other 
continue to operate. As such, the way in which creative spaces are made is as 
much a question of the everyday practice of its inhabitants and users, as it is 
has become a question of urban planning. Given that the norms and 
articulation of urban (re)development involve mechanisms of state control and 
management, while the practice of creativity is typically understood as 
individual or small group activity, the research on the production of creative 
spaces in Taiwan and China necessarily involved an examination of the state-
society relations in the two countries. Using an ethnographic approach, the 
research has tackled the problem by looking at the ways in which creative 
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spaces were made (often through a formal or informal process of negotiation), 
how they are used (in terms of their integration into the institutions of the state 
or their autonomy) and how their insertion into urban space has raised 
questions of equity (since the target spaces were often marginal urban spaces). 
Looking at this middle level of practice, the research locates a space where the 
commonalities of the macro level (which are often abstract ideas on space), 
and the contingent complexity of the micro level (often practiced space) meet, 
and where there has indeed been possible to construct a preliminary typology. 
Based on the examination of approaches to operationalization of creativity 
across the research sites, three tendencies have been found: a corporative 
approach tending towards the setting up of hybrid institutions spanning state 
and stakeholder groups, a normative approach which attempts to combine 
didactic appeals with targeted top-down redevelopment, as well as an 
entrepreneurial approach which relies on the mechanism of competition and 
invites state actors to participate as entrepreneurial actors, though the double 
position of the state as market participant (as the local state) and market 
regulator (as the central state) in the case of China complicates the definition of 
‘enterprise’. The typology is further developed in Chapter 2, following a review 
of literature on creativity as well as on the selected countries.  
 
On this note, it should be emphasised that as a field of policy examined at a 
comparative level, the operationalization of creative spaces is an under-
researched area, particularly in Asia. The present piece of research has thus 
attempted to provide the empirical work needed to learn about the specific 
mixes of state and societal flows, the specific ways in which policy and rhetoric 
are implemented, and the specific spaces that ultimately emerge. From a 
comparative perspective, these different approaches and ways point towards 
an underlying diversity which defies neat categorization along cleavages such 
as Taiwan-China, Communist Party-Guomindang, market socialism-
developmental capitalism, but seems rather to be accompanying a new policy 
field as it emerges from obscurity to the limelight, bringing with it disparate 
groups and interests which are now combining in a great number of ways. 
These can be understood better through a comparative approach, which has 
highlighted not only expected isomorphism but also the unexpected complexity 
at the lowest level of political practice; a case in point is the comparison of 
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Taipei’s URS programme (Chapter Four) and Beijing’s Dashilar Platform 
(Chapter Seven), which are both defined as a policy tool called ‘urban 
acupuncture’ (small, targeted interventions), yet also present a very different 
practice in terms of how the programmes are evolving, their links to non-state 
groups, as well as the ways in which the programme has been integrated into 
the local state.  
 
 
1.2 Methodology and case selection  
 
Research design and case selection 
The research was designed as a sub-national comparative study, taking 
instances of creative space production within urban redevelopment as basic 
case studies. In total, eight sites across three cities were selected for 
ethnographic research, though additional sites are also discussed to construct 
a historical background for the selected eight. In order to avoid what Snyder 
(2001) calls ‘mean-spirited analysis’, i.e. one based on inappropriate coding of 
national means, comparable sub-national functional equivalents from China 
were selected against the template of Taiwan. China being an internally 
unevenly developed country with large differences between its cosmopolitan 
centres, provincial capitals and peripheral regions, Beijing was ultimately 
selected as the most appropriate location for a comparative study. Not only are 
the urban economies of Beijing, Taipei and Kaohsiung comparable in broad 
econometric terms, Taipei and Beijing are both locales where a strong interplay 
of municipal and national politics takes places, while Kaohsiung is similarly 
invested in national-level politics due to its status as the stronghold of the 
opposition Democratic Progressive Party. An additional case, that of Xiamen, 
was considered for inclusion in the research to provide better balance in case 
selection and was excluded primarily due to material and practical concerns, 
rather than a change in the epistemological grounding of the research – it 
remains a promising candidate for inclusion in further studies which could 
elaborate on the mechanisms of policy transmission and emulation within 
China itself. An alternative case study of Shanghai was also considered, yet its 
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distinct metropolitan brand of politics would perhaps not have found full 
comparative expression with Taipei, while its sheer size and global 
interconnectedness make it more amenable to a study of creative spaces in 
Asian cities such as Hong Kong or Singapore.  
From the initial selection of a few representative cases (Pier-2 in Kaohsiung and 
Treasure Hill in Taipei), subsequent sites and interlocutors were selected 
through a snowballing approach. Thus, during initial fieldwork at Pier-2 Art 
Center, many of the artists commissioned there were found to have also 
produced work for a nearby park that replaced the demolished stretch of 
hardware shops on Gongyuan Road. In turn, research conducted there led to 
contacts with activists, filmmakers and artists who were now active in the 
movement to protect historic houses in Hamasen. All three research sites were 
also found to be inter-connected by virtue of having been included in municipal 
plans for the redevelopment of the entire area. This set them apart from sites 
such as the Qiaotou Sugar Refinery, which were ultimately excluded from the 
case selection due to their physical, temporal and thematic distance. The 
fieldwork sites in Taipei were selected through a similar approach, which led 
from the former veterans’ village of Treasure Hill to other sites of culture-led 
redevelopment in the city. These were crucially also sites where a similar 
(sometimes identical) configuration of actors had been active, which ultimately 
led to the identification of the Urban Regeneration Station programme as 
representative of the city’s cumulative efforts at creative space production. 
Lastly, case selection in Beijing originated from the 798 Art Zone as the city’s 
representative creative space, yet ultimately resulted in emphasis being placed 
on Caochangdi and Dashilar. In a similar vein to the case selection in Taiwan, 
these were included by tracing where similar groups of actors had been active, 
as well as through following the suggestions of interviewees, these being taken 
as an important indication of the beliefs which inform their practice.  
 
Methods 
The backbone of the research rests on ethnographic observation conducted 
between September 2012 and July 2013; during this time, sites in Kaohsiung, 
Taipei and Beijing were visited in order to conduct fieldwork including nearly 40 
semi-structured interviews of varying length (from two-hour conversations to 
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short Q&A sessions), photographic and video material, and supported by field 
notes and a journal to track the progress of the study and provide the starting 
points for the analysis of data. In addition, a large body of policy papers, local 
and national media reports, and government brochures were also included as 
supplementary material from which different discourses on creativity in urban 
redevelopment could be constructed. These were included primarily in order to 
examine how a narrative of creativity was being developed and propagated 
through officially sanctioned government publications in addition to the analysis 
of laws, regulations and policy papers.  
 
One potential weakness of the methods used in relation to the research design 
is the relatively richer data obtained from non-state actors involved in the 
production of the creative spaces in question. Owing to their accessibility, 
which was on the whole far greater than that of state actors and institutions, 
the ethnography of their practice was constructed through lengthy participation 
and observation, which included semi-structured interviews of the kind used 
with state actors, but additionally allowed for a range of other interactions, from 
semi-formal to purely informal. As such, the situatedness of the author may 
present a point of contention for a more naturalist approach to qualitative 
study. Nevertheless, it is the position of this research that the rich narrative 
emerging from the extended interaction with communities of artists, activists, or 
spatial professionals such as architects, provided important insights into the 
lived spaces of the research sites which would otherwise not have been 
possible to obtain, while the study of policy and planning is to a greater extent 
possible through archival work and discourse analysis. This also relates to a 
second potential weakness with the research design – the case selection. While 
the sites do have certain broad commonalities already mentioned at the 
beginning of the Introduction, they also present a wealth of diverse ways of 
operationalizing creativity, with virtually as many ways as there are cases. 
Nevertheless, this research maintains the sites must be approached from 
different levels of analysis; just as they may seem uniform on the macro level, 
and multitudinous on the micro level, the mid-level nevertheless presented 
avenues for the construction of a typology, suggesting trends which may 
emerge from the ‘messy’ and unpredictable micro level.  
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Key terms and concepts 
‘Creativity’, a key concept for this study, has been variously taken as an 
ingredient of genius (Eysenck, 1995), as a human instinct (Jung, 1964), or even 
as divine practice which separates it from mere production (as creatio ex nihilo). 
The concept is here defined as pertaining to a number of artistic, cultural and 
artisanal practices requiring the transfer of skill and inspiration from an abstract 
plain to one which can be distributed as a commodity. Creativity as a practice 
is associated with individuals or small groups, while also benefiting from what 
has typically been called the ‘creative milieu’. While Törnqvist defines it as 
‘quintessentially chaotic’ (Törnqvist, 1983), such a milieu has been the elusive 
target of economic planning, finding expression in creative clusters, innovation 
hubs, and art zones, underlining state and corporate involvement in the 
creation (attempted at least) of this precarious environment.  
 
Quite apart from being merely a place where creative practices are pursued, 
the term ‘creative space’ is understood here as a contested urban space 
wherein the different understandings of creativity (as a daily practice of artists, 
as an economic activity of the culture-creative industries, or as the resource 
from which the commodity of intellectual property is produced) are played out 
in physical space, following Lefebvre’s conceptualization of mutually 
dependent spaces in dialectical tension. Thus, such spaces transcend a purely 
functional definition, accounting for the exclusion of cultural institutions such as 
museums or concert halls, as well as industrial clusters such as innovation 
hubs or high-tech zones. They are at once a lived space for artists and other 
residents, a planned space for municipal authorities, as well as an imagined 
space through their connection to national narratives on identity, culture, and 
art. Additionally, creative space is here defined as the object of a relatively new 
field of policy, which combines both elements of economic and cultural policy, 
as well as including an expanded set of stakeholders. 
Another key concept, the ‘production of space’, is also developed from 
Lefebvre’s work, and is understood here as a sum of practices which 
interpellate the different aspects of space, from the abstract to the lived and 
imagined spaces. As such, the study of the production of creative space must 
take into account not only the level of policy or planning, but must study the 
narratives and discourses which bring creative spaces into being as a specific 
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category, as well as experience the daily rhythm of these spaces.  
‘Redevelopment’ is another concept used throughout this research and is 
defined as an organised, planned alteration of urban space designed to 
increase the space’s value and utility, which distinguishes it from organic 
growth or small community-efforts, even though similar results may well be 
achieved. As a top-down, planned effort, it is usually, though not always, 
instigated by state institutions; although neoliberal reform has greatly changed 
the scope and style of redevelopment (from a comprehensive, high-modernist 
plan to a marketing-style ‘strategic plan’), redevelopment retains a significant 
impact on residents and urban space.  
Lastly, the research is throughout characterised by an examination of ‘state 
capacity’. While typically understood as the ability of a state to govern the 
territory, peoples, and resources under its control (cf. Skocpol, 1985), the term 
is here understood as the ability of the state to successfully address the non-
state actors involved in the production of creative spaces. As such, it is related 
to another concept, that of the ‘style of governance’, which refers to the ways 
in which the negotiation with non-state actors takes place, for example through 
the evocation of normative standards, the adoption of a mechanism such as 
the market, or through a functional integration of societal demands. As such, it 
becomes possible to gauge not only the effectiveness of the state (measuring 
capacity), but to think about how different ways of exerting power result in 
different configurations of creative space across the selected cases.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
Following the introduction covering research questions, methodology and case 
selection in the first chapter, the thesis continues in Chapter Two with an 
overview of the three lines of inquiry that have informed this work in the broad 
sense. Discussing the condition of space, its form and how it relates to human 
activity, the first section begins the political inquiry of space with Lefebvre’s 
seminal work ‘The Production of Space’ (1991). From here, the chapter 
discusses the applications of Lefebvrian spatial theory in the context of creative 
space production by interrogating tensions between the planned space 
 17 
characteristic of statist management, and the lived space which forms the basis 
of many creative and artist communities. By connecting this debate to the 
neoliberal shift in urban governance, which rests on an ideological foundation of 
‘organic self-organization”, the chapter introduces creative city strategies as an 
integral part of this neoliberal shift, though one which can better be explored 
through an examination of state and societal capacity, rather than through a rigid 
mould churning out ‘neoliberalisms’, i.e. only explorations of how the term can 
be applied in the Asian context. The chapter continues with a historical overview 
of urban space in China and Taiwan, focusing particularly on the retreat of the 
state, globalization, and commodification as the three changes which have set 
the scene for the advent of creative city strategies, which represent the third line 
of inquiry. Tracing the origins of creative city theory to a re-appreciation of art 
and culture as the economic category of creativity, it outlines how the discourse 
arrived in China and Taiwan, as well as how it was adapted to serve both as an 
economic policy, as well as the locus of discussions on identity and national 
development. Lastly, the chapter introduces how a typology of creative space 
approaches was constructed.  
 
Chapter Three is the first of two chapters on Taipei, organised around a case 
study of Treasure Hill, a former illegal village of civil war veterans which was 
converted into an artist village through a long process of conflict and negotiation 
between the city and activist groups. The resulting spatial configuration is 
defined as a museumification of the village and its extant residents, and serves 
as an opening into the inquiry of the institutionalization of creative space 
production, which is taken up in Chapter Four. Here, the research traces the 
making of corporative institutions of spatial production in Taipei, emphasising 
the ability of the municipal state to usefully integrate professional and business 
communities’ input while also allowing access to the distribution of the state’s 
resources.  
 
Chapter Five presents the case of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s second city. Although 
three separate sites make up the case selection for the chapter, all three are 
found within what used to be the city’s central, coastal neighbourhood, but which 
had fallen into disrepair in the preceding decades. Here, a swathe of city-led 
initiatives has produced a set of creative spaces, displacing in its wake a 
 18 
historically rooted community of metalworkers. The chapter analyses the 
discourse of ‘historicization’ used by the city to justify the large demolition 
project, connecting it with the way the neighbourhood is being transformed to fit 
with a normative view of creativity, replacing its working-class character with a 
centrally constructed ‘creative zone’ identity. Lastly, a look at a genuinely 
community-run project at Hamasen serves both to contrast the state’s efforts 
and as a reminder of the importance of a grassroots perspective in the study of 
creative space production.  
 
Chapter Six, the first of two chapters on creative space in Beijing, is set aside 
by its more theoretical slant; in order to underline the significant differences in 
the state-art relations in China and contrast them with the findings of the 
previous three chapters, the section of art and state underlines the reformation 
of this relationship from an ideological, Maoist one, via a two-decade long break, 
to a relation built on market tenets. While the state (especially the local state) is 
thus shown to have returned onto the contemporary art scene, the central state 
also retains a strong supervisory role, meting out punishment to artists who 
‘cross the line’. The centrality of contemporary art in creative space production is 
further explored in Chapter Seven. While Taiwanese creative spaces have 
often sprung from a broad coalition of artists, social activists, spatial 
professionals etc., Beijing’s most renowned creative space have been set up by 
a globally mobile, financially independent artist elite, which also figures as a 
crucial factor in the entrepreneurial way such spaces are created and indeed 
perpetuated. The chapter closes with a look at Beijing’s historic neighbourhoods, 
where creative strategies have been increasingly adopted by the entrepreneurial 
local state as a way to maximize redevelopment returns in protected 
neighbourhoods, as well as by small groups of independent actors whose fate is 
however unclear amid the increasing attention of larger financial interests.  
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Chapter Two: Towards a Typology of 
Creative Spaces 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction: Planning and living the city 
 
As a methodologically heterodox project aimed at the analysis of space 
between state and society, at the physical outcome of the meeting of two 
abstract spaces, one planned and the other lived, this project has inevitably 
suffered from foiled ambition and some necessary downscaling. Nevertheless, 
the central theme remains: the ways in which creative spaces relate to urban 
redevelopment in the selected cities of Taiwan and China. Being culturally, 
linguistically and economically related cities, the problem was not so much one 
of incommensurability, but rather of finding the balance between the study of 
planning policy (‘the letter of the space’) and grassroots practice (‘the spirit of 
the space’). Moreover, belonging somewhere in the field of Greater China 
studies as well as that of urban studies, the research project had from the 
outset been designed to challenge the reluctance of both fields to venture 
beyond their immediate areas of study onto a comprehensive yet abstract level 
of political inquiry, one that would transcend the area and look at specific 
phenomena instead. From overarching, umbrella concepts such as urbanity, 
developmentalism, the creation of a civil society, down to the quotidian 
(sometimes mundane) observations on the practices of artist communities, one 
question pervades this work: why is the idea of creativity becoming a mainstay 
of the urban condition, and why does its operationalization produce such a 
multitude of outcomes at the lowest level? Is it a question of external 
constraints and resources, or simply a consequence of some cases having 
been lead by more engaged and successful actors? 
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An approach to this question has been formed through a consideration of three 
separate themes though which the many ways of producing creative space 
have been examined: the politics of space, Chinese and Taiwanese political 
economy, and the so-called ‘creative city discourse’. This chapter introduces 
these three separate fields before arriving at a typology of creative spaces, 
which emerged from the theoretical inquiry as much as the fieldwork research, 
but which remains most visible at a middle level of analysis, in the space 
between macro-economic and political concerns, and the micro level of 
individual (or small group) practice. The first of the three themes, space, is a 
crucial concept in the political understanding of cities, refusing the take 
physical and abstract space for granted, but rather seeing it relationally as a 
product of human activity. The second theme is one that intersects with the 
other two, inquiring into the Taiwanese and Chinese developmental models 
and assumptions about whether path-dependencies shape urban space, all of 
which are pertinent to the comparative study of how creativity is used in urban 
redevelopment. Lastly, the globalised discourse of the creative city, itself a 
derivate of a neoliberal shift in urban planning, requires an interrogation based 
on whether such policies are immutable or translated. As already set out in the 
opening section, I argue that ‘creativity’ is used and operationalised in Taiwan 
and China in significantly differing ways, many of which are predicated upon 
the balance of power between the various constellations of the state (rather 
than levels) and those of ‘society’ – understood here as a loose term covering 
epistemic communities of planners, artists, architects and others who 
participate in the production of creative space without direct recourse to the 
resources of the state. While the Taiwanese state shows greater capacity in 
integrating societal pressure within its institutions (or creating hybrid 
institutions to this purpose, a capacity I call a ‘socialised state’), this is also due 
to the existence of a more dependent artist/creative community. Conversely, 
although Beijing’s case suggests a powerful yet non-socialised state (i.e. one 
which cannot always usefully integrate societal pressures), the resulting 
configurations of creative spaces in the city cannot be understood without 
taking into account the autonomous, economically independent artist elite 
active in the production of these spaces. The case of Kaohsiung in many ways 
exhibits the traits of both larger case cities, though its top-down statist 
approach is often tempered by public apathy. Kaohsiung’s relatively small size 
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and accessible politics have however made it possible to explore and develop 
concepts that were later used in the research of Taipei and Beijing; the 
question of how globalised policy discourses are translated and implemented 
for example, brought into question the applicability of terms such as 
‘neoliberalism’, ‘gentrification’ or even ‘historical preservation’ without critical 
pause. Simultaneously, one cannot ignore that the process of producing 
creative spaces in all three cities involves a (re)integration of marginal space, 
triggering questions about the equity and sustainability of such urban change. 
Another common trend was also apparent in all three case cities: a 
pluralisation of the urban planning process concerning creative spaces. The 
term should not be taken in a normative way and it suggests no necessary 
democratic opening in the mechanism of urban space production. Rather, it 
refers to a process that is equally a ‘de-professionalization’ of spatial 
production as much as it is ‘community involvement’, two sides of one coin 
that cannot be understood separately. 
 
Although great care has been taken not to spread the theoretical grounding of 
the research too thin, much work remains to be done in order to move towards 
what Magnusson (2010) calls a ‘politics of urbanism as a way of life’ 
(Magnusson, 2010: 53). Such a politics of urbanism has in this case been 
constructed on the examination of a narrow urban category (creative space), 
and across politically and culturally related, yet distinct locations. Using the 
phenomenon of creative space as a focal point, the research has from the 
outset remained firmly outside a national-level conception of politics, while 
attempting not to be inadvertently limited to the city (or sub-city) scale. The 
policies and practices concerning creativity form a part of a globalised 
discourse in which actors as diverse as politicians, planners, architects, artists, 
corporate leaders and shopkeepers are all engaged in the remaking of space, 
which is where the initial thinking on the subject of this research also began. 
 
Creativity in urban redevelopment furthermore touches upon areas of policy 
handled by several different traditional governmental bodies: national ministries 
of culture, of development, of economy; municipal cultural, economic and 
planning bureaux; national and municipal institutions such as museums, 
galleries or universities; public foundations and other new institutionalised 
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forms of cultural governance. Many of these have fundamentally different 
expectations and tasks regarding the function of creativity in the city, which 
was evident especially in the Chinese case study. Additionally, as an 
experimental and new field, creative and cultural policy remains relatively open 
to non-state actors, from professional associations, NGOs and pressure 
groups, opinion leaders, media and even residents. Due to this sprawling array 
of potential actors, the case selection was necessarily strict and limiting, 
painful as it was to leave fieldwork data unused1. Ultimately, the question of 
how creativity is used in urban redevelopment schemes was examined along 
the state-society spectrum using space, political economy of urban space and 
creative city discourse as the main three themes on which the research was 
constructed, resulting in a broad typology of how creative strategies are 
deployed within the conflictual field of urban redevelopment. 
 
 
  
                                                
 
1 The research layout initially included a case study of Xiamen, aimed at exploring how 
spatial patterns and policy trends from Beijing are in the process of being adopted by 
second-tier cities in China. Although much interesting work emerged, the case study 
was ultimately excluded due to constraints on time as well as the length of the present 
research.  
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2.2 Space, a critical approach 
 
Space, and urban space in particular, is unthinkable without human activity – 
this simple maxim lies at the core of this thesis. Heidegger’s Raum as 
‘something that has been made room for’ (Heidegger, 1975: 154) or Michel de 
Certeau’s definition of space as practiced place, a location that has been 
transformed into space by virtue of mobile elements which operate in it (de 
Certeau, 2002: 117), both acknowledge that space is essentially coaxed into 
being by activity: be it thinking, moving or measuring. Yet for both of them, 
space remains more of an occurrence, an empty interval within which dwelling 
or everyday life occurs, an interval from which pure abstracted space can be 
achieved, or an interval that provides the theatre or stage for action (ibid. 124). 
Space is however, by virtue of also being social space, a space that is 
produced. Lefebvre (1991) expands on this initial notion to suggest that this 
has two main implications; firstly, that natural space is disappearing, becoming 
lost to thought; and secondly, that every society produces its own space, 
which cannot be understood simply as a collection of lives and things (a lived 
space), nor as a collection of works on space (a conceived level), but as a 
space that possesses a spatial practice with its own form, rhythm and centres 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 30-31). 
 
Lefebvre is quick to point out that while space is amenable to ‘reading’, this is 
a descriptive and secondary activity, debunking thus the linguistic tradition of 
approaching space in a way in which everything is language and space 
reduced to a chain of signs (ibid.: 133). The relevance of such a position to this 
research is that while a semiotic reading of space is possible (and was indeed 
required in order to conceptualise the assumptions and norms guiding 
development), it cannot fully explain the ways in which space appears, 
changes, is used or contested without considering and analysing the political, 
economic and cultural processes which are linked to actors’ practices and 
beliefs. The present research, while being firmly grounded in the study of 
space (or more precisely, of urban spaces designated for creative activity), is 
essentially a critical study of the practices of individuals, groups and 
institutions - in short of the ways of doing things, of making space. Moreover, 
this practice cannot be divorced from the hard power relations which govern it. 
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It is precisely in this point that the research also diverges from the general, 
theoretical level of Lefebvre’s observations, preferring instead to descend to 
the level of practical politics of space. 
 
Once we accept that space is best experienced by living in it, be it in a sense 
of dwelling, the anthropological everyday, or by participating in the mode of 
production which secretes the space, we can successfully complete the move 
towards studying space not as a topography or through a strictly architectural 
or urban planning lens, nor as an abstract cognitive construct, but as a layered, 
and not at all static, space of meanings, assumptions and norms, as well as of 
political and quotidian action. Nowhere is this more necessary than in the study 
of creative space, a concept whose vagueness demands a heterodox 
approach to locate it as a political convenience, an industrial policy, a daily 
reality, and lofty ideal all at once. Furthermore, by virtue of being at once the 
primary locus of creative production (practiced by small groups or individuals), 
the focus of the state’s attention (through its apparatus of planning and 
regulation) as well as a lucrative investment field for financial interests, the 
research has attempted throughout to analyse the interplay of these interests 
on the chosen fieldwork locations, using a political ethnography as the primary 
method of research. 
 
Taxonomy of space 
The present research proposes to use Lefebvre’s ‘spatial triad’ as the basic 
taxonomic tool with which creative space is subjected to investigation. This 
triad, which exists in a dialectical tension, is  conceived as three layers or 
forms of space:  representations of space (maps, plans, etc.), spatial practices 
(flows, organizations, hierarchies) and the somewhat awkwardly called spaces 
of representation (which include imaginations, theories, mythologies) (Lefebvre, 
1991). Lefebvre is notoriously unclear on some of the finer details of these 
spaces and it is in any case not the intention of this research to expound upon 
their definition, but rather to use them as an analytical frame in the study of 
space, in order to construct a comprehensive analysis which treats urban 
plans, spatial patterns or resident’s fears and hopes as parts which make up 
space as a whole. 
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Using this approach, the production of creative spaces can be understood as 
an imposition of the abstract representation of space (such as municipal plans 
and development imperatives) onto existing urban spaces, which may or may 
not welcome such a top-down operationalization of creative strategies. The 
opposition between such newly conceived spaces and those they seek to 
supplant is a recurring theme of the research. The new urban space invariably 
stems from the abstract, discursively constructed space of professionals and 
technocrats, while the existing urban spaces have long since become ‘lived 
space’ – the fluid and dynamic space of everyday life. Within this opposition, 
which can be concretised in the present case as the tension between state and 
non-state actors (although not always only along this line), the research has 
produced a typology of approaches towards the production of creative spaces: 
normative, corporative and entrepreneurial. In turn, these can be understood as 
different ways in which the plans, managerial practices, and technocratic 
control are transmitted to the level of the street. 
 
Rather than being simply a function of a sliding scale of state-society relations, 
this typology stems from an interpretation of the researched spaces, based in 
turn on an immersive research method. As Schatz put it, such an immersion 
produces ‘complex configurations of factors that combine and recombine in a 
striking variety of ways’ instead of simply testing ‘elegant causal chains’ 
(Schatz, 2009: 11). As a taxonomy, it may therefore be considered by some as 
a futile, inelegant one, yet its use lies in the ability to distinguish between 
understandings of general, shared concepts such as creativity, the value of art, 
or culture-led redevelopment that are frequently found on both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits as well as further afield. Analogous to political ethnographic 
work on concepts such as democracy (Schaffer, 1998), the research 
interrogates these differing conceptions of creativity (and by extension, culture 
and art) in the urban setting of Taipei, Kaohsiung and Beijing. In all three cases, 
contested creative space, one where the conceptions of governmental 
planning bodies and the practices of extant communities clash, has been at 
the core of the research. 
 
Using space as the basic object of inquiry has enabled an examination of the 
meeting of state and society even within the small case studies chosen for this 
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project, namely artist zones, cultural areas and other ‘creative spaces’. Such 
urban phenomena have been the subject of many metropolitan-level inquiries 
(cf. Boontharm (2012) on Tokyo, Bangkok and Singapore, Colomb (2012) on 
Berlin, Grodach (2012) on Austin, Jayne (2004) on Stoke-on-Trent), though less 
effort has been devoted towards ‘breaking out’ of methodological constraints 
which have characterised the study of cities (and specific clusters or areas 
within them) in a radically more open and relational way that would also allow 
for the consideration of national-level politics, flows of power and ideas. 
Jacobs (2012) for example calls for ‘diffusionist’ models of the mobility (of 
policies, ideas etc.) with a ‘Latourean concept of translation’ – i.e. one that is 
able to detect and usefully analyse the nuances in the adoption of similar 
policies in the city. Such an approach would be able to integrate phenomena 
such as ‘gentrification’ or ‘urban revanchism’, or policies such as adaptive 
reuse or private-public partnerships without treating them as immutable over 
space and time, but rather seeing how similar phenomena transform through 
the practice of different power balances in the chosen cities. 
 
While being essentially a study of policy transformation and variety, it is 
important to underline some existing debates regarding the homogenization of 
urban space. One relevant aspect identified in the literature on urban space is 
that of the assumed proliferation of what Augé (1995) calls ‘non-places’: 
automated, non-interactionary, air-conditioned, ordered spaces, their identity 
(if any) often reconstituted, reimagined and sterilised. This space, as an end of 
space to coincide with an end of history, is identified by Augé through a 
semiotic reading of space – precisely what Lefebvre presciently warned about. 
While all of us have probably wondered at the homogenised, repeatable 
experience of being at an airport, it is unlikely that all urban forms are as 
function-dependent, nor is their construction the result of some underlying 
‘sameness’ that pervades the spirits of their planners and those who 
commission them. Recent arrivals onto the urban landscape, such as 
waterfront redevelopments, private-public partnerships, central business 
districts, gated residential communities, quasi-public spaces under private 
control etc., seem to be emerging not only across Greater China, but are 
indeed worldwide phenomena most often linked to a neoliberal reorganization 
of space (cf. Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Brenner and Theodore, 2005; Irazábal, 
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2006; Minton, 2009; Sorensen et al., 2010). The problem with an examination 
stemming from an assumption of homogeneity is however the unavoidable 
tendency to explain such phenomena through an increasingly parsimonious yet 
unsatisfying explanation, be it ‘neoliberal urban policy’, ‘cultural globalization’ 
or a combination of the two. In contrast to such a view, the present research 
has started from the intention to examine the differences within the apparent 
sameness of policy and spatial forms in regards to the use of creativity as one 
of the strategies for the economic development of cities under conditions of 
globalised competition. 
 
Situating creativity in the comparison of spaces 
The analysis of creative space strategies does not assume to treat cities as 
enclosed, self-limiting units. Indeed, in China and Taiwan, the position of the 
case cities in a global economic and cultural (ranking) system is often a 
question of national as well as municipal politics, suggesting a comparative 
study is well placed to answer questions about how urban policies spread. 
Earlier scholarly work focused on networks and nodes of cities in a global 
hierarchy, most notably by Castells in his seminal work on network society The 
Rise of the Network Society (1986) as well as Sassen’s work on the global city 
(2001; 2002). Such an approach has also found practical application, most 
notably by Loughborough University’s Globalization and World Cities centre, 
yet the quantitative network-based analysis of cities has in recent years come 
under considerable scrutiny; Robinson (2005) in particularly identifies a lack of 
qualitative data to support assumptions about the flows and connections upon 
which a hierarchy of ‘world cities’ is constructed – a hierarchy which city 
officials in all three research locations often referred to. The present research 
subscribes to this view in the hope of contributing sound qualitative data: not 
to reinforce a simplified hierarchy of cities by adding more variables to the 
score-card, but rather to explore how one set of policies and beliefs, that of the 
value of creativity in urban (re)development, has been transformed across the 
three chosen fieldwork sites. Considering Jane M. Jacobs’ call for research 
which locates ‘failure, absence and mutations’ rather than ‘linear stories of 
neoliberal same-ing’ (Jacobs, 2012: 419), the present research has 
endeavoured to chart precisely such changes through a study of the creative 
 28 
spaces which resulted from creative strategies adopted by the cities’ various 
actors. 
 
Furthermore, a traditional approach of studying formally equivalent municipal 
institutions or ‘levels’ has been eschewed in favour of studying what Savitch 
calls ‘functional equivalents’ in his comparative study of post-industrial 
phenomena in New York, Paris and London (Savitch, 1988). The comparison of 
the case cities is implicitly a study of two political and social systems, with the 
definition of the ‘political’ expanded well beyond the organs of the state. In the 
maze of spatial politics, groups such as NGOs, business, even loose groups of 
artists or professional networks of architects etc. have to be treated as having 
a clearly political role, as engaging in urban space as its producers – an 
inherently political action. Equally, the state is here not treated as a neatly 
stratified unit, nor is the inquiry into its workings limited in any formal way. The 
state, be it local, national, village level or institutional (museums, state-owned 
enterprises) is distinguished from other actors mainly by its monopoly on 
regulation and by implication, violence (from demolition, relocation, financial 
penalties to the threat or use of physical force). Given that the 
operationalization of ‘creativity’ is both the concern of technocratic, managerial 
control by the state and of individual or small self-organised efforts, the 
intersections between state and society are many, and have typically been 
researched either as top-down planning (be it successful or not) or as 
grassroots, community-building. The present research emphasises that such a 
dichotomy must not go as far as to suggest a zero-sum game, or treat ‘state’ 
and ‘society’ as complete and independent entities. As fieldwork in all three 
research sites has shown, a more fluid understanding of both sides is 
necessary to be able to account for the interactive modes of producing 
creative space.  The present research has identified two themes around which 
the analysis of creative spaces is structured: the opposition between planned 
and spontaneous space, and the capacity of the state and of civil society under 
competitive (neoliberal) urban space production. It is hoped the resulting 
typology (or the outline thereof) will contribute a critical geographic element to 
comparative studies of Taiwan and China, as well as expand on debates within 
the field of urban studies with a set of case studies from Greater China. 
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Planning and spontaneity 
The dichotomy mentioned above stems from the opposition between planned 
and organic space, as well as between approaches to urban politics that 
emphasise the former or the latter quality of cities. Jane Jacobs (1961) stands 
out as the early voice of ‘the street’, bringing to light the first time the practices 
of self-government and self-organisation which sustain any successful 
neighbourhood or city in opposition to the rationalist, high-modernist planning 
practice personified in her 'arch-enemy', New York's chief planner and builder 
Robert Moses. What Jacobs perhaps neglects however is the role political and 
economic power play in the production of space; while her analysis of the 
social cost of New York’s slum clearance programme is incredibly intuitive, it 
nevertheless skirts politely around issues of race and class, while also 
maintaining a certain naïve, almost Proudhonist view of a pre-modern, village-
type society as the optimal distribution of space. 
 
Another powerful voice against statist planning, one acutely aware of the role 
of power, has been the work of James C. Scott, whose Seeing Like a State 
details a string of planning failures, and the failures especially of 'schemes to 
improve the human condition' (Scott, 1998). In many ways, the identification of 
planning failures has encouraged a move away from high-modernist practices 
of planning and a focus on community and grassroots organization. This new 
planning and managing style has benefitted many marginal spaces by the 
increased openness of the planning process. Yet ‘planning failure’ has also 
been the driver of the move towards a neoliberal reconceptualization, not only 
on the national level but also within the city, town or village politics. A Hayekian 
reverence for a self-organising, self-perpetuating market as the optimal system 
for information dissemination between trading individuals remains the 
ideological basis of neoliberal reforms, even when it is increasingly obvious the 
current form of market economics requires heavy state involvement, 
particularly in the urban setting, and nowhere more so than in China. While the 
central business districts stand as monuments and markers of a new age, 
replacing Maoist smokestacks with skyscrapers, they are as much the product 
of free market entrepreneurialism as statist planning – and not only in China. As 
Lefebvre noted of monumental buildings, they '...mask the will to power and 
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the arbitrariness of power beneath signs and surfaces which claim to express 
collective will and collective thought.' (Lefebvre, 1991: 143). 
 
Capacity, power, neoliberalism 
While Jane Jacobs remains a crucial figure in the study of cities, the ‘will to 
power’ that Lefebvre mentions cannot remain unexamined. Critical geography, 
having moved from what Ward (2010) calls a 'cartographic scale', to one where 
metrics are not fixed, has built on Marxist conceptions of space, revealing 
power relations beneath the technocratic sheen of the planning profession and 
its functioning especially under conditions of globalised capitalism. While much 
excellent work has informed my thinking on the subject, David Harvey’s work 
on neoliberalism and urban space (Harvey, 1989), Peter Marcuse on space and 
race (Marcuse, 1997), and Mike Davis on the conflicting effects of globalization 
on his native Los Angeles (Davis, 1990) have been particularly influential in 
setting the general thrust of the present research. In bringing together the 
‘planned’ and ‘lived’ levels of analysis, both the formal, planned city as well as 
grassroots space-making initiatives are seen as the building blocks of creative 
spaces through an ethnography of space, that is, by analysing the results of 
policy implementation and negotiation in the built/lived environment. This is 
where the comparison of two nominally very different political systems across 
the Taiwan Strait comes into starker focus, as similar policy trends (such as 
pursuing creative city strategies) have resulted in very different spatial 
arrangements. 
 
Taiwan and China, two late developers with similar cultural backgrounds are 
separated by several decades of life under divergent political systems – even 
though shared path-dependencies with roots before the 1949 division make 
their comparison highly rewarding. As both Taiwan and China enter a post-
industrial stage (though this is not universal in the latter), the need to retain 
competitiveness has become a deeply engrained belief in urban policy-makers 
on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, causing friction between the traditionally 
statist, planning-heavy economic models of both countries, and the newly 
received wisdom on marketization as an optimal mechanism of resource 
allocation. Far from being an actual objectivity, this belief is deeply connected 
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to the implementation of a neoliberal reform programme which both countries 
have embarked upon, for different reasons, since the 1980s. From the field of 
macro-economic policy, elements of neoliberal policy trends have become part 
of an urban planning doxa and feature heavily in creative policy strategies, 
which for the most part can be traced to 1980s Britain and the United States2. 
 
The issue of how (and if) neoliberalism is being adopted in Asia remains 
however a contested academic topic, though many conflicting views may be 
explained by the differing understanding of what ‘neoliberalism’ entails. The 
question surrounding neoliberalism in China has in particular been the subject 
of much academic debate, especially regarding the continued role of the state 
as a contradiction to neoliberal politics. Thus, Liew (2005) for example 
emphasises the legacy of state socialism as proof that China is not accepting 
neoliberalism, while Wang Hui and the Chinese New Left emphasise the 
inherently statist and anti-democratic nature of neoliberalism (Wang and Karl, 
2004). In his assessment of the debate, Wu (2010) argues neoliberal economics 
should be seen as a fix to a set of problems that became apparent in the 
1970s, while the deepening of free-market reform following Deng’s 1992 
Southern Tour was necessary to prevent another crisis (Wu, 2010: 628). On the 
other hand, debate over Taiwan’s neoliberal reforms is made up mainly of self-
examination wherein many societal transformations are branded as neoliberal 
as an all-encompassing expletive with scant analytical value. In such divergent 
situations, the present research has attempted to avoid the wholesale use of 
the term, preferring instead to draw a comparative analysis of capacity, both of 
the respective states and non-state groups involved in the production of 
creative space. While the term ‘neoliberal’ is often used, this is mainly in 
reference to its use by interviewees or relevant literature, rather than a subject 
of inquiry. Rather, this research adopts a Foucauldian understanding of 
neoliberalism as an art of government which ‘…asks the economy how its 
freedom can have a state-creating function and role, in the sense that it will 
really make possible the state’s legitimacy.” (Foucault, 2008: 95). Understood 
                                                
 
2 The re-examination of cultural industries as creative industries took place largely 
within the Greater London Council, which looked to new ways of measuring economic 
benefits of culture to make up a crucial part of proto-New Labour’s move between the 
perceived ills of statist planning and the excesses neoliberal deregulation (O’Connor, 
2007). 
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from this perspective, the research transcends a typology of ‘neoliberalisms’ 
and approaches the term as a set of processes that are subjecting to a market-
based mechanism of legitimation those areas that were previously outside its 
influence. Although Wu may be completely correct in concluding market reform 
is a ‘…societal modernization project and is consistent with the CCP’s effort to 
modernise China…’ (Wu, 2010: 621), this does not determine the extent to 
which marketization (or as Foucault would have it, ‘a market mechanism of 
veridiction’) will influence China’s future development or how, in the cases 
researched here, it influenced the legitimation strategies pursued by actors 
involved in creative space production. 
 
On the other hand, a more state-centred approach has recently been bolstered 
by newfound concern for societal wellbeing among China’s ruling elite, and 
much scholarship has been produced on the topic of understanding China 
through state-centred ‘Leninist government’ theory, as Chalmers Johnson puts 
it (Johnson, 1982). In his article on the paradigms of Chinese politics for 
example, Gilley argues forcefully in favour of ‘kicking society back out’ and 
approaching China from a comparative communist approach; far from being 
replaced by Asian developmentalism, Leninist rule and developmentalism are 
thought to usefully complement each other (Gilley, 2011: 531). The examination 
of creative space production may in many ways appear to be quite removed 
from the theory of the Chinese state, yet as spaces that are both marginal (and 
outside of state control) and representative (and of great value to the state), 
they occupy the liminal space of state and society and are subject to different 
interpretations and beliefs concerning the state’s role. As cases examined in 
Chapter Six show, there is for example still significant tension between the 
more entrepreneurially minded local state and the more lofty concerns 
embodied in central state bodies such as the Ministry of Culture. As for the 
comparative angle, the research maintains the usefulness of a comparison 
between China and Taiwan, even considering Gilley’s exhortation for 
comparative communist approaches. As heir to a Leninist KMT party state, the 
democratised Taiwanese state maintains a paternalistic and normative notion 
of governing in certain broad policy areas, especially those dealing with culture 
or art. What sets it apart from China is primarily its ability (and willingness) to 
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integrate societal pressures into its vision, as the case studies in Taipei and 
Kaohsiung have demonstrated. 
 
Through the study of the interplay of state and societal actors in the limited 
confines of creative spaces, the reader may indeed identify recurrent themes of 
power, especially in the application of planned spaces onto the physical 
landscape of the case cities, an application that somewhat challenges notions 
both of democracy and authoritarianism in the urban field. Here perhaps is the 
place to address the ‘Gramscian elephant in the room’. Bob Jessop in 
particular has brought a neo-Gramscian approach to the study of urban 
accumulation strategies, arguing for an approach which examines ‘…how 
urban regimes operate through a strategically selective combination of political 
society and civil society, government and governance, ‘parties’ and 
partnerships.’ (Jessop, 1996: 64. emphases in original). Without a doubt, many 
of these analytical categories have been used in the present research; it may 
well be that it is only through a lack of theoretical rigour that it cannot truly be 
called a Gramscian piece of work, rather than any discord in the general thrust 
and objective of the approach. Perhaps future research on creative spaces in 
Asia will benefit from a more tightly focused theoretical foundation, but for the 
present research, a frugal use of neo-Gramscian terms is hopefully sufficient to 
develop a typology of spaces, though they might be equally usefully examined 
as different levels of hegemony or forms of political rule: the corporative mode 
of producing creative spaces in Taipei for example corresponds neatly with 
Gramsci’s ‘inclusive hegemony’, while the Beijing and Kaohsiung cases are 
more akin to limited forms of political rule involving a narrower set of groups. 
The limited nature of the research, having focused on what are relatively small 
areas of the city, is one potential reason for the apprehensiveness regarding 
using a neo-Gramscian approach; nevertheless, the typology that emerged 
from the focused fieldwork on a selection of sites across three cities in Greater 
China suggests further research will benefit from the perspective on urban 
regimes as suggested by Jessop. 
 
The comparative analysis stemming from interpretive fieldwork has produced a 
typology of approaches to the production of creative spaces; a typology which, 
while not exhaustive, nevertheless supports the original hypothesis on the role 
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of capacity in organizational patterns concerning the mix of state and 
technocratic control and/or reproduction of what has typically been considered 
organic, unplanned (unplannable?) practice of creativity. Ultimately, while the 
comparison between China and Taiwan has remained at the core of the 
research, the themes which the typology addresses are also universal ones, 
questioning the efficacy and efficiency of creative space in three cities with 
hugely differing capacity and style of governance: corporative, entrepreneurial 
and normative. These approaches are by no means absolute, yet they remain 
useful in distinguishing the variations or creative space strategies pursued in 
the case cities, variations whose historical context must first be examined in 
the following section. 
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2.3 Political economy of space in Taiwan and China 
 
Taiwan’s development and democratization have often been studied with the 
explicit or implicit intention of exploring China’s futures; here however, Taiwan 
and China are examined not so much as ‘alternative Chinas’ but are seen 
mainly as having had a related history of producing urban space, one that was 
occasionally similar in intention and often dissimilar in its results. The Maoist 
state was for example able to enforce on China its vision of an industrializing 
socialist country, with strict controls on population movement, consumption 
and growth in the cities. This system, designed to extract surplus capital from 
the countryside to invest in urban industrial development, also resulted in the 
relatively low rate of urbanization, amassing decades’ worth of pressure for 
urban growth. The cities of Taiwan in contrast were equally marked by the 
Guomindang’s earlier attempts at building an ideologically-shaped, normative 
space, as well as their inability to enforce an orderly urban regime in the years 
after their escape to the island. The section therefore proposes to examine 
shared historical background before proceeding to look at the development of 
the two countries’ urban spaces separately, through themes such as 
developmentalism, globalization and the retreat/resurgence of state power, all 
of which have significantly marked both China and Taiwan. To successfully 
understand what a demolition in Kaohsiung, a community project in Taipei, or 
an artist village in Beijing mean, it has been necessary to consider these 
spaces from such diverse aspects. Although the resulting work is not testing 
hypotheses of state-society relations in China or Taiwan, some of the 
qualitative data may well be used to advance our understanding of the state as 
an actor in the urban field of both countries, especially in terms of its capacity 
to address the demands of highly focused, specialised groups of actors. 
 
Chinese urban forms in the 20th Century: heritage and visions 
Western colonial interests have by the early 20th Century created a varied and 
extensive urban fabric which interacted with local urban traditions either by 
supplanting or hybridizing it, and created the first cities which were truly urban 
in their juxtaposition with the rural: places without roots, diverse and changing, 
they were qualitatively different from villages, towns and even the imperial 
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metropolis of Beijing, where the basic building block, the courtyard house, still 
ruled the city. Though this period is influential for the continuation of the way in 
which urban forms developed in China, the present paper begins its review 
with the Republican period and the Nationalist project of building a new 
national capital in Nanjing – a project with great relevance to both Maoist China 
and the KMT regime on Taiwan. The Nanjing project is the first concerted effort 
at planning a new city, a new urban form, as well as a new ideal citizen to 
populate it. Musgrove (2000), Cody (2001) and Lipkin (2006) all deal with 
different aspects of the “high-modernist” project of national renovation in the 
urban context. The city became the focus of this social engineering effort, the 
comprehensive plan its hallmark. The state, while in effect weak and unable to 
support this gargantuan task financially, had a very clear idea of what the new 
Chinese city would look like, what kind of people would inhabit it and how 
power relations in society would be visible in physical space. Thus, foreign 
trees were imported, slums cleared, rickshaw drivers harassed and 
monuments to new found national fervour commissioned - the implications for 
codifying a language of modern urban space, where symbols of the ‘global 
city’ have become measuring sticks of success, are of course considerable. In 
this way we see how the abstract space of an ideology that dictated a drive 
towards ‘modernity’ was made very material by the actions of those in power, 
many of which were schooled in the West, or relied on Western architects and 
planners such as Henry K. Murphy (Cody, 2001). 
 
Considerable parts of this modernizing zeal were inherited by the KMT’s 
Communist nemesis and thus carried on into the era of the People’s Republic. 
Other parts and forms were carried over with less thought or little agency. Yeh 
(Yeh, 1997) for example describes the republican origins of the danwei, the 
work unit which marked the urban landscape of Communist China so 
profoundly that its progeny still constitute one of the main actors in processes 
of urban redevelopment today, be it as the “socialist land masters” as Hsing 
(2010) would call them, or simply as a template for life behind walls and gates, 
still an important element of Chinese urban form (Lu, 2006; Huang and Low, 
2008). In many ways however, the Maoist urban regime was far closer to 
traditional Chinese urban forms than its authors may have intended. Essentially 
‘anti-urban’, it was designed not only to limit urban growth and consumption to 
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fund an increase in production instead, but favoured a disjointed, segmented 
space, which made the city feel less urban (Lu, 2006). The vertical integration 
through the work unit, rather than a horizontal provision of services (with the 
exception of work units which were too small to provide all services such as 
schools and hospitals), coupled with a lack of urban growth meant many 
Chinese cities remained almost unchanged; Beijing in the 1950s and 1960s 
differed far less from its imperial past than it does today, with life still going on 
behind walls, in compounds and self-sufficient work units and only imperial 
towers piercing the flat urban landscape. 
 
On Taiwan meanwhile, the Nationalists’ ambitions stunted by their ignominious 
defeat during the civil war, grand projects were abandoned in favour of smaller 
ones, many based on the garden city movement originating from the UK. While 
some success was achieved by planners and builders in the countryside (most 
notably at Jhong-Sing New Village, cf. (Wang and Heath, 2008; 2010)), the 
application of Garden City ideals such as low-rise buildings and wide 
pavements were mainly ignored in rapidly growing urban areas such as 
Yonghe, demonstrating how the ambitions of the KMT planning regime were 
tempered by its inability to impose regulations effectively. Nevertheless, 
Taiwan in many ways changed from a model colony of Japan to a model 
province of an exiled Chinese government, with many traditionalist and hybrid 
forms of architecture introduced by the KMT during the martial law period: the 
chinoiserie of the curved roofs and bright reds reminiscent of the Imperial 
Palace replaced the modernist forms of Nanjing’s capital building project. 
Unable to impose its urban vision in the face of rapid urbanization, the 
normative elements found their expression especially in the construction of 
landmark buildings such as Martyrs’ Tombs, government buildings, museums, 
even the re-building of original structures such as Taipei’s city gates. The 
search for a suitable identity became one of the main concerns of urban 
planning and remains to this day a crucial question confronting Taiwan; in 
some ways, most of the cases examined in Chapters Three, Four, and Five fall 
under the rubric of this questioning of identity. 
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China’s urban landscape in the reform era 
Since the 1978 reforms were instigated, the city and the process of 
urbanization have been at the centre of China’s developmental path. Starting 
with Special Economic Zones, an increasing autonomy of municipal authorities 
and the ensuing opening-up of China’s coastal cities to foreign investment and 
influence, we can trace a legacy of government policy aimed at strengthening 
the urban at the expense of the rural (though this does not apply to peri-urban 
land, which has largely benefitted, economically, from urban expansion), and 
one which has created a clearly stratified structure of space ranging from first-
tier, coastal cities (and Beijing), to the metropoli of the interior and down 
through to frontier cities and smaller towns (Chen, 2006). 
 
What remains a more contentious question is how this process, once its 
general direction was formalised in policy terms, progressed from that point 
onwards. Certainly, the retreat of the state from successive areas of policy 
implementation cannot be ignored and it has indeed become one of the most 
commonly used approaches for the examination of urban China, but it cannot 
in itself be sufficient. When asking what drives urban development, one must 
confront the question of whether this is a gradual and harmonious process, or 
whether it is in fact driven by conflict and tension. Most of the literature 
mentioned below implies the presence of conflict; indeed some authors have 
come down square on the side of what Abramson (2007) would call a 
dialectical mode of development, one in which constant conflicts propel the 
process of development. This approach neatly ties in with and examination of 
the conflicts to control the most fundamental resource of urban China, land. An 
opposing, gradualist understanding of China’s urban development tends to re-
evaluate conflict as ‘trial and error’, in which old and new institutions coexist to 
create a reform without losers (Zhu, 2005). Tempting as it may be to side with 
the parsimony of this view, the proliferation of case studies and research on 
conflict over urban space makes is a somewhat problematic notion. 
 
Ultimately, any inquiry into the production of urban space in China must deal 
with the changes in state control and provision of urban land, which can be 
understood as a retreat of central state control, a devolvement of power to the 
local level, as well as the introduction of the market as a mechanism for the 
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distribution of resources. Oi (1992) for example introduces the concept of ‘local 
state corporatism’, suggesting a weakening of central planning powers in 
favour of entrepreneurial local state actors. Although Oi was not concerned 
with how the local state is vertically incorporated vis-à-vis the central state and 
national developmental objectives, the idea of the municipal government as a 
(the?) land entrepreneur suggests a retreat of central state control over the 
particulars of urban development while simultaneously retaining control over 
the overall national developmental goal and the mechanisms governing its 
achievement. The notion of the local state as entrepreneur was further 
developed by Walder (1995), emphasising the role of local officialdom as 
agents of economic development. Municipal governments, as instigators of 
growth, landlords and agents of the central state (in terms of the broad 
developmental agenda) are thus in a strong position to remodel urban space 
according to their own terms and needs. This includes lucrative land lease 
deals, which incentivise municipal authorities toward certain types of 
development, an idea developed by Gaubatz (1999, 2005) in her work on 
central business districts. To a large extent, her work finds echoes in the work 
on Beijing’s creative spaces, which similarly examine the local state’s 
incentives to engage in creative strategies and the promotion of culture-led 
redevelopment. 
 
The role of the local state is further elaborated by Fulong Wu, underlining the 
reinvention or consolidation of local-level institutions such as municipal and 
ward-level administration or even Residents’ Committees, which serve both as 
buffers to absorb transitional shock, as well as important agents of 
development in their own right (Wu, 2002). The section on Caochangdi Village 
in Chapter Six neatly ties into these findings, showing how the local village 
authority has adopted the ‘artist village’ as its own project, resulting in a 
significant expansion of the village’s creative space. Institutions such as these 
have entered into purely commercial transactions with both foreign and 
domestic business interests, which leads Wu (2002) to believe that they are the 
instrumental in the process of land commodification; unable to extract taxes in 
efficient ways, the local state is forced to enter the real estate market, where its 
interests are aligned with those of developers and not necessarily those of city 
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residents, a state of affairs which has received both academic (Wank, 1999; 
Broudehoux, 2004; Huang, 2004; Friedmann, 2005) and media attention. 
 
Hsing (2010) takes a similar approach to Wu’s in looking at local government 
actors, underlining the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or ‘socialist 
land-masters’, as he calls them. Hsing sees the process of land 
commodification very much as one guided by central state legislation, but 
ultimately formed by the competition between municipal governments and 
non-municipal state actors such as SOEs, universities and other urban 
‘landowners’. In contrast to the ‘growth coalitions’ of the Western world (Logan 
and Molotch, 1987), urban development in China is characterised by 
competition between different state actors, all of which enter onto the land 
market. To gain an upper hand in their battle for control over lucrative city 
space, municipalities use strategies such as redevelopment of dilapidated 
areas, securing legal authority over land transfers or adopting what Hsing calls 
either a ‘city rational’ or ‘city modern’ strategy to legitimise their efforts, 
bringing into the fore the more abstract plain of the city (Hsing, 2010: 38-42). 
The present research suggest that ‘city creative’ narratives could be the latest 
in a string of precisely such strategies, presenting new ways of extracting 
surplus value from the urban space under their control – especially in 
conditions where wholesale redevelopment is impossible due to objective 
constraints such as heritage protection, which has in recent years become 
more of an ‘obstacle’ it was in the first reform decades. 
 
What then is the role of the central state, how far has its influence been 
removed? While it may be true that during the first half of the reform decades, 
the central state effectively underwent an organised retreat from urban 
development and the creation of land markets, the permanency of this situation 
has since been called into question. Xu and Yeh (2009) in particular stand out 
in pointing out that while the state relinquished control in many policy areas, 
the ascent of local government has not been without a reaction, a reassertion 
in which the state has been re-centralising regulatory authority and intervening 
in the overheated land and property market by constraining demand and 
supply, by targeting and guiding FDI towards specific regions, and directly 
promoting development with ‘enclaves’ such as university or environmental 
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towns. Further research into the developing relationship between various strata 
of the Chinese state is no doubt required to assess whether the central state 
remains absent, repositions itself of re-enters the city. As far as the case of 
creative space is concerned, this research has tried to explore the relationship 
between various state actors and professional networks, and compare those 
with the experience of Taiwan. In this, a focus on state capacity - understood 
from both sides of the state-society ledger - has been useful in making sense 
of how and why similar policies are adopted, and how and why they result in a 
variety of different creative spaces and arrangements. In many ways, the 
research question deals with a facet of a globalizing discourse transmitted by 
epistemic networks, though with the added factor of the state as the ultimate 
arbiter. 
 
Globalization 
The power struggle between local and central government may determine the 
power relations inside Chinese cities and even conditions the urban form of the 
cities, yet the developmental teleology which is thus implied cannot fully be 
understood without considering the effect of what can best be termed 
‘globalization’, as well as the way in which the market economy influences and 
produces urban space in its most general meaning. The fundamental question 
concerning globalization is whether it is some extraneous influence, or whether 
it is an influence only by the grace of domestic actors open to it; as Gilley 
argues, ‘…central state leaders were already predisposed towards openness.’ 
(Gilley, 2011: 524). His argument leaves plentiful room for re-interpretation; 
while the trauma of the Cultural Revolution might be one explanation for the 
reformist leadership’s experiments, each pushing them in a spiral of trial-and-
error further towards globalised, market-led capitalism, the cultural, idea-side 
of a globalised urban world should not be discounted either. As Louisa Schein 
(2001) reports from her own fieldwork with the Miao in 1993, the ‘urban’ is not 
simply the physical world of the city; rather, it act as a locus of consumption, a 
coded language which imbibes objects with ‘elite distinction’. Thus, a western-
style cake eaten in the backwaters of Guizhou becomes a symbol of urban life, 
stark against the visual code of rurality and underdevelopment. This ‘cake 
effect’ is of course less visible in the modern Chinese city, but it exists 
nonetheless, and on a greater, more diffused scale. Similar implications 
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attesting to the symbolic and real value of the city are found in the work of 
Gaubatz (2005) and Gandelsonas (2002); the city in China has become the 
processing centre for globality in a visual and commoditised sense, 
transforming infrastructural projects into a quantifiable measure of success, as 
attested by Rudolph and Lu (2008) in their interviews with prominent 
Shanghainese. Morley (2009) defines the effect of globalization as an 
architectural articulation of modernity, a conscious mimicry of cities like Hong 
Kong and its vertiginous skyline that is perhaps better explored through 
approaches stemming from organizational theory such as mimetic 
isomorphism. Urban forms are converging not only visually (this is a symptom 
of sorts), but it is the producers of urban space who are increasingly dancing to 
the same tune, using the same jargon, and who form an epistemic community, 
not only of planners and professionals, but of commercial developers too. 
 
What is striking about this process is its perceived universality in late 
developing countries; the homogenisation of space through mass produced 
infrastructure projects has previously altered both Japanese, South Korean and 
Taiwanese urban landscapes, with a similar clamour of approval from local and 
central officials, the media and the business community (Sorensen, 2002; Jou, 
2005). It is of course not surprising that the process of globalization and its 
effect on space is not unique to China; what is of discursive interest rather is 
the way in which this ‘globality’ is adapted and used in China and Taiwan, how 
meanings shift with developing economies of aspiration and consumption, 
whether they retain their original connotations or whether they are mere shells, 
filled with a substance of wholly local provenance. This question is to a large 
extent reflected in academic debate surrounding globalization; while early 
proponents such as Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (1991) introduced terms 
such as ‘global city’, explaining the way in which flows of capital, information, 
goods and labour are channelled through nodes (i.e. global cities), this 
research takes particular note of work emphasizing the importance of local 
factors which may be overlooked by a neat system such as Sassen’s; Fujita’s 
(2003) work on Tokyo’s experience as a continued centre of manufacturing, or 
Chu’s (2008) perspective on Hong Kong’s changing configuration as ‘global 
city’ have shown the inadequacy of looking solely at a city’s functions in global 
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system of capital accumulation and the need to consider both state and indeed 
the sub-municipal levels as a fluid, open space of political action. 
 
Although arguments in favour of understanding the Chinese urban 
transformation through a state-focused lens continue to be persuasive, 
perhaps it is the theory of state which needs updating, examining the state not 
as a monolith of singular resolve, but rather a bloc of loose ideological and 
economic tendencies towards a ‘strong China’, a ‘stable and harmonious 
society’ etc. This research hopes to contribute precisely to such an 
understanding of state-society relations, albeit in the limited and specialised 
world of art and the creative economy. The variations in creative city strategies, 
which itself form a part of a globalised discourse on the urban economy with 
clear normative implications (with creativity, individuality, openness, tolerance 
given economic value in opposition to old industries, conformity, uniformity 
understood as economic hindrances), can largely be understood as the 
function of the state’s capacity to integrate or transform this discourse, i.e. the 
translation that takes place. While the succeeding chapters on case studies in 
Taiwan and China interrogate the state’s ability to control the production of 
creative spaces, one theme visible throughout is the need to understand the 
state through the examination of those affected by it and dealing with it, lest 
we assume the state to be impervious to outside influence. This research 
maintains that while the state in both China and Taiwan remains the key actor 
in producing, adopting and adapting globalised discourses such as the one on 
creativity, this autonomy of the state does not preclude its ‘socialization’, 
especially in the case of Taiwan. 
 
Taiwan, model developer? 
While most histories of Taiwan R.O.C. begin in 1949 with the final evacuation 
of the Nationalist government from the mainland, Taiwan was in many ways a 
model colony before it became a model developmental state. While the 
Japanese planners focused mainly on creating a modern agricultural sector, 
most of Taiwan’s cities also received their first comprehensive plans and 
planning regulation in the same period. More importantly, Taiwan was a 
planning laboratory for the nascent colonial power, showcasing Japanese 
expertise and rational, ‘modern’ planning at its peak (Bristow, 2010). 
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The destruction of much of Taiwan’s economy during WWII, as well as the 
uncertainty in which the newly installed rulers of Taiwan found themselves in, 
meant that the priority for the Guomindang was survival, something which 
would often depend on luck and circumstance, as well as farsighted policy. 
One of the latter is certainly land reform from 1949 onwards, which ensured a 
more equitable distribution of assets (itself an important pre-condition for the 
so-called East Asian model of development), weakened landed opposition to 
the regime and also eased migrationary pressures on Taiwanese cities; while 
their growth was marked throughout the post-war period, the pattern of 
migration was dispersed among mid-size and larger cities and towns and the 
workforce absorbed in local industrial developments (Speare, 1974). The 
developmental model that eventually launched Taiwan into an economic boom 
has been the subject of much academic discussion and study (most notably 
Johnson, 1982; Kuznets, 1988; Lin 1988) and can be best described as a state-
led development project which relies heavily on close contacts with industry 
leaders, as well as the approval of the working classes, which is achieved by 
rapid real increases in wages without major increases in income distribution 
inequality. In terms of the comparative perspective of the Taiwanese model vis-
à-vis Korea or China, it differs from the Korean by the absence of large, family-
run conglomerates (a point it shares with China’s experience), while differing 
from the Chinese in the social equity of its developmental phase (Bourguignon 
et al., 2001). 
 
In terms of the physical space that this project of development produces, its 
central characteristic is an intense industrialization resulting in Taiwan 
becoming the country with the highest density of factories, as well as the 
highest energy consumption density (Hua, 2010: 56). Additionally, as this 
industrial capacity is dispersed across the island, the entire eastern lowlands 
have been subjected to intensive development, urbanization, environmental 
degradation and rising land values. The dispersal of industrial capacity and 
urbanization patterns over the island is one point of Taiwan’s developmental 
model which illustrates well the potential for comparison with present-day 
mainland China, where in-situ urbanization and the creation of small to medium 
enterprises has also left a mark on the vast swathes of the countryside, just as 
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it did in Taiwan. In villages as in the cities, fast economic development of the 
kind which Taiwan, Japan and now China have been experiencing comes of 
course at a considerable environmental cost, both in terms of degradation of 
natural habitats, as well as the destruction of cultural heritage and the creation 
of a sub-standard built environment in which considerations for aesthetics or 
humanist values are not part of the equation. 
 
A further point of comparison can be found in that both China and Taiwan, 
though passing through different economic systems, have maintained a 
curious kinship when it comes to questions of national narratives; the Republic 
of China on Taiwan remained a paternalistic and (at least on paper) radical 
state of Sun Yatsen’s design. Development on both sides of the Strait was not 
merely economic development for its own sake, but an exercise in rebuilding 
the Chinese nation or building a Taiwanese one – this influenced urban space 
in a number of ways, perhaps most obviously in an aesthetic sense (Kuo, 
2010). In spite of this, practical concerns guided daily political action, which 
include the necessity to maintain a network of clietelistic relations in Taiwan’s 
case, or the necessity to maintain social stability in the face of glaring 
inequality in China’s. Thus, we find in Taiwan a curious combination of radical 
distributionist policies such as land-to-the-tiller (which simultaneously 
weakened large landholders opposing the regime) on one hand, and on the 
other the laissez-faire attitudes towards the provision of urban housing, which 
has been highly commodified as a result (La Grange et al., 2006). 
 
The last point also touches upon a crucial shift in Taiwanese urban space 
towards a ‘neoliberal’ order; while the role of the state has famously been 
crucial in fostering the economic development of Taiwan, the accumulation of 
public debt in the 1980s, coupled with increased demands for democratization, 
meant that the retreat of the state from the production and control of urban 
space had begun in earnest. Additionally, due to the rising popularity of 
opposition movements, Taiwan was in a position where liberalizing reforms and 
deregulation were seen as a part of the process of democratization: as such, 
they were embraced by the opposition, but also pre-emptively adopted by the 
ruling Guomindang (Chen, 2005: 100-101), in a situation not dissimilar to the 
experience of Eastern Europe and China, where the ruling elite embraced 
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deeper economic liberalization as a fix to the crisis of the 1980s. In terms of 
what consequences this had on the physical space of Taiwanese cities, we 
must first emphasise that the deregulation of planning, coupled with a 
relaxation of the housing market and the sale of large tracts of state-owned 
land in urban centres almost immediately triggered a construction boom. 
Secondly, the increasing partnership between developers and the state, as well 
as the demographic change in urban centres meant a trajectory of urban 
redevelopment that served primarily the middle- to upper-income households – 
another point of comparison with China. Such an urban space released the 
potential value of land benefitting the developers and local politicians, but it 
also brought political dividends to local and national politicians, especially 
since the Taipei Mayor’s office has become somewhat of a stepping-stone 
towards national leadership. In practical terms, the coalition of developers, 
politicians and the middle classes found its expression also in city 
beautification programmes, such as the construction of parks in city centres to 
replace degraded housing, known as the ‘green bulldozer’ (lǜsè tuītǔjī) (Huang, 
2012). As neighbourhoods such as Taipei’s Yongkang Alley were developed, 
nearby slums and squatter housing were being cleared in an effort to produce 
a city of order, efficiency and cleanliness (Chen, 2005: 112). The same spirit 
marks two instances of culture-creative redevelopment analysed in Chapter 
Three and Five, namely Taipei’s Treasure Hill and Kaohsiung’s Gongyuan 
Road, as well as Beijing’s hutong redevelopment initiatives explored in Chapter 
Seven, indicating the deployment of notions of culture and creativity must be 
examined from a critical perspective which takes into account tensions along 
class lines. 
 
The creative spaces being constructed and planned constitute but one facet of 
urban development, yet are subject to the same power relations and 
developmental trajectories shaping urban space in general. The participation of 
the local state as an entrepreneurial entity in China for example stands as a 
principal example of the need to understand creative space production within 
the context of urban development. Similarly, the normative spaces-making of 
Kaohsiung’s municipal creative spaces may be analysed through Taiwan’s 
precarious status and the quest for its identity, but may equally be better 
understood given the long legacy of normative space-making of the Republic 
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of China, from Nanjing to Jhong-Sing New Village and the palatial Qing-
dynasty style of many of the country’s public edifices. What binds these 
disparate cases together to form a singe field of inquiry is above all the 
adoption of an organised, coherent set of beliefs regarding the economic value 
of creativity, culture and art, which this research terms as the ‘creative city 
discourse’. 
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2.4 The Creative City in Taiwan and China 
 
With the intention of comparing the operationalization of creative strategies in 
the cities of Taiwan and China, this chapter will begin by tying an enquiry of 
space with current debates on urban political economy, where the discourse of 
‘creativity’ has caused much ink to be spilt over the implications of 
commodifying culture in the context or urban (re)development. Creativity as a 
discourse of urban planning and politics is seen as a frame which allows the 
incorporation not only of marginal spaces, but also marginal practices and lives 
into a mainstream vision of urbanity, allowing the planning and political 
authority to bridge the gap between the statist, managerial conception of the 
urban and the small, ‘organic’ and putatively autonomous city it wishes to 
control. Simultaneously, the policies of supporting creativity can be seen as a 
consequence of an economic shift to a post-Fordist mode of production. 
Harvey (1989) in particular introduces the concept of the ‘cultural fix’ to analyse 
why ‘culture’ had become a major concern in urban development, and what 
this in turn says about the current phase of capitalism. It is certainly no 
coincidence that the discourse on creativity emerged out of a shift in the mode 
of production, i.e. an entry into a post-Fordist capitalism. It is also not unlikely 
that as a transformation towards rentier capitalism takes place, the practice of 
creativity will flourish, considering it is an economic activity producing new 
intellectual property as the bedrock of a rentier economy. Within this broad 
context, both Taiwan and China have clear developmental goals aimed at 
increasing their capacity to produce cultural goods and the discourse on 
creativity has been eagerly taken up by both countries. 
 
Additionally, it has been observed in all three cases that a very small number of 
works dominate the official understanding of creativity in the city, namely 
Richard Florida’s work on the creative class (Florida, 2002), as well as Charles 
Landry’s work on creative cities, originally co-authored with Bianchini for the 
Demos think-tank (Landry and Bianchini, 1995). As well as having become by-
words for creative city discourse, both authors have engaged in lucrative 
consulting, with Landry even having been commissioned by Taipei to provide 
recommendations on what creative strategies the city should take up (see 
Chapter Four). While their ideas, summarised as a belief that culture and 
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creativity can bring about economic success, have gained currency in the 
policy-making world, quite the opposite is true for the academic one; Florida in 
particular has been the target of harsh criticism. While Landry has limited 
himself to more general observations about bureaucracy, platform-work in 
urban policy and the importance of horizontal connections, Florida’s work is 
predicated on an altogether wider assumption – that of the ‘creative class’. 
This class, composed of a series of professions ranging from finance to design, 
management to painting, is said to be the driver of economic growth and the 
‘dominant class in society’ (Florida, 2002: ix). Florida’s recommendations to 
cities wishing to court this new ‘class’ are based on the needs of the 
‘creatives’, which Florida, aware of policy-makers’ fondness for 
acronymization, calls the ‘Three Ts’ – technology, talent and tolerance. 
Perhaps not altogether surprisingly, the sweeping approach of Florida’s 
creative class has found clearer expression in China’s own ‘creative city’ 
expert, Li Wuwei, who advocates China’s ascension towards a ‘creative 
society’; while eager to criticise the current obsession with GDP, what Li 
proposes instead is a creative society based on a new lifestyle which, 
confusing cause and effect, he says will rise from creative industry: ‘Creative 
clusters are the physical carriers of the creative industries. Their unique form of 
industry clustering and spatial layout has given rise to new lifestyles, such as 
loft living and the bohemian settlements of SOHO.’ (Li, 2011: 121). Much like 
Florida, Li is guided with a preoccupation towards a supply-side economics of 
creativity which chimes well with the ‘build it and they will come’ approach to 
urban development characteristic of many large projects. Some of these may 
languish in apparent abandon (as the highly publicised cases of China’s ‘Ghost 
Cities’ illustrates), but in economically dynamic cities like Shanghai, large 
cultural-creative developments are beginning to be a new favoured ‘flagship’ 
development, just as skyscrapers were in previous decades (Zheng, 2011). 
 
Florida’s brave assumptions about how ‘creatives’ deliver growth have been 
among the most harshly criticised aspects of his work; Marcuse (2003) points 
out the causal mechanisms are not specified, relying instead on assumed 
correlations. Others have attempted to verify these assumptions and provide 
the necessary empirical data; Markusen and Schrock (2006) have thus 
attempted to define ‘the artistic dividend’, though their findings suggest only 
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limited links between artistic strength and recent growth rates (Markusen and 
Schrock, 2006: 1682). Rather than challenge Florida on methodological 
grounds, this research treats his work not as a competing academic argument 
that requires debunking, but rather a symptom of a much deeper shift in the 
relationship between artistic production, the market, and urban space. As 
such, Florida’s work and fame can be better understood as a consequence of 
a change in the mode of production, rather than a genuinely transformative 
idea. Even the term ‘creative class’, with its normative evocation of tolerance 
and individual entrepreneurship, the apparent lack of rootedness causing 
creative workers to leave town if it does not live up to their expectations, is 
reminiscent more of Calhoun’s use of the term cosmopolitan as a ‘class 
consciousness of frequent travellers’ (Calhoun, 2002). 
 
While Florida’s work has been thoroughly examined in the case of the USA, 
where his consultancy is also most active, this research suggests a look at 
Asian cases provides a useful perspective from which to evaluate the 
emergence of the creative (class/city) discourse as a function of a late-
capitalist mode of production, as already outlined by Harvey (1989). It is 
particularly the transformation of Florida’s thought that is most illustrative, as 
the last of his ‘Ts’ – tolerance – is sometimes omitted by socially conservative 
governments unsure of why and how legalizing gay marriage or working 
against racial or religious prejudices could benefit their urban economies, 
though Pang suggests Singapore has been moving in an opposite, and equally 
oversimplified, direction, ‘on the assumption that gayness equals creative 
talent’ (Pang, 2012: 60). More than any other feature however, the case cities 
all share the belief that the fostering of creativity is a relatively inexpensive yet 
efficient way to increase their competitiveness, or in the case of Kaohsiung, to 
actually enter the competition in the first place. From this perspective, it has 
been necessary to examine how the idea of creativity, of creative cities has 
been implemented, when it has been deployed and how the different actors 
involved in the processes of producing creative spaces have accepted it. 
 
If Florida presents the supply-side of creative strategies, both Taiwan and 
China have no lack of demand-oriented initiatives, which aim to upgrade 
existing industrial chains with a qualitative shift towards more value-added 
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industrial production. Particularly on the national level, such an interpretation of 
creative city discourse has found its way into various national development 
plans. In Taiwan for example, the 2002 ‘Challenge 2008’ plan lists ten major 
themes, six of which can be associated with the expected 
benefits/requirements of adopting a creative development strategy: cultivating 
‘e-talent’, developing cultural creative industry, setting up bases for innovation, 
doubling tourist numbers and developing a ‘digital Taiwan’ (Executive Yuan, 
2002). Chinese five-year plans (FYP) have similarly begun emphasising the 
importance of ‘cultural exports’, as is the case with the 12th national FYP, 
whereas municipal FYP go a step further in emphasising the importance of 
cultural and creative output for economic development (Beijing Municipality, 
2011). One over-arching trend in the inclusion of creative and cultural 
economic development is certainly the belief that creative strategies can move 
the city (or country) up the value-added chain and increase its 
competitiveness. In smaller cities, this trend is particularly visible, as 
Kaohsiung’s efforts to put itself ‘on the map’ clearly illustrate. 
 
Lastly, the present research may be reproached for suffering from a case 
selection biased towards marginal or socially vulnerable spaces, which in turn 
over-emphasises the potential detrimental effects of creative city strategies. 
However, the focus on the use of creativity in the integration of marginal 
spaces faithfully represents the frequency with which these spaces are 
represented. Defunct industrial objects, illegal housing, dilapidated historical 
neighbourhoods all present sites where a significant ‘rent gap’ exists that can 
be exploited through redevelopment. The ‘rent gap’ theory, first introduced by 
Neil Smith in 1979, rests upon a distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ 
rent of a given area, explaining why poor neighbourhoods are also sites of 
rapid gentrification and redevelopment (Smith, 1979). Although the theory has 
received both criticism (most notably (Bourassa, 1993) and subsequent 
updating (Clark, 1995), the basic process at work has been observed at least 
since Engels wrote his treatise on the housing question, in which he observes 
how ‘…growth of the big modern cities gives the land in certain areas, 
particularly in those which are centrally situated, an artificial and often 
colossally increasing value; the buildings erected on these areas depress this 
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value, instead of increasing it, because they no longer correspond to the 
changed circumstances.’ (Engels, 1935: 23). 
 
While the rent gap theory can thus provide a political economic explanation for 
redevelopment in general, where it really provides added explanatory power is 
in its ability to incorporate symbolic value in the calculation. Only in this way 
can we then explain why Taipei city decided to redevelop Treasure Hill rather 
than raze it, why Kaohsiung is investing large amount of public money into 
abandoned warehouses, or why a project to upgrade deteriorating hutongs in 
Beijing could attract the interest of the local government. The appearance of a 
discourse of creativity enables a re-use of such spaces rather than their 
wholesale demolition, making seemingly less profitable investments attractive 
due to the value added by the cultural capital of the area. It is noteworthy that 
this capital need not be monetised, indeed this accounts for the variety of ways 
in which marginal space is being integrated across the selected case cities. In 
Taipei for example, the case of Treasure Hill shows the perceived benefit/profit 
was found in satisfying a need for memorializing or re-inventing common urban 
heritage; conversely, the hutong upgrading projects combine an external (and 
sometimes not entirely faithful) acknowledgment of historical value with the 
return on the profits of investors such as SOHO China, which has recently 
redeveloped a large tract of land in central Beijing. It is from this perspective 
that the examination of creative city discourse in urban redevelopment projects 
in Taiwan and China can produce the greatest contribution to the study of 
urban (re)development in general, as well as by nuancing the rent gap theory 
by emphasizing the commodified yet non-monetary value of the research 
locations, all of which are important distinctions contributing towards a more 
accurate typology of creative spaces in the two countries.  
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2.5 A typology of creative spaces in Taiwan and China 
 
The typology developed in the chapter was not one planned from the outset of 
the research; nor was it a clear goal towards which the research led. Rather, 
the categorization into three types, three approaches of how creative city 
strategies are utilised in urban redevelopment arose quite organically from the 
fieldwork, first as a aid to the analysis of the data, later as a finding in its own 
right. As a heuristic device, it is not intended to act as a definitive, replicable 
rule that could be applied to any city with the view to categorise it, yet the 
broad arrangements of coalitions governing the use of creativity do have some 
explanatory value that can be applied to other cases. The presence of a strong 
integrating state in Singapore for example has produced not only similar spatial 
configurations, but has also spawned similar public discussion on the values of 
preservation versus museumification and discussion on the perils of 
commercialization, all against the backdrop of a debate on identity (cf. 
Henderson, 2001; Ooi, 2011; Boontharm, 2012). In Beijing, the template for 
creative redevelopment seems to correspond closer to New York, seen in the 
proliferation of the word ‘SOHO’ (sic) both in policy circles, public discourse, as 
well as various marketing schemes. Kaohsiung on the other hand seems to be 
looking towards Bilbao as a model city, yet its ability to integrate more than 
only superficial lessons is under significant doubt. Ultimately, these 
comparisons are beyond the remit of this study and serve to suggest potential 
further research using a similar set of criteria against which to evaluate urban 
redevelopment schemes that rely or incorporate the notion of creativity, 
culture, or art. 
 
The typology is based on several themes and observations shared across the 
different research sites, as well as some categories that pertain to the research 
questions, such as those on style of governance, types of grassroots response, 
institutional frameworks deployed, as well as ways of integrating marginal 
space. Based on these criteria (examined in more detail below), it has been 
possible to carve out three broad approaches: the corporative approach of 
Taipei, the normative approach in Kaohsiung, and the entrepreneurial approach 
favoured in Beijing. It is however equally important to remember that the 
typology presents in effect a ‘snapshot’ of what is a dynamic and 
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unpredictable process of institution building and negotiation over what creative 
spaces in cities actually mean, or what their role should be vis-à-vis the state 
or various stakeholder groups. In this sense, the typology serves to underline 
some fault lines, along which the case cities can be separated; Taiwan and 
China are distinguishable by their style of governance, particularly in the 
(un)willingness to devolve power to groups outside immediate state control. 
That being said, the local state in Beijing has nevertheless arrived at similar 
methods of deploying targeted, small-scale creative redevelopment in its 
historic areas as Taipei, despite there being significant differences in the 
institutional and legal framework underpinning such work. 
 
Table 1 - Typology of approaches to creative space production 
 
 
 
Corporative Normative Entrepreneurial 
Representative 
city 
Taipei Kaohsiung Beijing 
Templates and 
role models 
Seoul, Singapore, 
Hong Kong 
Bilbao, Yokohama New York, London 
Style of 
governance 
Socialised state 
with capacity to 
incorporate non-
state practices into 
hybrid institutions 
Bureaucratic 
dirigiste state, 
engaging creative 
communities only 
as content creators 
Market-based, 
competitive and 
disaggregated state 
with sporadic central 
state interventions 
Grassroots-
level practice 
Professionalised, 
financially 
dependent, socially 
engaged 
Dispersed, 
financially 
dependent 
Entrepreneurial, 
financially 
autonomous, 
politically muted 
Institutions of 
creative space 
production 
Hybrid institutions, 
quasi-NGOs, 
professional 
associations, 
corporate 
foundations 
Integrated directly 
into municipality 
 
Small independent 
associations 
Joint ventures 
involving municipal 
holding companies, 
SOEs; village 
corporations, small 
independent NGOs 
and enterprises 
Processes of 
marginal 
space 
integration 
Museumification 
 
Institutionalised 
regeneration 
strategies 
 
‘Platform’-based 
regeneration 
 
‘Green Bulldozer’ 
 
Deproletarization, 
Historicization 
 
Normative 
community-building 
 
‘Green Bulldozer’ 
Gentrification 
 
‘Platform’-based 
regeneration 
 
Large-scale 
redevelopment 
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Style of governance 
Although governance theories normally define ‘governance’ as patterns of rule 
in general, recent focus has been directed mainly at so-called ‘new 
governance’, which refers specifically to the changing role and scope of state 
activity considering the greater involvement of non-state actors such as 
corporations following neo-liberal reforms from the 1980s onwards (Bevir, 
2007: 25). While touching on issues of neoliberal governance and the reforms 
associated with it (indeed the creative city discourse is to a large extent a 
product of this shift), the inquiry on governance in this research is largely in 
service of constructing a comparative analysis of the different ways in which 
creativity strategies have been incorporated in three selected case cities. Being 
as they are on two different sides of the Taiwan Straits, the cities have much in 
common in terms of their cultural background and broad geo-economic 
location, yet the vast difference between the nominally authoritarian mainland 
and the democratic island of Taiwan has meant a comparison of formally 
equivalent institutions would not have resulted in necessarily comparable data. 
The style of governance thus includes ways in which the state organises the 
managerial side of creative spaces: who controls day to day activities, where 
the funding comes from, what role is given to spatial professionals such as 
architects, planners, engaged artists etc. As the empirical chapters show, this 
style varies greatly even in Taiwan itself, where Taipei is characterised by a 
socialised state, i.e. one which is able to accommodate and integrate societal 
pressure and input, and as such possesses the tools of governance necessary 
to create hybrid institutions such as Urban Regenerations Stations examined in 
Chapter Three; in contrast, Kaohsiung’s city government maintains a hold on 
its nascent creative spaces, as well as using normative narratives to encourage 
citizen ‘edification’ and promote the value of creativity among the people. 
Beijing presents a radically different situation; while the Chinese state is often 
seen as strong, overbearing, and authoritarian, the case of creative space 
production is characterised by the presence of disaggregated state actors in 
competition with each other, and with non-state actors. The data for this level 
of analysis was gathered mainly through interviews with creative space 
managers and officials, the analysis of city publications (both professional and 
those aimed at the public), as well as an examination of relevant regulations, 
plans and other representations of space. 
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Grassroots-level practice 
Facing the state we find a group of actors loosely identified as being producers 
of creative spaces, as well as having the distinction of falling into the category 
of cultural workers, creative workers, or some other hybrid designation. In this 
research, no one overarching term the like of Florida’s ‘creative class’ is used; 
instead, these spatial practitioners are sometimes synonymous with groups of 
artists, architects, urban planners, academics: depending on the case in 
question. What they have in common however is that they are overwhelmingly 
the target ‘users’ of creative spaces. The data collection method in this case 
was based on interviews, participant observation and some discourse analysis, 
providing important insights into especially the different ways in which these 
groups deal with the influence of the state; in both Taiwanese cases, the higher 
interpenetration, as well as financial dependence on the state, means avoiding 
or ignoring the state is an option only for corporate foundations (such as the 
JUT Foundation for Arts and Architecture, see Chapter Four). Interestingly 
though, the case of Taipei underlines the importance not of financial, but 
professional autonomy. A comparison with Beijing then provides insight into 
how the ability of these groups to circumvent the state, as well as their ability 
to usefully interact with it, may be a crucial factor in the resulting spatial 
configurations. Whereas a financially autonomous, yet not always 
professionally autonomous artist elite has been adept at avoiding the state and 
building own creative spaces in Beijing, these have not enjoyed the same level 
of legitimacy and protection as their counterparts in Taipei, where financially 
dependent groups are nevertheless adept at pressuring, persuading, or guiding 
the state by virtue of their access to the state’s planning and decision-making 
mechanisms. 
 
Institutions of creative space production 
In many ways, this level of analysis is the result of a dialectical process of 
negotiation between the aforementioned two levels; the institutions in this case 
being understood as ‘agreed upon ways of doing things’, they speak to the 
ability of both state and non-state actors to exert power and influence on each 
other, as well as the ability to circumvent this influence if necessary. Thus, the 
 57 
negotiation between the integrating, socialised state in Taipei’s case, and a 
professionally well-organised yet financially dependent community of spatial 
professionals and artists, resulted in a corporative arrangement, where new 
hybrid institutions were created, providing stable funding and positions to the 
various creative groups which the city was eager to include. The municipality 
was able to steer these projects to a far greater extent than Chaoyang District 
is for example able to influence the creative spaces of Caochangdi (Chapter 
Seven). Kaohsiung is on the other hand characterised by a more dirigiste 
approach by the municipality, which created institutions of creative space 
production and management directly under its control (Chapter Five). 
Institutions such as Pier-2 Art Center operate as redevelopment agencies, 
galleries, landlords, curators, and even as a local economic development 
agency attracting foreign investment. While the 798 Art Zone shares some of 
these traits (particularly as a landlord and local redevelopment agency), the 
normative undertones typical of Kaohsiung (for example in the selection of 
events, exhibitions, commissioning of public art) are not present, with the 
galleries, studios and other spaces judged merely by their ability to afford the 
rising rent.  
 
Integration of marginal spaces 
Apart from playing an increasingly prominent role as a method of increasing 
city competitiveness, creative city strategies have often been found alongside 
schemes to integrate marginal spaces into the urban fabric. Considering 
defunct industrial facilities, slums, squats, dilapidated housing often occupy 
premium land, claims on such desirable space often result in conflicting views 
regarding their (re)integration into the city’s mainstream. In such cases, 
creativity strategies can mitigate some of the resulting conflict, making them 
attractive policy choices for municipalities as well as activists, which can 
broadly be divided into three contexts. Firstly, creative redevelopment can 
reduce the perceived social or conservational cost and achieve a compromise 
regarding the re-use of the marginal space. Treasure Hill in Taipei and Dashilar 
in Beijing are both examples of marginal spaces where both state and societal 
actors adopted the creative and culture-led redevelopment, albeit not always 
producing the same conclusions. Secondly, as a palliative measure, such 
redevelopments are better able to mask otherwise unpopular or inequitable 
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projects. The razing of Gongyuan Road in Kaohsiung is a case in point, where 
the emphasis on the public art and the contextualization of the area as a 
creative neighbourhood were among key arguments presented by the 
municipality, obscuring somewhat the underlying ‘slum-clearing’ slant of the 
demolition that resulted in clear demographic change in the area. Lastly, 
creative redevelopment also allows for a more profitable redevelopment of 
protected areas where large, wholesale redevelopment is not otherwise 
possible. Both the URS (Urban Regeneration Station) projects on Taipei’s 
Dihua Street, as well as the Dashilar Platform in Beijing are examples of how an 
emphasis on creative space production (with its perceived preference for loft 
living, industrial or commercial architecture etc.) allows for new ways of 
incorporating historically protected yet financially untenable areas. 
 
Somewhat apart from these strategies are other associated processes, which 
may or may not be a planned or desired consequence of creative 
redevelopment, yet nevertheless warrant our attention. The question of 
‘gentrification’ is an especially interesting one due to its recurrence not only as 
a quantifiable economic process, but also as a lens through which the effects 
of creative strategies in redevelopment are understood by those involved. As 
such, the loaded term was emphatically used by activists working against the 
demolition of Treasure Hill in Taipei as an accusation of municipal plans to 
redevelop the illegal settlement; it was also often discussed by members and 
visitors at HomeShop in Beijing, with a special blog, the ‘Gentrification Disco’3, 
dedicated to the subject. While the applicability of the term may be in question 
(commercialization or museumification often describe the changes more 
accurately), the underlying changes that evoke its use are not. As the following 
empirical chapters show, the deployment of creative redevelopment on Asian 
cities is no less prone to causing radical demographic change in its wake. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
 
3 The various contributions to the blog, including the author’s, are accessible at 
http://www.homeshopbeijing.org/blog/?tag=gentrification.  
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Chapter Three: Making Municipal Practices 
of Creative Space in Taipei 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction: Developing tools of creative space 
production 
 
 
“A city’s vitality requires constant cultural and creative nourishing like running 
water. The height of modern skyscrapers, the level of economic development, 
as well as the city’s appearance may all age and wither with the years. But a 
city’s heart can only gain charm with the passage of time.” 
(Urban Regeneration Office, Taipei City Urban Development Department: 
Village Taipei, 2011: 4) 
 
The opening sentence of the 2010 issue of Village Taipei, the yearly publication 
of Taipei’s Urban Regeneration Office, sets the scene for the exploration of 
culture/creative-led urban redevelopment in Taipei over the past couple of 
decades. Moreover, for a government department closely involved in the 
construction of Taipei 101, now the world’s 2nd tallest building, the dismissal of 
such outward signs of progress may seem almost heretical. The position Taipei 
finds itself in is not special, nor are the solutions adopted, which is precisely 
the justification behind a comparative project examining creative space and 
urban regeneration across Taiwan and China. Cities all over the region and 
further afield are investing in a rebalancing of their economies and obtaining 
the edge which, so the received wisdom goes, may mean the difference 
between prosperity and Detroit. Unlike Abu Dhabi however, Taipei is not 
constructing another Louvre or Guggenheim, nor is it relying solely on the 
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mechanism of the market to bring about a post-industrial creative economy. 
Rather, Taipei’s creative spaces are being produced by a coalition of state and 
private actors not too dissimilar to the island’s developmental model, 
emphasising co-operation between state, labour and business, with a large 
share of small to medium enterprises setting it apart from contemporary 
developers such as South Korea. Indeed many of the creative spaces 
examined in this chapter also adhere to this formula, are modest in size and 
often came about from the necessity of cooperation between three sets of 
actors: the municipal state, civil society (mainly professionals such as 
architects, artists and academics), and the business sector, where a rise in 
corporate charitable activity and novel ways of brand-building meant the entry 
of many firms directly into the field of culture-led urban redevelopment. In 
answering the fundamental research question about the ways in which 
creativity is operationalised, how it is incorporated, marginalised or favoured in 
the field of urban redevelopment, Taipei presents what I call a corporative 
approach, which may have notional relation to the developmental state yet also 
has a clear provenance rooted in a process of negotiation between the actors 
mentioned above, within the mix of neoliberal and statist management in 
Taipei’s urban planning practice. 
 
Taipei presents in many ways the most comprehensive of the four case studies 
which has in broad terms followed naturally from the work in Kaohsiung, where 
Taipei’s lead has consistently been seen as a challenge and model, producing 
a somewhat related yet significantly more statist approach (see Chapter Five). 
With nearly 7 million inhabitants in the wider metropolitan area, Taipei may be 
smaller (though wealthier) than Seoul, Shanghai or Beijing, but in many ways 
these cities are seen as its main competitors in the region. Adding to this the 
ambiguous diplomatic status of Taiwan, the city as a political and economic 
unit plays a role in representing the whole island, while city to city links are also 
one of the few formal links the island nation can establish. This accounts for 
the eagerness of municipal officials for international cooperation, which was 
evident in many facets of the city’s creative space production that emerged 
during fieldwork. The research aimed to locate Taipei within the wider 
interrogative field of the why and how of ‘creative space’ in Greater China. This 
entailed the development of an analytical approach based on the interpretation 
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of the space between discourse and daily practice, where the institutions of 
creative space production are built: actors such as planners and architects, 
relevant municipal and national regulatory and planning bodies, corporate 
actors such as construction and real-estate companies, art foundations, 
professional associations, as well as various local, non-affiliated residents 
whose voices are increasingly being heard against the backdrop of rapid urban 
redevelopment. The result of this segment of research suggests that Taipei has 
developed a highly co-dependent, co-operative mode of spatial production - 
the corporative approach - where state, business and civil society actors are 
increasingly interchanging roles in the field of urban redevelopment, especially 
culture-creative solutions. It is argued therefore that this mode of spatial 
production is dependent upon an organised and socialised1 state, able to 
delegate and co-opt corporate and civil actors, nominating and delegating to 
them what is essentially understood as a developmental task of restructuring 
city space to better suit a post-industrial, regionally competitive environment. 
Equally however, the state is often unable to provide the content and 
professional links necessary for the success of nascent industries such as 
design, underlining the need for the inclusion of non-state actors in the 
process; the chapter argues the ability and willingness to integrate non-state 
inputs is a crucial element of a corporative style of governance.  
 
In this corporative way of producing creative spaces, the state addresses 
relevant communities such as the business community, planning community, 
artist community etc., all of which also stand to gain influence by being 
addressed and co-opted; one example is the formalisation of artists’ influence 
on decisions regarding aesthetic issues and selection of bodies tasked with 
operating culture venues. It was in this way that veteran activist and one time 
adversary of the city, Margaret Shiu, found herself sitting on planning 
committees, vetoing colour schemes and demanding clear rules on rewarding 
public and private investment into the arts in what was a direct integration of 
this community’s demands into the political and planning process that was 
hitherto closed to outside influence (Interview, Margaret Shiu. 16 May 2013). 
                                                
 
1 The term socialised is here used to denote a state that exhibits a greater capacity to 
incorporate societal pressures through daily consensus building, joint projects and 
other forms of non-electoral politics.  
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Taipei’s answer to the question of how to operationalise creativity, or rather 
how to transcend the divide between the technocratic, statist management of 
urban planning and the individualist, organic practice of creativity was in effect 
to create outgrowths of the municipal state which are able to accommodate, 
employ, fund or otherwise support the small-scale work of ‘creative 
individuals’, without either side ever making the criteria for cooperation too 
clear, meaning the door is open for a wide range of interactions between the 
urban redevelopment bureaus and creative/culture workers. This goes a long 
way to accounting for the proliferation of different ways of employing creative 
strategies in Taipei, as the municipality provides a number of programmes 
which call for creative content to be developed or offered by non-state actors.  
 
In practice, this approach first evolved at Treasure Hill, a former veterans’ 
village whose transformation to artist village is analysed in this chapter. There, 
the role of the creative community transformed on the long journey from 
squatting (seen initially as an obstacle to the urban redevelopment), to being 
integrated in the process as the central motivation behind the preservation of 
the physical space of the village. To paraphrase, the creative community in 
Taipei is increasingly providing the abstract space (of creativity, of art, of new 
representations) which makes preservation of marginal physical spaces 
possible through a negotiation between involved groups of actors: municipal 
planners, residents, creative/cultural workers, spatial professionals and, in the 
case of more centrally located sites, the business community. By providing the 
content, these groups also provide the legitimation for the pursuit of creative 
city policies in urban redevelopment, as well as bolster the standing of 
dedicated municipal bureaus within the bureaucracy as a whole, as was seen 
in the second Taipei case study on the Urban Regeneration Stations (URS), 
analysed in Chapter Four. The involvement of the state however engenders a 
creeping institutionalisation of the production of creative spaces, bringing with 
it questions of authenticity, of the divide between ‘real’ and ‘co-opted’ art 
spaces, as well as subjecting creative spaces to a peculiar market/statist set of 
expectations, where market impulses towards more popular uses of these 
spaces are translated into the state’s concern with providing such popular 
content to avoid the impression state funds are being used to fund marginal or 
niche art with little commercial value or popular appeal. 
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Through the analysis of the spaces in this chapter, it is argued that the 
corporative type of creative space production characteristic for Taipei is one 
which had initially been formed in the closed space of Treasure Hill, where 
through a long period of conflict and negotiation, new ideas about the (re)use 
of marginal spaces were introduced, sometimes forcefully, by the spatial 
professionals and artist communities, but which, owing also to these groups 
differing relations with the municipal state, resulted in a process of 
museumification. From the perspective of the research question, this way of 
operationalizing a creative space is indicative of the highly active and adaptive 
state, yet its isolation prevents it from developing a permanent and replicable 
process of institutionalisation of creative space production, no least due to 
Treasure Hill remaining under the control of the cultural department and not 
strictly an issue for urban planning bodies. On the other hand, the process of 
creating an abstract practice of urban creative space production has been 
taken further in URS programme (Chapter Four). While building on the practice 
negotiated at Treasure Hill (not always consciously but rather through a 
process of filtering out the unimaginable), the URS programme differs in the 
role that the private sector has played in its formation. The URS sprung from a 
field relatively more open than that of Treasure Hill, mixing influences from 
Treasure Hill with industrial policy of the developmental state (regarding 
culture-creative industries) with the more neoliberal approaches implicit in 
creative city discourses. The resulting institutionalization comprises not only 
the ‘hardware’ such as the galleries, studios or museums, but more crucially, 
the ‘software’ which underpins the programme, from content and network 
formation, to practices and shared beliefs, all of which tie it in with a wider and 
more dispersed effort at creating a creative city, which in turn is the 
comparative angle against which the experiences of Kaohsiung and Beijing are 
weighed.  
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3.2 Taipei’s Urban Space - from developmental collateral 
to engine of development 
 
 
While literature on the Taiwanese/East Asian developmental model abounds, 
explaining it either as a triumph of free market economics (World Bank, 1993) 
or state-led development (Amsden 1985, Johnson, Wade 1990), it has less to 
say about the urban space such a socio-economic trajectory has created in its 
wake. While certainly geared towards export-oriented manufacturing, Taiwan’s 
urban space was additionally formed by a host of specific conditions involving 
the political uncertainty and shifting legitimacy concerns of the ruling 
Guomindang (KMT) from reconquering the mainland (which presupposes the 
temporary nature of its stay on Taiwan) towards a model Nationalist party state 
built along state-led free market approach and finally as a state with a modern 
economy and a complicated legal status. The latter factor can be taken as 
reinforcing the city-based model of regional competition in the globalised 
economy, as Taiwanese cities are often able to participate on an equal footing, 
unlike the state. 
 
Under the influence of US economic advisors, a new generation of KMT 
leaders began constructing a mixed model of state-led developmentalism, 
‘graduating’ in effect in 1965 with the closing of the US aid office in Taipei 
(Cullather, 1996: 1). What this meant for Taipei’s urban space is a mixed 
picture; while the successful land reform and strengthening state managed to 
avoid the rapid migration to urban centres typical of South-East Asia, the influx 
of refugees from the mainland nevertheless created the need for economical 
and quickly constructed housing, though planning bodies often struggled to 
accommodate and accurately predict population flows. While the state offered 
limited loans for the construction of tracts of residential housing known as 
‘gongyu’ (walk-up apartment buildings usually between 2 and 5 storeys high), 
the effort lacked coordination and mostly provided accommodation for the 
middle ranks of the bureaucracy and military. The example of Yonghe, just 
across the Xindian river from Treasure Hill, exemplifies the failures of urban 
planning even where it was more comprehensively applied. Using the English 
‘garden city’ as a grounding concept, the planning group had previously 
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designed Zhongxing (Jhong-Sing) New Village in Nantou county as an 
upmarket ‘new town’. In Yonghe however, the application of winding lanes and 
lack of restrictions on the type and volume of buildings and serious 
miscalculations regarding population inflows soon resulted in a ’disorientating 
urban labyrinth’ (Wang & Heath, 2010: 161), with tightly clustered low-rise 
buildings, haphazard infrastructure and a liberal interpretation of planning 
guidelines, with houses often built right at the edge of the plot to maximise 
floor space. The case of Yonghe is by no means an outlier; quite the opposite, 
it presents a typical picture of contemporary Taiwan where the developmental 
regime had little regard or time for the creation of a quality urban space, bar 
the highly symbolic space of state ritual such as the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial 
Hall or various Martyrs’ Shrines. 
 
As the economy boomed and Taipei expanded eastward however, the capacity 
of the planning bodies increased with it, culminating in the vast new business 
district development in Xinyi, also home to the formerly tallest building in the 
world, Taipei 101. As urban spaces go, the contrast with overcrowded Yonghe 
or the atavistic architecture of CKS Memorial Hall could not be starker, yet 
similarities in the intent of the plan do exist: if Yonghe or Zhongxing New 
Village were meant to become a green and leafy Taiwanese version of the 
English garden city, and CKS Memorial Hall was reminiscent of the Forbidden 
City, so Xinyi was meant, in the words of its planners, to become Taipei’s 
Manhattan (Lin Chin-Rong, 2006: 25). In light of city policies favouring high-rise 
construction and an emphasis on the creation of a new financial centre, Jou 
(2005) argues this ‘Manhattanisation’ was a key feature of policy, though also 
noting that it has become more of a ‘globally synchronised fantasy city’ rather 
than a working financial industry centre (Jou, 2005: 137). The wide pavements, 
pedestrian zones and seamlessly connected ‘skywalks’ facilitate a culture of 
strolling, shopping and consumption. They are emblematic of Taipei’s ambition 
to become a ‘global city’ and also a response to contemporary worries about a 
‘disequilibrium’ in the Taiwanese economy, which prompted the bureaucratic 
elites to stimulate domestic consumption - the local impetus for a deregulatory 
shift (Tsai, 2001: 365). 
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Somewhat counter-intuitively, the hybrid space of Treasure Hill can be placed 
firmly within this context; the process of museumification at Treasure Hill is not 
an independent, site-specific process, but represents another facet of Taipei’s 
effort to enter into a regional competition with other global cities using ‘cultural 
capital’ - a concept which has proven indispensable to spatial professionals in 
persuading the municipal authority to switch from bulldozing the site to 
redeveloping it as an artists’ village. At the same time, the case of Treasure Hill 
shows the extent to which competition-oriented planning policies have become 
ingrained in the professional planning community, as well as their appeal to 
policy-makers from both dominant political forces in Taiwan, albeit for different 
reasons. 
 
‘Neoliberal’ Space in Taipei 
While the theoretical dimensions of the neoliberal transformation of space, as 
well as the difficulties in applying the term without careful consideration have 
been discussed in Chapter Two, the discussion on neoliberalisation of space in 
Taiwan begins from one of the most contested points in the debate: what is 
neoliberal space and how is it made? Is it even appropriate to use the term in 
the case of Taiwan, which arguably still maintains an autonomous state? If 
planning orthodoxy maintains that planning is a balancing mechanism between 
the interests of the state and capital, then the neoliberalisation of planning can 
be seen as a move away from the seemingly impartial balancing, to what urban 
planning bodies refer to as a partnership, a collaborative planning model where 
deregulation and the retreat of the state as the sole arbiter and decision maker 
has opened avenues for participation to other stake-holders, be they 
businesses or civil society groups, though such a neutral description skirts 
around the issue of influence and power of the various stake-holders in 
influencing spatial planning, as was the case in Treasure Hill and other cases of 
participatory planning. Furthermore, the key point of difference between high-
modernist and neo-liberal planning is in the scope of the plan; if 
comprehensive and putatively objective plans are the hallmark of the former, 
the latter conceives of planning as the result of bargains between private and 
public actors (Pinson, G: 2006: 1006). 
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In the case of Taipei, and especially Treasure Hill, neoliberalism refers to the 
emergence of participatory planning, the devolution of former state 
responsibilities to civil society or business actors, as well as the introduction of 
a new language of governance emphasising competition, community and 
creativity. Taipei’s case is not so much one of a state giving way to the private 
sector, but a more comprehensive and subtle shift in urban governance, policy 
formation and implementation, as well as the language used to promote (and 
oppose) urban redevelopment. Neoliberalism in the urban field is not, as its 
economic precursor, only a drive towards deregulation and privatisation, but is 
a shift in the limits of the acceptable caused by an earlier economic and 
political (neo)liberalisation, even to the extent that what are imported policy 
solutions with strong neoliberal backgrounds (such as public-private 
partnerships, the sale of public land etc.) are understood as pragmatic 
solutions adopted by a rational technocracy (Wang, 2012). Seen within the 
context of a newly democratising state such as Taiwan, the democratic roll-
back and disenfranchisement of urban population often levelled against 
neoliberal urban policy are however not as relevant in Taiwan and will not be 
considered here in length. Instead, further attention will be given to its practical 
implications, tracing how they relate to the case of Treasure Hill. 
 
The policy changes, such as various build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes, as 
well as tenders of public land, helped to accelerate the real-estate based 
growth of Taipei, which had already been stimulated by increased spending 
and higher wages throughout the late 1980s and 90s - itself a consequence of 
a post-developmental economic policy. The pent-up demand in the housing 
sector was then finally released by financial deregulation, since private housing 
construction was previously only allowed limited credit from state-owned 
banks, preventing large-scale commercial housing developments (La Grange et 
al., 2006: 64). As the price of real-estate continued to increase, so the question 
of previously underused or marginal space became relevant: from old industrial 
complexes such as the Huashan Brewery, Songshan Tobacco Factory, to the 
veterans’ villages and illegal dwellings in today’s Da’an Park or around 
Treasure Hill, these previously overlooked places would now have to negotiate 
between the needs of a growth coalition of state and real-estate developers, 
and the limited protection afforded to such space by the budding civil society 
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with a variety of sometimes conflicting agenda. These negotiations would take 
place within a field defined increasingly by transnational standards and a new 
language and praxis of urban planning, but also against the backdrop of an 
increasingly mobilised society prepared to make demands on the municipal 
authorities. A case in point is the Yongkang Community, where a community 
movement arose from an initial protest against the destruction of a local park, 
and eventually became a crucial actor in the planning practice of the area. 
Chuang (2005) sketches out the movement’s and the community’s evolution 
from a single issue advocacy group to a complex and often conflicted 
organisation. As a centrally located area, it attracted real-estate investment; 
lacking a coherent housing policy or any provisions for controlling the private 
production of housing stock however, most of the housing in this area of 
downtown Taipei was high-grade luxury housing, often built on formerly public 
land. As the demographic situation of the area changed further, elderly men 
playing chess in the park began to be seen as a nuisance and groups such as 
street vendors were eventually pushed out by shop-keepers despite the best 
efforts of the city planner in charge of the area (Chuang, 2005: 393). While 
Chuang does point out the limitations of middle-class mobilisation, he remains 
optimistic about the potential of community mobilisation in general. Indeed, the 
case of Yongkang is one of the possible outcomes of neoliberal planning, and 
grassroots mobilisation in the 1980s has brought about a more open planning 
practice in general. With the liberalisation of the political space, organisations 
such as OURs or the Tsui Mama Foundation emerged, both of which would 
later play a crucial role at Treasure Hill. 
 
What an affluent and central example such as the Yongkang Community 
cannot sufficiently account for is the fate of marginal spaces in Taipei. These 
spaces, not available for (immediate) commercial redevelopment, and often 
hampered by either unfavourable locations or protection status, are 
nevertheless being incorporated into a comprehensive city vision - under the 
rubrics of beautification and culture. Both categories will be examined in 
succeeding chapters, but the notion is here introduced by looking at the 
creative city discourse as a tool with which marginalised spaces are brought 
into the fold; if Kaohsiung presents a case of brutal force masquerading as 
greenness and culture, Taipei’s situation is more complex, no least due to a 
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highly active civil society and the greater involvement of foreign observers and 
professionals. Seeing both the use and exchange value of space in Treasure 
Hill and other marginal community spaces in Taipei, it is a study of the 
transformation of an informal space into a formal one, from a grey area to a 
feature on the city map. Lastly, the isolation from immediate pressures for 
commercial redevelopment which characterises many of these sites may have 
allowed the state and civil society actors the leeway to experiment with novel 
solutions – creative space production and adaptive reuse of heritage being 
chief among them. 
 
Integrating marginal spaces: dependents’ villages and ‘illegal’ 
neighbourhoods 
While self-built and haphazard housing stock may be representative of 
Taiwan’s fast developing urban centres in the 1950s and 60s, another form of 
housing stock also developed at the time, one which is emblematic more of the 
ROC’s past than future. The so-called Dependants’ Villages (眷村 juàn cūn) 
were initially built for families of military personnel or war veterans after the 
Guomindang’s retreat to Taiwan. While many have been demolished or 
transformed over the years, some basic characteristics of dependants’ villages 
are important to understand the cultural and social value of a neighbourhood 
such as Treasure Hill, which also developed from such a ‘village’. While there 
were officially around 100,000 households living in dependants’ villages by 
1982, this figure greatly under-represents the extent to which these semi-
planned neighbourhoods have marked Taiwan’s urban landscape, since it 
excludes any illegal structures (and people living within them) from the official 
number. Because the official definition is limited to housing provided by the 
military and (loosely) managed by the Ministry of National Defence (MND), this 
ignores the spread of illegal, unregistered and unmanaged structures which 
sprang up around the sanctioned units, often seamlessly and without any 
visual or demographic break, effectively rendering official statistics useless in 
terms of ascertaining the size and population of the dependants’ villages. 
Though initially not dissimilar in living standards to ‘legal’ housing of the time, 
plagued in general by over-crowdedness and poor quality, the villages were 
distinct places culturally and ethnically, and remained so up to the 1980s. 
Being organised along regimental and provincial lines, they often acted as 
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centres of a transplanted community life from whichever region or province of 
mainland China the troops hailed from. As such, the social life of these 
communities was both tightly knit and very isolated from its surroundings, 
accounting for a number of idiosyncratic cultures created within the 
dependants’ villages, while at the same time underlining their marginality. The 
location of the villages, often build on public or unused land, is another one of 
their characteristics. Treasure Hill was for example built on the bank of the 
Xindian River at the time when the military concerns about a Chinese invasion 
effectively rendered most waterfronts in Taiwan inaccessible, separate places. 
Ironically, the demilitarization of space prompted the rediscovery of Taipei’s 
waterfronts and set the plans for the demolition of Treasure Hill village in 
motion. Other villages were build around military bases, around disused 
infrastructure or on urban fringes, but even those built in city cores, such as the 
neighbourhood previously occupying what is now Da’an Forest Park in central 
Taipei, were isolated communities moving from marginality to locations of 
nostalgia as their space was valorised, often through the work of Taiwan’s 
artists within the wider question of identity which still pervades the cultural 
discussion in Taiwan. Especially during the 1990s and into the 2000s, film 
crews often used extant dependants’ villages as locations (Treasure Hill 
included), even to the extent where different crews would bump into each other 
as the selection of suitable locations shrank through demolition and 
redevelopment (Braester, 2007: 58). As the veterans’ villages vanished from 
Taipei’s cityscape, so the few remaining ones attracted the attention of civil 
society groups campaigning for social and aesthetic causes (the latter 
subsuming both conservationism as well as adaptive reuse). 
 
As the extant villages show however, it was the aesthetic causes that better 
captured the attention of both the city and the professional community. The 
aforementioned 44th South Village is a prime example of the type of 
conservation effort aimed at preserving the material, rather than social heritage 
of the villages. Given the prime location of the village in the shadow of Taipei 
101, the site attracted attention during plans for its demolishing and was 
subsequently preserved as a ‘cultural garden’, with some of the structures 
refurbished to display exhibitions on life in the dependants’ villages, as well as 
housing the Xinyi neighbourhood meeting hall. The village was preserved, 
 71 
albeit in a sanitised version, with standardised colours and materials used 
throughout, and the exhibition space presenting a rather rosy, nostalgic version 
of life in the village. The villagers in this particular case mounted no serious 
opposition to their rehousing and most had left by 1999 - a marked difference 
to Treasure Hill and one made significant by the division between the officially 
sanctioned villages and those that lay outside Ministry authority. Treasure Hill 
in fact also had a ‘legal’ dependants village which was removed in 1993 by the 
MND with residents rehoused elsewhere and the site changed into a basketball 
and tennis court - it was never this part that caused controversy, but rather the 
‘illegal’ settlement sitting beside it. 
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3.3 Treasure Hill: From Taipei’s favela to a living museum 
 
 
The unique location of Treasure Hill with its narrow alleys and stairways 
traversing the hillside, gives THAV a European rural village feel. Over the years, 
various groups settled the hillside with their own lifestyles and needs creating a 
tribal-like organic scene. With the existing residents, together with the urban 
policy of preservation and revitalization, the Artist-in-Residence program and 
Youth Hostel it is hoped that the parties will collaborate in the spirit of 
"paragenesis" to create a better future of the entire community. (Taipei Culture 
Foundation website: Treasure Hill Artist Village) 
 
 
The eradication of ill-fitting neighbourhoods in the ‘creative city’ is by all means 
not the only option available to city authorities; if the case of Hardware Street 
in Kaohsiung is one of demolition and the subsequent historicisation of the 
remains, the present chapter will contrast this with an altogether different 
approach, one which is the result of a protracted negotiation between key 
groups interested in the site. It is argued that Taipei’s Treasure Hill (寶藏巖 
Bǎozàngyán) has been subjected to a process of museumification through a 
combination of top-down redevelopment efforts and a higher level of 
involvement from NGO actors (both those sympathetic and hostile to municipal 
policy); the resulting space maintains and reproduces a delicate community of 
the original residents, combining it with ‘creative forces’ within a controlled 
environment. As such, the case of Treasure Hill is a transition from an illegal, 
marginal neighbourhood replete with the sort of Lefebvrian ‘lived space’ which 
sprouts concealed from the planners’ gaze, to a key point in Taipei’s cultural 
and art infrastructure, an artist village and outdoor museum, as well as a home 
for the now diminished group of original residents. While their presence may be 
preserving, on paper at least, the organic quality of a self-organizing 
community, it is this quality which the present research questions throughout, 
seeking to answer why and how this marginal area populated by vulnerable 
groups was transformed into a ‘artist village’ and social housing project. While 
the area itself is small, as is the number of residents, the case was both slow-
burning and high-profile, involving a full cross-section of Taipei society and 
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politics over a period of three key decades (1980-2007) in which Taiwan as a 
whole transitioned from an authoritarian developmental state into a democratic 
consumer society. Moreover, it is argued that the practices formed at Treasure 
Hill have contributed towards the formation of a corporative approach to the 
production of creative spaces as explored further in the following chapter. 
 
As a case study of a creative space in Taipei and the ways it was produced, it 
is therefore also a study of the adaptive strategies of the (municipal) state, as 
well as the dynamics of cooperation/conflict with key groups such as planning 
professionals, architects, academia, artists and creative communities, as well 
as social activists (the latter category often includes varying combinations of 
the aforementioned groups). By examining the process, this chapter puts 
forward the notion that the discourse of the creative city was used by the state 
and planning professionals to incorporate areas which were previously beyond 
the remit of the modernist planning city, areas which could hitherto be 
‘incorporated’ only through wholesale demolition. The involvement of the 
epistemic communities of planners, architects and other professionals which 
previously opposed demolition projects constitutes a distinct change in the 
way of governance and planning of urban space - be it creative or lived or, as 
is the case in Treasure Hill, both. Spatial professionals played the role of 
mediators, involving civil society groups where necessary and answering the 
pressure for commercial success and justification of its investments from the 
local state. By influencing urban spatial policy, a precedent for wider societal 
involvement was created, yet the final result of the long process of conflict, 
consultation and compromise also hints at a continuation of the state’s 
autonomy in managing urban space, especially where business interests are 
weaker due to objective constraints (political controversy, conservation issues, 
etc.). Ultimately, the professional groups’ policy input was incorporated into the 
city’s wider vision, simultaneously exhibiting both a neoliberal planning 
mentality (with comprehensive planning giving way to a urban planning as 
strategy) as well as the pragmatism characteristic for developmental regimes - 
something which is picked up in the following chapter on the institutionalisation 
of creative space production in Taipei. In the case of Treasure Hill, several new 
ways of thinking about urban space in Taiwan are already present and form the 
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core of new ways of dealing with the urban environment, especially so-called 
creative spaces: 
a) space as the central means of production in a post-Fordist economy 
b) neoliberal participatory planning, with an emphasis on accommodating 
influential groups as well as stifling non-commodified uses of space (favouring 
its exchange value over use value) 
c) incorporation of marginal spaces into the city using creative city discourse 
propagated by both civil society members and key policy-makers as a widely 
acceptable compromise 
 
Each of these strands has already been examined in the previous chapter, but 
are here revisited separately to construct a specific context within which the 
analysis of the Treasure Hill case is located. Based on fieldwork conducted on 
site between December 2012 and July 2013, as well as a chronological study 
of writings on and about the site, it is argued that Treasure Hill in its present 
form exists as a synecdoche of the wider settlement on urban spaces, 
particularly creative spaces in Taipei where the role of civil society actors as 
policy-prompts complements an adaptive state seeking to extract value from 
the inclusion of marginal spaces under its formal control. While the 
arrangement allows for significant advancement in complexity from previous 
high-modernist models of space production, as well as from the autonomous 
and alternative spaces, it is also beholden to a shift in governance and the role 
of the city as the primary locus of economic production and is thus inseparable 
from processes such as globalisation (and its local variants), the 
entrepreneurialization of public services, and in Taiwan’s case, the continued 
pragmatic autonomy of the state. In this aspect, the case of Treasure Hill also 
reveals similarities between it and the ‘green bulldozer’, as a spate of 
demolitions to make way for parks came to be known (Huang, 2012). Just as 
the environment (and green politics) was used widely by the Chen Shui-bian 
city administration to gloss over the less savoury aspects of wholesale 
demolition, art and culture come to play a similar role in Treasure Hill to the 
extent of being called the ‘culture bulldozer’ by the Treasure Hill Commune, a 
radical left-wing group fervently opposed to the institutionalization of Treasure 
Hill as an artist village. 
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Treasure Hill 1: from demolition to preservation 
My first encounter with Treasure Hill came just around the time that its status 
was being formalised by the city’s cultural bureau in 2004 - not in any 
professional capacity, but to attend a party of dubious legality within the then 
still existing artist squat. The area occupies roughly 6 acres between Xindian 
river and a small hill separating it from Gongguan, the bustling student 
neighbourhood of south-eastern Taipei. A temple has been standing on this site 
since the Qing dynasty, though the area was developed into a munitions depot 
by the Japanese army, and subsequently into an air defence post by the 
Republican Chinese troops who also built dormitories on the site, from which 
the current settlement sprang. The history of Treasure Hill is one of immigration 
and marginalisation, a place where waves of newcomers to the city settled; 
indeed its diversity (多元性 duōyuánxìng) is still held up as the area’s main 
attraction by the many official publications and pamphlets which the city, 
through its cultural bureau, publishes about Treasure Hill. 
 
The community of war veterans and others living in the shadow of Guanyin hill 
had shrunk considerably in the recent past, both through a natural process of 
emigration, as well as a series of demolition and resettlement initiatives by the 
city authorities from 1980 onwards. While many residents left, newly arrived 
artists began arriving and changing the area considerably, especially after 
2003, when the city-sanctioned Global Artist Participation Project (GAPP) 
attracted numerous international and domestic artists. While I was not aware of 
this at the time of my first visit in 2003, Treasure Hill was on the cusp of the 
most significant change in its status since the first proposals to demolish it 
some 23 years earlier - it was to become managed by the city’s cultural 
department as a formally established international artist village. The change 
would see all of the households and artists residing there at the time uprooted, 
although some were allowed to return to their houses after a two-year stint in 
temporary housing while the village was being renovated according to city-
approved plans. While the current arrangement at Treasure Hill may mimic an 
organically grown space, it is a carefully planned and tended one, more akin to 
a garden then a meadow. The arrangement, as a result of a series of 
compromises between the four key groups (residents, formal civil society 
groups, squatter activists, and city authorities), was the starting point from 
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which the field-work was structured. The effort to capture the daily, repeated 
and constant flow of the space was used to evaluate the present 
characteristics of the artist village and use those to analyse the evolution of the 
institutional arrangement at Treasure Hill against the background of the three 
ways of thinking about Taipei’s post-industrial urban space, namely space as 
productive means, the neoliberalisation of space and city management, as well 
as the question of the integration of marginal spaces. All three aspects are 
present in the space of the artist village, and all three have shaped decision-
making regarding the transition of an illegal settlement to a legal creative 
space, via the involvement of civil society actors and a final resolution of the 
conflict through both violent means and negotiation. 
 
Using long(er) term observation and repeated visits to the site, semi-structured 
interviews with several members of staff and resident artists (both international 
and domestic), as well as more casual conversations with the area’s many 
visitors, the field work at this site aimed to provide a basis against which the 
archival research could be evaluated (mainly consisting of emotionally charged 
news reports and broadcasts, articles, blogs, pamphlets, petitions). In contrast 
to other sites, the longer duration of fieldwork, covering eight months of 
periodic visits from December 2012 to July 2013, allowed for a more detailed 
ethnography of space to emerge, which was valuable in constructing the 
argument of this chapter. During this time, I visited the site both on weekdays 
and weekends, as well as in different weather conditions/seasons to establish 
a clearer image of how the site works as an outdoor attraction, who visits it, 
what the relations between different users are, and how the artist village 
operates on a daily basis. From the outset, it was indicated by the managing 
team that the artist village, the scene of so much controversy, was wary of the 
research and permission to talk to any resident or artist has to first be obtained 
from them - unusual for a “village”, perhaps less unusual for a government 
body. While outwardly retaining the look of a hillside village, Treasure Hill is 
more akin to a cultural centre, with a unified managerial structure overseeing 
the many component parts: studios, exhibition spaces, cafes, shops, a youth 
hostel, offices and 21 ‘original households’ (當地居民 dāngdì jūmín), which 
retained the right to inhabit the houses they (illegally) built based on their 
welfare status and previous decisions - some households accepted earlier 
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compensation and lost the right to return regardless of their income situation. 
Currently, the households are renting the refurbished houses on a 12-year 
tenancy agreement with the Department of Cultural Affairs (via another non-
governmental organisation, Tsui Mama Social Housing), the renewal of which 
will be decided at a later date following negotiations between the community 
and the city (Interview with TH manager, 2013/04/04). In addition to the 
households, the village hosts one or two international and a similar number of 
domestic artists-in-residence at any time, who also live on site for periods 
ranging from two to seven months. Most of the remaining space is let out for 
affordable rent (TWD3000-7000 pcm) under the ‘Loft Space’ programme which 
currently hosts 15 small ventures from studios, workshops, to cafes and 
shops). Separate from these subcontracted areas, Treasure Hill Artist Village 
(THAV) also runs a youth hostel, as well as some peripheral tourist amenities 
and information points. Below the village, a number of lawns, allotments and 
open spaces link it with the riverside path from Guting Riverside Park, popular 
with strollers and cyclists alike. 
 
The production of this creative space spanned three decades; a complete 
chronological reconstruction is not necessary and instead, I will try to construct 
a general narrative of how the Treasure Hill issue evolved from the perspective 
of the interplay between civil society, residents and municipal authorities. From 
the outset, when Mayor Lee Deng-hui announced that illegal settlements were 
a blight on Taipei’s urban facade, the community was primarily faced with the 
problem of where to relocate the (mainly elderly) residents. Certain sections of 
the settlement were ‘legal’ army residences and were thus removed and 
resettled according to the defence ministry guidelines in 1993, but most of the 
village presented a problem which quickly attracted the attention of civil 
society groups such as the “Wúké guāniú yùndòng” (無殼蝸⽜牛運動), a housing 
advocacy group whose name literally translates as ‘Snails without Shells’ (i.e. 
slugs). By the second half of the 1990s, these civil society groups had been 
honing their skills during various demolition conflicts, many involving 
dependants’ villages and other marginal spaces: a well-publicised case at the 
time was Mayor Chen Shui-bian’s demolition of Kangleli, where the mayor 
broke his promise to resettle the residents before demolition began to great 
furore from the professional community and residents (Zhang, 2005). The 
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subsequent administration, led by Ma Ying-jiu, exhibited a higher degree of 
understanding for the requests of residents and urban planning professionals, 
compensating residents more fully and, more importantly, adopting a more 
conciliatory tone especially towards the demands of the planning and 
academic community, as was the case in the already mentioned 44th South 
Village in Xinyi, where the redevelopment was billed primarily as an effort in 
historic preservation, rather than just the clearance of illegally built shanties. By 
the time Treasure Hill was considered by a special working group established 
by Ma, the practice of incorporating historical-preservationist concerns into 
demolition and redevelopment projects was therefore already firmly 
established by a city administration keen to defuse social conflict and 
legitimise urban redevelopment with the integration of professional and social 
groups (cf. Zhang, 2012). 
 
From the onset of organised resistance and negotiation over the fate of 
Treasure Hill, keywords such as ‘memory’, ‘history’, ‘community’ were 
introduced; in a statement dated February 18 1999, the housing association 
Tsui Mama for example emphasises: “To demolish Treasure Hill would be to 
demolish 40-odd years of community and neighbour relations, but would also 
mean destroying a piece of Taipei’s history of urban development.” (Tsui 
Mama: Statement. 18 February 1999). By holding up Treasure Hill as a 
generalizable, generic past of Taipei, these same keywords formed the basis of 
the plan to create a co-habitational art village presented by the ‘Organization of 
Urban Re-s’ (OURs, 專業者都市改⾰革組織 Zhuānyè zhě dūshì gǎigé zǔzhī). Their 
plan underlined the importance of the community as a relatable piece of ‘our’ 
past and in effect grafting the welfarist, social aspect of co-habitation onto the 
idea of what a creative space in Taipei should do, that is publicly memorialise 
the past and allow its integration into modernity. In the case of Treasure Hill, 
the idea of using art and creativity within an urban redevelopment project was 
introduced by the professionals enlisted by Ma Ying-jiu to produce a report on 
the demolition and resettlement plans in 1999. The head of the Department of 
Cultural Affairs at the time, Taiwanese writer Long Yingtai was especially 
instrumental in adopting the concept of the ‘poor art village’ as an optic 
through which Treasure Hill was viewed. Originating from her circle at the 
Department, the concept stems from the ‘arte povera’ movement in Italian art. 
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Stripped of its radicalism, it became one of the foundations on which the 
approach to the spatial restructuring at Treasure Hill would be based (Lin 
Hongzhang, 2006; Lin Hongzhang, personal communication, 9 October 2013). 
 
Table 6 - Chronology of major events at Treasure Hill, 1980-2010 
July 1980 Mayor Lee Teng-hui proposes construction of Park no. 297 to remove the 
‘landscape mess’ 
 
June 1994 Ministry of National Defence demolishes military dormitories (the ‘legal’ 
section of Treasure Hill comprising of 46 households) 
 
November 
1995 
Mayor Chen Shui-bian constructs basketball courts and stair access to 
riverfront; first protests by residents take place 
 
June 1997 Mayor Chen postpones demolition pending completion of relocation 
plans 
 
March 
1999 
Mayor Ma Ying-jiu establishes working group on the demolition and 
resettlement of Treasure Hill, subsequently headed by NTU Urban 
 
October 
2001 
Ma Ying-jiu approves plan to transform Treasure Hill into a ‘Village/Art 
Exhibition and Performance Area’ 
 
April 2002 Taipei’s Parks and Street Lights Department demolishes 38 houses by 
the riverside as part of ‘flood protection’ project 
 
2003 - 
2004 
 
‘Global Artivist Participation Project’ (GAPP) takes place over the winter 
June 2003 Taipei City Department of Cultural Affairs commissions OURs to produce 
a report on feasibility of an art village 
 
April 2004 Remaining structures are legalised as Taipei’s first “historic community” 
 
February 
2006 
New York Times praises Treasure Hill in a reportage on Taipei 
 
May-June 
2006 
Applications for interim resettlement and return to Treasure Hill open for 
those current residents deemed to be vulnerable social groups 
 
December 
2006 - 
January 
2007 
Police clash with artists, clearing the way for a 2-year transformation to a 
formalised artist village; peak of conflict within civil society groups 
 
February 
2007 
Taipei City formalises Treasure Hill status as ‘protected heritage area’ 
 
October 
2010 
Taipei Treasure Hill Artist Village officially opens under the management 
of the Taipei Arts Foundation 
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Following the approval in 2001 by Mayor Ma of the plan to transform Treasure 
Hill into an art and performance village, Treasure Hill departs from the 
trajectory of previous contested marginal spaces undergoing similar 
redevelopment. The invocation of ‘art’ and ‘creativity’ as a tool and indeed 
justification for a hybrid solution to both the social issue (resettlement of 
residents) and the aesthetic one (the preservation of vernacular architecture) is 
a novelty particular to Treasure Hill. From this point onwards, Treasure Hill 
becomes a study in the production of a hybrid creative space. Although the 
residents’ welfare issues remain a key stated concern of the village, the 
residents’ input remains limited with the main actors being the city government 
and formal civil society groups (OURs, Tsui Mama, NTU Institute of Building 
and Architecture), with a more informal group of artists and students, the 
Treasure Hill Commune, emerging after 2004, well after the concept of ‘art 
village’ has already become policy. 
 
Treasure Hill 2: Contesting creativity 
The first official, city-sponsored art event to take place at Treasure Hill was a 
small film festival in 2002, as part of the 2002 Taipei International Arts Festival. 
In the year that followed, the Global Artivist Participation Project (GAPP) 
introduced the first batch of resident artists from Taiwan and abroad; this is 
most usefully thought of as the beginning of Treasure Hill’s life as a place of 
art, the beginning of its journey towards becoming a formal arts venue. 
Organised with the support of the OURs, GAPP had the tacit mission of raising 
the profile of the area in conjunction with what one of its organisers, Kang 
Minjie, calls the ‘highly political and calculated tactics of conservation’ (Kang, 
2005:155). Aimed at persuading the city not only to preserve some of the 
buildings (this had in any effect already been decided), but to gather support 
for the idea of ‘cohabitation’, the OURs emphasised the inseparability of the 
cultural value of the place as recognised by the city from the presence of the 
original community. The solution to the double questions of preservation and 
veterans’ housing problems was to construct a hybrid space which could cater 
and protect both. The GAPP’s selection of ‘art interventions’ are best 
represented by Finnish architect-artist Marco Casagrande, whose 
performances and activities introduced the idea of Treasure Hill as Taipei’s 
‘attic’, a place where obsolete and forgotten things are stored, and to which 
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one may return when searching for answers from the past. (Casagrande, 2006: 
91) The concept proved popular with the city, remaining the quintessential art 
intervention ten years on, used in anything from the village’s official website to 
also providing the name for the youth hostel that forms part of the village. The 
Department of Cultural Affairs integrated the topics and ways to see space into 
its vision of the village, which remaining visible today as reproduced on official 
tours offered at the village to visiting tourists. On one such tour, the guide often 
stopped to point out where and what Casagrande was collecting and 
exhibiting (mainly old trinkets, photos, abandoned items…), while emphasising 
throughout the reaction of the residents, who from being bewildered at first 
later realised the importance of old, forgotten objects via the artist’s 
intervention. (Field notes, 21 March 2013) The lack of agency ascribed to the 
voiceless residents aside, what is being replicated is the idea of art, or in wider 
use creativity/culture, resuscitating a dying neighbourhood within the 
(semi)official narrative of the art village long after its integration into the city 
administration. 
 
The tactics used by the civil society groups proved themselves to be 
successful and lasting, lending more evidence to the efficacy of Taiwan’s civil 
society groups in lobbying municipal governments using cultural-creative 
narratives: similar to the case of Kaohsiung’s Pier-2 Art Centre (see Chapter 
Five), these sites had been ‘discovered’ by a community of architects and 
urban planners who also introduced the notion of re-use for cultural purposes. 
The working links between these professional communities and the city (mainly 
through various reports commissioned by authorities) may be a reason for their 
success, lending authority to their words. Yet the city authorities also viewed 
small culture-led reuse projects across Taipei as essentially innocuous, 
allowing groups to experiment and waiting to see what results might present 
itself, though not always without dismissing their potential. (Margaret Shiu, 
director at Bamboocurtain art space, interview May 16th, 2013). In the case of 
Treasure Hill, the combination of a receptive Department of Culture and an 
active civil society, led by erstwhile organisers, resulted in a deceptively simple 
solution to the quagmire of zoning and legalization issues by conferring on the 
area protected status and transferring overall responsibility for its development 
to the Department of Culture, though ultimate ownership rests with the 
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National Property Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
The village was thus spared wholesale physical destruction, but the status of 
the residents (both the ‘original’ ones, and the ‘newcomer’ artists) was initially 
left unresolved, providing the seed for subsequent conflicts within the civil 
society movement. After the formal, organised groups (OURs, Tsui Mama, NTU 
architecture and urbanism department) threw their weight behind a solution 
within the framework of the city, the question was not whether the residents 
would stay or go; the question was under what conditions and terms. Here, 
significant divisions appeared between the aforementioned groups and the 
group of artists and activists living and working in Treasure Hill, the latter 
organising themselves as the Treasure Hill Commune (寶藏巖公社 Bǎozàngyán 
gōngshè). While many of them had previously received the support of the 
formal groups (no least through projects such as GAPP), they found 
themselves increasingly isolated from the decision-making process in a 
manner similar to the residents. Once OURs produced a series of reports 
commissioned by the city government, these revealed the extent to which the 
existing ad-hoc co-habitational space would be altered. The minute details and 
hearsay included in the reports, identifying unacceptable behaviour of ‘bad 
tenants’ such as drinking, noise, lack of hygiene and even sexual harassment 
(OURs, 2004) incited the first altercations between some residents and OURs 
when an angry resident heckled Kang Minjay during an international public art 
symposium held at the Taipei Fine Arts Museum in May 2005. Beyond the 
anger of the residents, the report reveals the normative language used by 
OURs when discussing the future of the village, suggesting the future co-
habitational village will not tolerate unsuitable tenants, be they artists or original 
households. With the power to decide on the makeup of the village now in the 
hands of the city, questions of residents’ rights increasingly overshadowed the 
flowery language of art-resident cohabitation. 
 
In the late spring of 2006, the city finalised the resettlement options available to 
the residents: they could either receive full compensation of NTD720,000 (app. 
£12,000 at 2006 exchange rate) and lose the right of abode at Treasure Hill, 
receive partial compensation of NTD360,000 but would have to arrange their 
living arrangements during renovation on their own or rent government 
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temporary housing, or they could forgo compensation, but would be put up in 
temporary housing for free by the city during the renovation. (Source: Taipei 
City Treasure Hill Area Temporary Housing Usage Fee Table; Taipei City, 
November 2006). Many residents felt becoming tenants would mean a loss of 
ownership over the structures they built. In a heated exchange of accusation 
and counter-accusation, the Treasure Hill Commune accused OURs of 
colluding in property theft led by the city and ‘corporate interests’. OURs 
replied with an equally vitriolic statement accusing the Commune of harassing 
elderly residents, stirring up dissent, of disrupting public order with lewd 
behaviour and not having the interest of the residents at heart. Moreover, 
OURs added that since the buildings are illegal, all previous ownership rights 
are invalid and the structures now all belong to the city as a protected 
historical landmark. As a historical protection order was the only way to avoid 
demolition, any rights that the residents had on their houses would be reflected 
only in the payment of compensation. Whatever the truth behind this 
exchange, the residents had effectively lost any ownership over their homes - 
they would now be tenants living in a landmark, paying rent to the city in return 
for their right to return to their houses following renovation, which had been 
entrusted to the architecture firm owned by the head of OURs, Liu Keqiang. 
 
Figure 1 - Eviction of the Treasure Hill Commune. Photograph courtesy of 
Treasure Hill Commune. 
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Looking at the relations between the main groups of actors on Treasure Hill, 
the residents are predictably split, with some supporting the formalisation of 
their status, and others hanging on to their claims of ownership over their 
houses. Before the heated exchange of statements between the Commune 
and OURs, it was the residents who expressed such fears at a round table 
organised by the Treasure Hill Commune a few months before the village was 
finally cleared (Yu and Xiao, 2006). The Treasure Hill Commune was at the time 
very active in collecting evidence of resident opposition to the plans accepted 
by the city and implemented by OURs, showing the extent to which the ‘artists’ 
were opposing the proposed artist village. They used residents’ concerns as 
the justification for their increasingly radical stance, culminating in the 
occupation and protests which followed the city’s decision to clear out the 
village by the 22nd December 2006 - which incidentally was also a few weeks 
after the 2006 municipal elections, thereby avoiding any fallout from the 
clearing of the village. The issue of ownership and residence ultimately ended 
in a violent confrontation between the recalcitrant residents and artists on one 
side, and OURs and the city on the other, resulting in riot police being called in 
to clear the remaining ’squatters’ out of their homes on the morning of January 
30, 2007, when Treasure Hill entered a three year hibernation, emerging finally 
as the Treasure Hill Art Village. The formation of the artist village is thus a 
moment where the city and the spatial professionals aligned against the wishes 
of those the village was ultimately meant to service; the difficult task of dealing 
with unyielding residents and artists was in effect ‘outsourced’ to OURs, with 
the city remaining quiet throughout, in the end only communicating by sending 
a strong police force. 
 
The increasing severity of the conflict surrounding the creation of the artist 
village casts a shadow of doubt on the ideas meant to be informing the new 
co-habitational village, while simultaneously reinforcing the relations between 
the city and the professional groups that proposed the plan. The issue of 
Treasure Hill is a watershed in the relations between these organised groups 
and the municipal authorities, breaking the historical precedent of 
confrontation and establishing a collaborative model firmly in its stead. The 
economic and political importance of spatial production which can be traced to 
both a transnational and domestic shift thus translates itself into a closer 
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relation between ‘spatial professionals’ and the local state, which in this case 
represents both traditional state authority, as well as introduces the drive 
towards valorisation of space typical of business groups. The spatial 
professionals are, due to their control of policy innovation and urban space 
solutions such as art villages, cohabitation, creative city discourse etc., able to 
positions themselves as the key actors which can provide what the municipal 
authority desires: value for money, a competitive edge in the region, control 
over a previously extra-legal area of the city in return for concessions on issues 
of social justice and aesthetic/historical concerns. The relative lack of concern 
for the demands of the resident artist community however, as well as the 
normative approach to the selection of residents both underline the exclusion 
of these constituents from the decision-making process, especially during the 
final stages, when vague ideas of cohabitation gave way to the minute details 
which were finally codified as the Taipei City Treasure Hill Settlement 
Conservation and Development Autonomy Statute, the fundamental piece of 
municipal regulation ruling the village presently. The well-known demolition 
controversies of Kangleli (14th/15th City Park) and Da’an Park pitted the spatial 
professionals against the city, yet Treasure Hill is a case of their collaboration, 
one which has established a pattern also visible in other localised 
redevelopment projects around Taipei as a new form of governance. 
 
Treasure Hill 3: Living museum, dead village? 
If the space of the Treasure Hill Artist Village is a consequence of a 
collaborative effort between the city and the spatial professionals borne out of 
a shifting role of space in the urban economy and politics, what does the space 
of Treasure Hill say about this collaboration? If indeed the outcome represents 
the best possible compromise, as the OURs often emphasised, the careful 
reading of the space indicates its priorities and uses. Based on a longitudinal 
observation over a period of eight months, the ethnography of the space 
mainly concerned itself with questions such as who the space is for, how it is 
used, who uses it, how it is made attractive and to whom, all of which 
overwhelmingly suggest that tourism, or rather tourists/visitors are the 
overarching concern of the management as well as the institutional mission. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the currently running art/creative residencies, as 
well as interviews with the residents artists, visitors and managerial staff 
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confirmed that while cohabitation, creativity, cultural production are the basis 
on which the site operates, the mandatory openness to visitors is a big 
motivation in both the selection process, as well as the daily routines of the 
successful applicants. It is argued here that Treasure Hill is a museum, subject 
to similar double pressures that museums face - to reproduce an acceptable 
aesthetic, and to provide a normative, even didactic role. Parallel to the 
shopping and entertainment spaces of Xinyi, Treasure Hill as a quasi-public 
space is also a spatial representation of the shift in the role of the city and its 
space, ultimately seen as having a link to Taipei’s competitiveness and 
cosmopolitan feel. 
 
Treasure Hill currently runs three art and creative based programmes in 
addition to the youth hostel and the social housing/original resident role. Due 
to the fast turnover and great variety of the foreign and domestic residencies, 
the third and most stable part of the art village, The MicroLoft programme, was 
examined in more detail in order to outline the arrangements pertaining to the 
artist community at Treasure Hill. By visiting the spaces under The MicroLoft 
programme, which provides reduced rent studios and spaces, the general 
impression is that it has especially been developing in the direction of 
providing a commercial element to the visitor’s’ experience. Since its inception 
in 2010, when the first eight spaces were allocated, the number of cafes alone 
has increased from one to a total of five out of the out of fourteen in 2013; the 
other MicroLoft spaces are also required to open their doors for visitors on the 
official open days, selling products such as artisanal paper, jewellery, offering 
workshops or simply tours of the artists’ studios. More than the residencies, 
which allow participating artists leeway in their work (as long as it can be linked 
broadly to the cohabitation/memory/nostalgia themes), the MicroLoft 
programme has become tasked with providing the consumable content for the 
large number of visitors. While sales contribute importantly to the young artists’ 
income, the presence of a constant stream of visitors can also be distracting. 
Several of the current residents went so far as to complain about the number 
of visitors at all times, even during ‘closed’ days, resulting in them having to 
draw the blinds on their studio to avert prying eyes, photographs being taken 
or visitors simply barging in. (Li Mengshu, resident MicroLoft artist. Interview, 
17 March 2013). While providing a welcome and relatively inexpensive place to 
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work, many of the artists I interviewed also clearly indicated they over-
emphasised the ‘social’ aspect of their work during the application process to 
improve their chances, but later on found opportunities for interaction with the 
elderly residents were few and far between; workshops were mainly attended 
by children, whereas some of the older men were often hostile to their 
presence. While certain community traditions, such as sharing meals, were re-
introduced in a formalised form after the transformation into an artist village, 
both the reduced number of residents (currently 21 households from over 70 
before eviction and renovation in 2007) and the relatively fast turn-over of 
young artists precludes the establishment of lasting and spontaneous links 
characteristic of a lived, organic community. Instead, such activities are now 
outsourced by the Department of Culture to Xuri Cultural Enterprises Ltd. (旭⽇日
⽂文化事業有限公司, Xùrì wénhuà shìyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī), which is also 
headquartered at Treasure Hill and manages the interaction of residents and 
artists for the purposes of cohabitation. While the intent may have been to ease 
communication between the constituent groups in the village, it nevertheless 
presents a rerouting of informal links via a formal framework, subjecting it to 
potential reframing in order to fit the pre-existing narrative the village is 
postulated on. 
 
The ritualisation of spontaneous social gatherings within a systematic schedule 
is mere re-enactment organised by an outside group hired by the city to foster 
‘symbiosis’. The tools which were developed to manage the area pay homage 
to pre-existing ties and rituals of community examined and praised by OURs 
and the planning community, but remain uplinked to the city bureaucracy - an 
arrangement which would be reproduced in other cases around Taipei, such as 
the Urban Regeneration Stations (URS) examined in Chapter Four. This 
outsourcing model, though rooted in neoliberal policy, indicates the continuing 
autonomy of the Taiwanese local state within the cultural-creative sphere 
where external pressures were in effect co-opted and brought within the 
municipal governance structure. The practice of outsourcing within Treasure 
Hill is not limited to the management of quotidian affairs. Treasure Hill operates 
as a policy laboratory for the involvement in and outsourcing to of a number of 
non-governmental or quasi non-governmental bodies, a practice which 
continues in the programmes examined in the following chapter, suggesting a 
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formation of ‘best practice’ at Treasure Hill as already having significant impact 
on other instances of regeneration using the creative city discourse. Treasure 
Hill for example houses the Tsui Mama Foundation that handled the transition 
and relocation of residents, while City Yeast (都市酵⺟母 Dūshì jiàomǔ), another 
NGO based at Treasure Hill, operates as a ‘think-tank’ whose stated mission is 
to ‘make people fall in love with Taiwan’s urban approach’2. Even the 
organisation with overall responsibility for Treasure Hill, the Taipei Culture 
Foundation, is a quasi non-governmental organisation originally set up in 1985 
that has since 2007 taken on the responsibility of running a variety of venues 
and events in Taipei on behalf of the Department of Culture, combining private 
and public funding. In effect, the city showed substantial adaptive capacity by 
first ‘outsourcing’ many of the problematic stages of the transition to NGOs 
and private firms such as OURs, Tsui Mama and now City Yeast and Xuri, and 
then integrating the space into the city’s bureaucracy under the Taipei Culture 
Foundation. Though it remains a site of policy experimentation, Treasure Hill is 
also firmly placed in the same administrative structure as the Taipei Museum of 
Contemporary Art, the Red House in Ximen, Taipei Puppet Theatre and the 
Songshan Creative Industry Area, all of which represent high-profile spaces 
constituting what a city urban planner called ‘new Taipei urbanism’ (Hsu 
Yanhsing, Taipei City Urban Regeneration Office deputy head. Interview, 30 
April 2013). 
 
While internally Treasure Hill operates as a government-run institution, its 
external face is markedly different. The presence of cafes, cake shops, tourists 
and art suggests a middle-class aesthetic reminiscent of gentrified areas such 
as New York’s Brooklyn, London’s Hackney, San Telmo in Buenos Aires or El 
Raval in Barcelona. Indeed, critical voices in Taiwan’s academic and art 
community have long discussed whether Treasure Hill presents a case of 
‘gentrification’. (Most notably (Lin H., 2006) and (Zhang, 2011)) Due to the 
strong involvement of the municipal authorities and professional associations 
however, the term ‘museumification’ is favoured here. Simultaneously covering 
some of the aspects of gentrification, especially the middle-class aesthetics 
seen as the defining visual prompt, museumification accounts for the 
                                                
 
2 CityYeast website, Q&A section. Accessible on: 
http://www.cityyehttp://www.cityyeast.com/about.php. Accessed 13th July 2013 
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institutionalisation of the space, as well as for the lack of overt commercial 
pressures, which are exhibited rather within the overall practice of the 
municipality itself. Thus, it is not a process led by commercial pressures 
exploiting the so-called rent gap (Ley, 1986), but a state-led commodification 
informed by a neoliberal shift urging the measuring stick of competitiveness 
onto municipal (cultural) policy, Treasure Hill included. Taken in this way, it is a 
space more akin to that of Salzburg, a curated space meant to preserve and 
offer to the public a sanitised, consumable alternative to the reality of daily life 
in the big city. (Hajer and Reijndorp, 2004)  Moreover, the example of 
amusement parks, which Sorkin (1992) calls a “jolly regulated vision of 
pleasure as a substitute for the democratic public space” (ibid: p. Xv), is 
consonant with the transition from the conflicted space of Treasure Hill village 
to the calm and pleasant atmosphere of the Treasure Hill Artist Village. 
Precedents in Asia, including Taiwan, in the construction of ‘aboriginal’ or 
‘cultural’ villages offer a further comparative frame in approaching the space of 
Treasure Hill. These spaces mimic villages of different themes and 
backgrounds but are fastened together and given a new role by a process of 
museumification: 
“…these disparate strands are held together by the 'village' motif and by the 
methodology of museumification. Cultural villages are, quintessentially, sites of 
a museum nature. Some are classified as 'living museums' or 'eco-museums'; 
some were initiated by museums; others house museums within their 
reconstructed village confines or replicate museum display techniques.” 
(Dellios, 2002: 3) 
 
Treasure Hill, as a hybrid space that is both a working artist colony, a social 
housing project and a cultural tourism site presents a less obvious, if 
nevertheless museological site; just as the working and conservation parts of a 
museum are off-limits, so signs stating “Treasure Hill Homeland, please DO 
NOT come in without invitation“ (寶藏家園：居民住所，請勿進⼊入 Bǎozàng 
jiāyuán: Jūmín zhùsuǒ, qǐng wù jìnrù), protect the remaining households from 
the unwelcome intrusions of the visitors, although the signs themselves have 
taken on the life of an exhibit, with visitors taking photographs in front of the 
signs on several occasions during my visits. On one occasion, when I asked 
why they were doing this, a young couple replied they felt it gave place 
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authenticity - literally, that the signs ‘make you feel it really is a village’ (Field 
notes, 21 March 2013). The residents of Treasure Hill have, together with the 
residents artists, found themselves in the role of exhibits/exhibitors, their 
vegetable patch as much an object of the tourists’ gaze as the art installation 
next to it. Moreover, the level of control and management of their lives and 
daily affairs within the institutionalised village presents yet another facet of 
governance; though the size of the museum-village is small, the scope of the 
city’s governing is not. It is not possible to overlook the seemingly conflicted 
use of both modernist and neoliberal approaches, both the normative and 
intrusive micromanagement by the city, and the outsourcing of this 
micromanagement to private bodies. 
 
Figure 2 - Tourists posing in front of the remaining buildings of Treasure Hill 
Village. Photograph by author. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
Treasure Hill stands out in the city-wide conflict between the modernist vision 
of Taipei as a city of glass and steel, and the more nativist, historicist vision of 
a laid-back colonial town with a rich tradition of vernacular construction, its 
illegality notwithstanding. Borne out of a decade-long conflict between civil 
society actors and several municipal bureaus, most notably the Parks and 
Street Lights Department and the Department of Cultural Affairs, the current 
space of Treasure Hill is both a novel institutional arrangement, as well as 
material consequence of the idea of ‘art as tool for social action’ gaining 
traction among both civil society and municipal policymakers. To the city, it 
presented an attractive and relatively inexpensive experiment, which has since 
become embedded within a wider policy network, and successfully slotted into 
various schemes: as an international artist village, as a tourist attraction, as 
proof of Taipei's diversity presented to visiting officials (which becomes 
important as the city gears up to become World Design Capital in 2016 in an 
attempt to replicate Seoul’s economic success after its successful hosting in 
2010). 
 
Meanwhile however, and perhaps because of the stated success of the 
arrangement, the village operates chiefly as a living museum, a repository of 
memory and nostalgia for Taiwan's rural past and a favourite past-time 
destination for young couples, amateur photographers and larger groups of 
elderly Taiwanese reminiscing about their own poorer upbringings. Essentially 
living their lives within this museum, the position of the remaining residents 
hints the novel institutional arrangement may not be stable at all, with no 
instruments in place to replenish the population and the artist village expanding 
steadily into vacated homes. Despite the intention to preserve, maintain and 
build upon a sense of community, the barrage of art-based initiatives hoping to 
involve the community seems to have exhausted the willingness of the 
residents to participate in yet another re-visioning of their space well before the 
inauguration of the village in 2010. The most likely outcome now seems to be a 
spatialization of an official version of Taipei's history, complete with cafés, 
galleries and shops servicing the weekend flâneurs of modern Taipei. This 
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outcome may take on the external guise of gentrification (cf. (Zhang, 2005), (Lin 
H., 2006)), but remains also firmly rooted in the organisation of a government-
run village devoid of clear or unobstructed market stimuli. Gentrification, in this 
case, may turn out to be an all too convenient lens with which to evaluate the 
changes that took place, prompting the present research to maintain that a 
process of museumification describes the situation more accurately. The 
remaining residents, now effectively tenants/exhibits of the museum, may be 
protected from the vagaries of the real-estate market, but their position 
remains nevertheless mired in a neoliberal logic viewing their lives (i.e. the 
culture they have created) as a resource fuelling the ‘creativity’ of the place 
itself, which in turn is thought of a resource of the post-industrial economy. The 
appealing narrative of culture and art provides the outer casing of the museum, 
yet the village as a whole is subjected to a commodifying logic of the neoliberal 
city. 
 
As far as the role of civil society groups that protested its demolition is 
concerned, the formal groups around OURs view it as a victory for their brand 
of action, which throughout emphasised engagement with the city. If it is a 
victory however, it is one symptomatic of the widening rift between those 
espousing aims of radical social justice and others with more mainstream 
concerns of preserving landscape and memory, as the bitter conflicts between 
the formalised and the squatter movements reveal. Nevertheless, it may be 
argued that it is precisely the invocation of the aesthetic and the nostalgic that 
enabled the achievement of (albeit limited) social justice, as it is the cultural/art 
village that found acceptance in the municipal state's mentality of governing, 
as well as provided the contextual link for policy-makers at the time, notably 
Long Ying-tai. Once the compromise between the formal social movement as 
represented by the OURs and the city was achieved however, the case of 
Treasure Hill becomes not one of civic society activation, but of a state-run 
experiment in creating a hybrid urban space following the recommendations of 
the epistemic community of urban planners and architects, who introduced the 
concepts of ‘village’, ‘arte povera’, ‘cohabitation’. Yet despite the lofty and 
vague principles on which it is conceived, the space nevertheless adheres to 
the requirements and rules of a city bureaucracy, indeed it is its integral part. 
Thus, the quantifying urge subsumes everything, even the residents and artists, 
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while stringent vetting techniques ensure that both the residents and the artists 
(both on residency and those doing daytime work) fit in with the pre-
established norms for this village-as-institution. The unusual arrangement 
governing the village owes its existence to the specific circumstances of the 
case (a tightly knit community, an activist network, the support of academics 
and professionals and ultimately, good political timing), yet the use a ‘culture-
creative’ approach to solving a question that started off as one of social justice 
is responsible for it becoming a question of municipal cultural policy. It is a 
case that shows the appeal of culture-creative policies when dealing with 
intractable conflicts regarding the use of urban space, and at the same time 
revealing their weakness in resisting institutionalisation as they are included in 
the pre-existing structure of cultural policy and, as the following chapter 
shows, urban planning policy as well. A case in point is the routing of pre-
existing avenues for interaction between the different constituent communities 
through the official channels by the rules governing life in the artist village. 
Those most free to interact outside these channels - the international artists in 
residence - often lack the language ability to interact with locals, as several 
interviewees indicated. On the other hand, the local artists/shopkeepers in 
various programmes have all been through a thorough selection process, with 
the required submission of reports and mid-year reviews ensuring their 
compatibility with the village: their willingness to participate in the outdoor 
museum experience by essentially serving the role of the museum shop/cafe. 
In terms of the tools of governance, it shows how the introduction of the 
creative city discourse made the Department of Culture an important player 
and adjudicator in producing and managing novel urban space, just as long as 
the site remained open to the public as a tourist attraction. 
 
The institutionalising process however, essentially a negotiation about ways of 
doing things, has also meant the municipal authorities had to adapt to 
accommodate the running of a space such as Treasure Hill - the Department of 
Culture was soon no longer the only new ‘creative space landlord’, with the 
Urban Regeneration Office also taking over several historically protected or 
derelict sites for use as creative spaces, using similar criteria for selection as 
well as monitoring tools such as requiring reports, although none of its sites are 
inhabited by original residents. By addressing the demands of the formalised 
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civil society groups and adopting their parlance, the city has internalised some 
civil society groups’ demands into a city-wide effort of institutionalising 
marginal spaces under the banner of creativity to ‘create’ or ‘conserve’ culture 
(most notably through the URS programme, see following chapter), often also 
engaging prominent members of civil society groups for paid work as 
architects, consultants and designers of the emerging creative spaces, further 
emphasising their role as spatial producers. The calls to express Taipei’s 
creativeness through its space, through the leisure time of its citizens have 
since become common-place in the vocabulary of urban planning and taken up 
enthusiastically by the KMT administrations which have led the city since 1998. 
Examined critically, this may represent a mere ‘artwash’, where the culture-
creative narrative plays a palliative role, securing backing from key constituents 
while ensuring municipal control over what are no longer authentic, lived 
spaces, though the institutions tasked with implementing creative city policies 
have shown considerable resilience and capacity to engage art and business 
groups. 
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Chapter Four: Institutionalizing Creative 
Space Production in Taipei 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: Building institutions of corporative space 
production 
 
 
On November 18 2013, Taipei was chosen as the next World Design Capital 
(WDC), the fifth to receive this title since the biennial event was first held in 
Turin in 2008. Seoul, chosen as host for the 2010 WDC, is widely seen as one 
of Taipei’s main competitors as well as sources of inspiration when it comes to 
the establishment of the culture-creative industry (and city), and it is therefore 
not surprising that Taipei city approached the bid seriously as a cross-
departmental effort. Apart from raising the city’s profile, the event served as an 
exercise for the various departments and branches of municipal government, a 
shift acknowledged by Deputy Mayor Chen as ‘embedding design into 
governance’ during his acceptance speech in Montreal (International Council of 
Societies of Industrial Design Press Release, 18 November 2013). Examining 
this statement is a useful spring-board from which the chapter will trace the 
process of institutionalising the production of creative spaces in Taipei, a 
process which also serves as a gauge of state capacity and its authority over 
the street-level production of creative spaces.  In analysing this process, the 
chapter aims to challenge notions of neoliberal urban governance which 
equate it with a retreat of the state, highlighting instead the involvement of 
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state actors in a project of standardising small-scale urban interventions in the 
‘Urban Renewal Station’ programme (hereafter URS; 都市再⽣生前進基地, Dūshì 
zàishēng qiánjìn jīdì). Seen within the wider theme of operationalizing creativity 
with which this research is attempting to grapple, the case of the URS is one 
example of state actors’ locating creativity within a pre-existing framework of 
city bureaucracy, with an explicit aim of influencing the image of Taipei as a 
creative city - both in the run-up to the WDC competition, as well as beyond 
this short-term goal. Additionally, as the URS programme is operated by the 
city’s Urban Regeneration Office, it is set apart from purely sectoral efforts 
such as the recently opened Songshan Cultural and Creative Park. Although 
the latter is Taipei’s largest investment into creative and cultural industries, it is 
better understood within the realm of cultural or economic policy and in any 
case does not differ substantially from similar efforts in the region and globally. 
Nevertheless, Songshan Cultural and Creative Park must be seen within the 
same municipal effort of ‘creating a creative city’ and shares with examples 
such as Huashan Creative Park a significant set of beliefs and accepted frames 
of activity. As it will also host the majority of exhibitions during Taipei’s time as 
World Design Capital, its omission in this work is perhaps unusual, yet the 
selection of the (smaller) URS programme is based primarily on the relatively 
larger variety of actors and policy inputs, making it a good candidate for the 
observation of the negotiations regarding the ways of doing creativity, 
especially within the field of urban regeneration, which has seen a global move 
towards adopting creative city policies aimed at coupling regeneration of 
physical space with efforts to support a creative economy. 
 
From initial ad-hoc efforts by a small group of Taipei’s art and architecture 
community, which focused on the adaptive reuse of abandoned industrial 
spaces such as the Huashan distillery, the reuse of various under-used urban 
locales has attained the role of stimulating growth in the creative industry 
section - it’s no coincidence that the programme is often referred to as ‘urban 
acupuncture’1, a series of targeted mini-interventions aimed at releasing the 
creative potential of the city. While these may be seen against a wider 
backdrop of creating the right conditions for (creative) business, reducing them 
                                                
 
1 The term is attributed to Finnish architect Marco Casagrande, who had been involved 
in the regeneration of Treasure Hill. 
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simply to their macro-economic function misses the point of the process: the 
building of institutions with roots in the state, the commercial world and the 
civil society. Rather than being a simple commercialisation of public space 
(many of the buildings and areas involved were in fact never public but were 
rather acquired by the city and opened to the public), the URS stations 
represent a production of a specific (quasi)public creative space with a defined 
goal of regenerating neighbourhoods and stoking creativity, however vague 
that may be. 
 
Moreover, the comparison of municipal and private sector efforts towards the 
building of a creative city (be they for profit or not) reveals an advancing 
homogeneity of the programmes in terms of the practice of producing creative 
space, from the underpinning beliefs to the spatial and organizational 
outcomes of such practices. Recalling debates on institutional isomorphism 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the need for 
legitimation through isomorphism2 is a plausible explanation: the case of 
Taipei’s URS is one of a municipal actors’ emulation of informal work 
introduced to Taipei by a group of artists, architects and civil society activists 
on one hand, and the work of corporate arts and culture foundations on the 
other, suggesting that the perceived legitimacy towards which the URS 
programme gravitates in fact lies outside the state and carries within it the 
accepted understandings of its mission beholden to earlier work by non-state 
actors. Put simply, the city institutions have been integrating and assimilating 
lessons from the non-state sector while also conferring on some of the non-
state actors the role of ‘go-to authorities’ for questions of culture-led urban 
regeneration. As such, the situation lends itself to an ethnography aimed at 
unravelling the assumed and shared understandings on which the URS and 
related institutions are based, which in term are spread and shaped by 
negotiations between state and non-state actors over the period of several 
                                                
 
2 DiMaggio and Powell suggest a typology of institutional isomorphism, wherein a 
coercive process of isomorphism refers to organizations adopting “ritualised controls of 
credentials and group solidarity’ (1983: 151) in order to confer legitimacy on their 
activity, while the mimetic process entails the self-modelling of organizations on what 
are perceived to be legitimate or successful examples from the field (ibid. 152). Lastly, 
the normative process guided by professionalization also applies in Taipei’s case, 
where networks of experts have contributed to the quick spread of certain models of 
operationalizing creativity.  
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decades. Rather than being imposed top-down, the URS programme, as well 
as similar private attempts, has been created through a series of such 
negotiations between the municipal and national state, the artist and creative 
community, and business groups. The first of such negotiations may well be 
found at Treasure Hill, and this chapter will build on comparisons with Treasure 
Hill Artist Village, not least due to the involvement of several of the same 
actors, both organisations and individuals. However, with its complicated 
history of conflict, compromise, and, most crucially, its isolation from the real-
estate market, Treasure Hill was never going to become the ideal template for 
arts-led urban regeneration. Nevertheless, it belongs within the same 
underlying narrative, namely that arts-led redevelopment coupled with policies 
supporting creative industries is desirable both in local terms (the effect within 
the neighbourhood), as well as on a city-wide basis in increasing 
competitiveness. Seen as a belief formed of traditions and dilemmas  (Bevir, 
1999), it has arisen as a response to new ideas about urban space creation, 
the reuse of defunct space, and the new urban economy, all of which had been 
entering Taiwan since the 1980s. A key term within this narrative is the 
‘adaptive reuse’ of abandoned, disused or underused buildings, especially 
those which do not fall into the foremost categories of architectural heritage; 
this term often subsumes all three ideas mentioned above. Returning to the 
case of Treasure Hill, it was akin to a new problem which the city’s planning 
and art community faced and which forced into the public discourse questions 
of equitable redevelopment, the value of art in public space and the discussion 
on what public space in fact is. The difference between the case of Treasure 
Hill and the cases described here is therefore in the intention to develop a city-
wide ‘institution’ which we can observe in subsequent cases of arts-led 
redevelopment, but which had not yet lent itself as the obvious policy choice in 
Treasure Hill. 
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4.2 Institutionalizing the production of creative spaces in 
Taipei 
 
 
Understood in ways as different as industrial policy, urban planning or arts and 
heritage preservation, the insertion of creative spaces into the city is not by any 
means a uniform process. Ad-hoc coalitions such as those which formed at 
Treasure Hill, raising the banners of preservation, identity and social welfare 
may well have been suited for that particular case, but the city-wide adoption 
of creative or arts-led (re)development in Taipei has taken on a more stable 
form. Strictly speaking, the actors can be divided into state/municipal, civil 
society and business sectors, yet a rigid division such as this may obscure the 
cross-group activities of many actors responsible for the spreading and 
adoption of the idea of arts-led urban interventions. In a similar vein, a rigid 
distinction cannot account for the proliferation of approaches and initiatives 
regarding creative space production (and space in more general sense), which 
have been identified not only in Taipei, but also within individual research sites. 
Thus, the construction of a typology of approaches to creative space has had 
to interpret and appreciate the differences, failures and variations in related 
policies across various cities3, which in turn has meant it was necessary to 
unravel the web of negotiation and persuasion, institutional drift and 
isomorphism, agency and constraints. In short, to analyse the way in which a 
consensus about how and why creative space production is important for 
Taipei. The author subscribes to the view that a useful way to get at an answer 
to these questions is with an interpretive focus on the beliefs of the actors 
involved while creating a comprehensive picture of the process of 
institutionalisation discussed in this chapter. Leaving aside discussions of 
ideology (understood either as a false consciousness or distorted 
communication), the aim of the research was instead to look at the 
construction of new institutions out of the often contingent case studies. 
                                                
 
3 Jane M. Jacobs calls these ‘mutations’ (2011) which should be traced to construct a 
truly alternative geography, rather than one which finds the sameness it has set out to 
search for. 
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While traditionally conceived as formal norms and structures, institutions are 
understood in this case as ‘shared understandings’ (Bevir, 2007), or ‘commonly 
accepted ways of doing things’ (Abers and Keck, 2006; 2013). In this light, the 
chapter examines the institutionalisation of creative space production, i.e. the 
transition into a shared and agreed way of using, organising and placing 
creative spaces in Taipei, wherein the shared assumptions regarding such 
institutions extend to the expectations of their efficacy. Instead of examining 
the faits accomplis of institutionalization however, the ethnographic research 
conducted in Taipei in spring of 2013 aimed to analyse the ‘institutional work’ 
(Lawrence et al, 2009) that has been put in: the institutionalising effort rather 
than the institutionalised outcome, locating the effort within the middle level of 
analysis, the interspace between discourse and practice. It is by no means 
certain that the institutionalising effort will result in long-lasting and resilient 
institutions - in any case many of the URS projects had a time limit of three or 
four years attached to them from the outset, unlike the arrangement at 
Treasure Hill, which is intended to run indefinitely (though in what form remains 
a moot point). Rather, the ‘institution’ discussed in the present chapter is 
understood as a process of integrating beliefs about redevelopment and arts 
into a wider framework of ideas, many of which have been implicitly connected 
with processes such as globalization or neoliberalization, ideas about the 
competitiveness of cities which include a macro-economic dimension, a form 
of demographic engineering (in the form of attracting and retaining ‘talent’) as 
well as particular concerns over Taipei’s past and future urban space. 
 
The three groups of actors mentioned above - state, civil and business - all 
entered the process of institutionalising creative space production with 
particular demands and expectations, ranging from pressures perceived by 
actors as ‘external’ or ‘objective’ (such as the need for working spaces amid 
rising rents, to raise the city’s profile, or to achieve better business results), and 
those which are seen as being inherent to the actors’ needs or stated beliefs 
(such as creating and preserving the city’s culture, civic responsibility to create 
better living environments or corporate philanthropy). Adopting an interpretive 
approach to the beliefs held by actors however does not necessarily 
distinguish between these self-reported categories, instead treating all of them 
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as guiding their action and consequently contributing to the formation of the 
institutions tasked with creating or up-keeping the city’s creative spaces. Thus, 
the case of the old Huashan distillery, discussed in the first subsection of this 
chapter, reveals how the ideas of the city’s artists and architect community 
came into contact (not always devoid of conflict) with the state’s initially rigid 
understanding of the artists’ efforts as trespassing, the tension ultimately 
resulting in the adoption by the state of some of the artists’ ideas. Similarly, the 
creation of corporate art foundations, modelled on similar movements in Japan 
opened the door for (elite) members of Taiwan’s art community to guide the 
work of these foundations toward the production of permanent spatial 
interventions. And lastly, the third subsection examines in a similar vein the 
intersection of all three sets of actors in the URS programme, combining 
artistic intervention with the need for standardisation and accountability, and 
insights from marketing and branding stemming from the corporate 
foundations. The resulting mix is not entirely different from analogous efforts in 
other cities, nor is the intention of this research to gauge Taipei against a 
normative benchmark of some sort. 
 
Huashan 1914 - ‘patient zero’ of Taiwanese creative spaces 
Built in 1914, as the current name of the area suggests, the Huashan4 distillery (
華⼭山酒廠，Huàshān jiǔchǎng) was an example of Japanese industrial colonial 
architecture set on nearly 8 hectares of land in what was then the eastern fringe 
of Taipei. As the city spread eastward however, the erstwhile distillery, known 
especially for its various types of baijiu, found itself surrounded by a dense 
urban landscape. Though real-estate prices are often cited as the reason for 
the distillery’s relocation, the land on which it stands was owned by the national 
government; rather, the immediate impetus for the plant’s move was the 
introduction of stringent environmental rules which meant continuing operation 
in downtown Taipei was no longer feasible. After its closure in 1987, the factory 
briefly served as the “Ba-de Road Car-park”, though its legal status was never 
                                                
 
4 Initially named after the Japanese colonial governor Kabayama Sukenori (????), 
the distillery was renamed by the nationalist government to a more acceptable Huashan 
(??), which literally means ‘flower mountain’, in what is a  The character ? (huà) also 
denotes Chinese ethnicity and is in any case very similar to Kabayama’s (??huà, 
meaning birch), being a homonym and only distinguished by the tree radical (?).  
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formalised due to the complicated relation between the land owners (National 
Property Administration of the Ministry of Finance and the Taiwan Provincial 
Government), as well as different operators (the Bureau of Labor Insurance and 
the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly, respectively). The same problem also 
meant the city was not able to intervene in the area through its 1997 Regional 
Environmental Reconstruction Programme (地區環境改造計畫 Dìqū huánjìng 
gǎizào jì huà), which urged local authorities to take charge of improving the 
environment and the site remained underused for much of the decade following 
the distillery’s relocation. 
 
It was this administrative logjam that the members of the Golden Bough 
Theatre Group (⾦金枝演社, Jīnzhī Yǎnshè) burst into with their ‘discovery’ of 
large abandoned warehouses perfect for their dance and theatre 
performances. The symbolism of this act for the ensuing process of 
institutionalisation cannot be understated, considering the administrative 
quagmire the old factory had found itself since production was relocated to 
Linkou. By-passing official planning, ownership issues and inter-governmental 
tugs of war, the theatre company introduced the idea of adaptive reuse into the 
public realm within a matter of months, aided also by publicity generated when 
its founder and director Wang Rong-yu was arrested for trespassing on 
government property. The speed with which the state subsequently took up 
the artists’ idea is impressive considering the number of conflicting claims on 
the area during the period in question. Taipei’s Urban Development 
Department was for example working on a study of using the site for the new 
Legislative Yuan building, though proposals were ultimately dropped due to 
local opposition, as well as the Department head’s opinions on the heritage 
value of industrial architecture. Huashan was clearly a valuable plot of centrally 
located land ripe for redevelopment, with conflicting claims revealing macro-
political cleavages between the DPP-run municipality and KMT-run central 
state, between different government departments, between the Development 
Department and the local citizenry. The artists’ own claims on the space were 
thus hardly uncontested, and the Huashan case illustrates the apparent 
attractiveness, and perception of, arts-led redevelopment in Taipei (even 
though, strictly speaking, Huashan was an issue for the central state as the 
ultimate owner of the land and the buildings on the site.) 
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The Golden Bough company first started using the space in the summer of 
1997 and in July of the same year, the ‘Society for the Promotion of Huashan 
Special Arts Area’ was established, addressing its first petition for the 
preservation of the distillery as an art centre to the Legislative Yuan in 
September, somewhat ironic considering the site had nearly become the 
Yuan’s new home. In December however, the experimental occupation of the 
space resulted in a clash with the property’s owners, as Wang Rong-yu was 
arrested during a performance that involved him riding a motorcycle through 
Huashan. Wang’s arrest turned out to be a galvanizing moment for the tight-
knit community of artists in Taipei. As Margaret Shiu, who later became 
director of the association running Huashan Special Creative Zone, recalls: 
“The whole arts and culture community came out … and that’s when Lin Huai-
min, the most important person in the arts in Taiwan came up and said if you 
can put a theatre director in jail just because he’s using somewhere that’s 
derelict and under-used, then there is something very wrong with society. Oh 
God! Immediately, the next day, the guy was released and this hot potato 
immediately transferred to the culture ministry and they said, please, if they 
want to use it, let them have fun with it. Let them use it, we’re gonna demolish 
it anyway.” (Margaret Shiu, Bamboospace Director. Interview, May 16 2013) 
 
As reluctant as the government may have been initially to deal with the ‘hot 
potato’ of Huashan, the gathering momentum of the movement soon made it 
impossible to ignore. Not only the art community, but also architects, urban 
planners and crucially, the business community all subtly influenced thinking 
about the value of art in a valuable and central location such as Huashan. The 
architect community had for example been exposed to new approaches in 
urbanism via epistemic networks from the 1980s on, yet lacked the initial 
impetus, provided in this case by the ‘trouble-makers’, as Margaret Shiu 
describes the group of artists working at Huashan. The business community on 
the other hand was at the time already concerned about Taiwan’s 
competitiveness and innovation, and with the creative industries seen as a 
close relation of the arts (rightly or not) threw their weight behind the project of 
adaptive reuse of Huashan. This may be the crucial difference to a case such 
as Treasure Hill; related as the artists’ claims or the state response may be, the 
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case of Huashan was the first major instance of the meeting of the arts, the 
state as well as the professional and business community and has established 
many of the mores, constraints, expectations and path-dependencies that 
have shaped the formation of the URS initiative and other art/culture-led 
projects of redevelopment. By observing and analysing the maturing of this 
particular creative space then, we will be able to construct a more detailed 
view of two significant tendencies in creative space production at Huashan 
which have been taken-up in subsequent projects of the same or similar type 
and scale. These are then, together with in-depth interviews and observation, 
taken to construct a clearer image of what the beliefs shaping the process of 
institutionalisation may be. 
 
1. Public-private partnerships 
After an initial flurry of activity resulting in the transferral of responsibility over 
Huashan to the Council for Cultural Affairs (Taiwan’s central government 
ministerial-level body), the area was entrusted to the Huashan Special Art Zone 
(HSAZ), the civil society organisation stemming from the 1997 movement. The 
NGO ran the former distillery until November 2003, during which time the group 
organised around 3500 different events at Huashan, repaired many of the 
decaying buildings and entrusted many of the derelict spaces to artists who set 
up studios and workshops, providing content but also creating a community of 
people with deep professional links to the space itself. During this period 
however, the new DPP government (the city had meanwhile returned under 
KMT rule) was preparing its own creative industry policy, which marks the 
beginning of direct government involvement at Huashan, with creative 
industries conflated with the arts under the ‘creative-cultural’ rubric (the same 
terminology is interestingly used in the People’s Republic of China). The so-
called “New Taiwan Art Star” policy called for substantial investments into 
Huashan amounting to NTD8.2 billion (around £160 million), including a 28-
storey art and culture centre, a pop music centre and the creation of an island-
wide network of creative industry centres situated in old warehouses in 
Taichung, Tainan, Chiayi and Hualien5. While the plan triggered uproar in the 
                                                
 
5 The policy was launched in July 2004 by Council for Cultural Affairs to dovetail with 
President Chen Shui-bian’s new cultural policy. (Executive Yuan Council for Cultural 
Affairs, 2004).  
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professional community over plans to construct a 28-storey tower in the middle 
of the protected area, as well as a clear shift towards a commercial 
understanding of creative-cultural parks, the responsibility to run Huashan was 
eventually given up by the HSAZ in a close vote of its assembly. Faced with the 
cost of running the venue without state support, the entire venue was then 
outsourced to a private business venture, the Taiwan Cultural and Creative 
Development Co., Ltd (台灣⽂文創發展股份有限公司 Táiwān wén chuàng fāzhǎn 
gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī). Founded by a publishing company, a hotel and a 
venture capital group, the company was in 2008 re-awarded operating rights 
over the majority of Huashan for a further 15 years at a rent of NTD 15million 
per annum (roughly £300,000) (Liberty Times, 16 June 2008). 
 
Though the re-awarding of operating rights was criticised by the artist 
community due to the perceived lack of oversight over the company’s 
decisions, the commitment of the government to a public-private partnership 
underlines the extent to which the notions of outsourcing to a profit-making 
business entity have entered a consensus on the production of creative spaces 
in Taipei (and Taiwan more widely), even among the professional community 
whose radical actions forced these spaces to be considered as a public good 
in the first place. The resulting mixed-use space, with an emphasis on 
commercially viability, became both an administrative template for other efforts 
such as Pier-2 in Kaohsiung (see Chapter Five), and in a more general sense, 
set the tone for the aesthetic and organizational structure of many arts centres 
in Taiwan. Seen from the perspective of the arts community, the public-private 
partnership formula also meant the formalization of their influence to the role of 
selection committee members, or members of various municipal boards. In the 
case of Huashan’s public-private partnership, the selection of the operator was 
decided upon by a selection committee where at least half of the members 
were required to be ‘specialists or scholars’, though their selection was still left 
to the authority in charge, in this case the Council for Cultural Affairs. 
(Executive Yuan Council for Cultural Affairs, 2001). Outside of this arena 
however, the influence of the arts community in running new spaces appears 
to have waned as the municipal and central state have developed 
administrative devices for developing and managing creative spaces, often 
with the involvement of private-sector enterprises. As seen in Kaohsiung, as 
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well as other locations in Taipei (Treasure Hill included), the governance 
structures of creative spaces have converged towards a model where day-to-
day management is outsourced to a private body, or such a body is ‘created’ 
by the state in case of a lack of genuine private interest. The institutional 
isomorphism observed is in this case characterised by the application of 
existing governance practices such as selection committees with newer ones 
such as public-private partnerships. While it may be explained by a need for 
accountability and the subordinate position of these organizations in the state 
bureaucracy, it also confers on new cultural-creative institutions a legitimating 
appearance that is legible to policy-makers and other government actors and 
spreads in accordance to expectations of organizations mimicking successful 
precedents (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), not necessarily with an eye towards 
increased efficiency or cost-effectiveness. 
 
2. Mass appeal 
As mentioned in the section above, the outsourcing of creative spaces to 
profit-making enterprises has direct effects on the range and type of offer at 
the cultural venue due to concerns over the profitability of investment. From 
the early days of serving as the hub for Taipei’s avant-garde and fringe art, 
Huashan 1914, as the centre is presently called, has become an undoubtedly 
more mainstream affair, where spaces and exhibitions are allocated to tried 
and trusted sub-tenants6. Thus, Taipei Spot opened its new cinema there, 
Alleycat’s Pizza, a popular chain of restaurants, also set up shop in the one of 
the abandoned warehouses, as has a yoga workshop and an Italian-style 
osteria. Huashan 1914 even has its own branded credit card. Alongside a list of 
amenities at Huashan 1914, the trend towards providing popular content is 
noticeable in the dominance of exhibitions and events of decidedly popular or 
commercial appeal (computer game launches, candy exhibitions and 
                                                
 
6 This is well illustrated with the controversy surrounding a Taiwanese graffiti artist 
Zhang Shuo Yin, know as Ting Tong Chang, who was arrested for vandalism for 
graffiting a building that had at the time hosted an exhibition on street art in New York. 
As a statement on the ambivalent stance of the centre towards Taiwanese street art, it 
gathered support among Taiwan’s already disgruntled artist community, and the artist 
later achieved recognition and a pardon by the Executive Yuan’s Council for Cultural 
Affairs (now the Ministry of Culture) in return for an apology. Ironically, he was later 
prevented from taking photographs of his own work by the Huashan’s operator, as the 
work had since become a protected part of the site. (Zhang Shuo Yin, graffiti artist. 
Interview, 13 February 2014; You, 2006) 
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“luminous 3D art” featuring comic-book style images of scantily clad girls 
tortured by an array of monsters being just three recent examples). While 
informative in an anecdotal way, this list would amount to a mere observation 
were it not also clearly stated as policy, with the trend being in fact sanctioned 
by policy papers on Huashan. While this direction is consistent with the 
transformation of Huashan from a fringe art centre to a creative industry 
cluster, the conflating of industrial policy with vaguer notions of creativity 
produces a wider effect on all spaces categorised as creative, as the example 
of the URS programme illustrates. Moreover, similar trends have also been 
observed at Treasure Hill, ostensibly a ‘purely’ cultural/art venue that has in 
recent years began to embrace a more commercial approach even in the 
absence of clear market pressures. In an interview about the curatorial choices 
at Huashan and other cultural-creative venues within the national programme, 
the chairman of the Taiwan Art Development Association (a civil society group 
working with government in the promotion of the arts) explained the state 
bodies’ choices were often influenced by the need to provide popular service 
with which they can justify the public investment, especially in a climate where 
popular media outlets have taken to criticising government profligacy. 
(Interview, Jiang Yao-xian, Taiwan Art Development Association (Chairman). 23 
November 2012) The trend towards the selection of ‘tried and tested’ choices 
is especially visible in the arts and culture, where results are often not easily 
quantifiable beyond visitor numbers, meaning a successful Dali exhibition in 
Taipei is quickly invited to Kaohsiung, or a yellow duck from Hong Kong to no 
less than three Taiwanese ports. The bias towards popular content builds upon 
the trend of outsourcing and seeking private sector partners in that it attempts 
to minimise risk for public bodies, while allowing them significant input in the 
selection and operation of these venues, as selections are often taken at the 
highest (political) levels. 
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4.3 Corporate art foundations 
 
 
From the late 1990s onward, a new set of spatial actors appeared in Taipei - 
corporate art foundations. While their parent companies, often big 
conglomerates including both financial and construction companies, have been 
actively involved in shaping urban space and policy, the arrival of dedicated 
non-profit operations heralded a new level of engagement specifically with the 
production of creative spaces in the city. It is argued further that their 
engagement has not only provided ‘yet another’ set of actors or interest 
groups, but that the activities and structure of the foundations have 
contributed to the way in which the municipal state has designed its own 
targeted spatial interventions such as the URS programme. From 
organisational and curatorial approaches down to the choice of media with 
which to communicate to target audiences and even the ‘look and feel’ of the 
newer municipal publications, the experience of the corporate art foundations 
has profoundly influenced the city government by providing a platform and 
template which would be adopted by state actors. The isomorphic process 
was further facilitated by a host of spatial professionals who, acting as a 
legitimizing authority, transmitted the experiences and built up collaborative 
projects between municipal and corporate actors throughout the 2000s, 
culminating in what I argue is a corporative (not corporate) approach in 
creating and managing creative spaces in Taipei. 
 
While one foundation, the JUT Foundation for Arts and Architecture (JFAA; 忠泰
建築⽂文化藝術基⾦金會 Zhōngtài jiànzhú wénhuà yìshù jījīn huì) is the key case 
studied here, the process of introducing the notion of corporate art foundations 
into the field of public space, and especially creative spaces, began in earnest 
with the Fubon Group, Taiwan’s financial services giant. In 1997, the Group 
established the Fubon Art Foundation7, which has been run since its inception 
                                                
 
7 The group’s first foray into culture-related charitable work was in 1990, when the 
Fubon Cultural & Education Foundation was founded, though this was, as the 
foundation’s website states, in reaction to: “…degrading social value, moral standard 
and along with the rising juvenile delinquency…” (Fubon Cultural and Education 
Foundation website, Who We Are section; 
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by Maggie Tsai, the daughter-in-law to the group’s founder and chairman, Tsai 
Wan-tsai. This genealogical fact is not entirely without significance: many of 
Taiwan’s larger corporate foundations are headed by family members who 
often also sit on the boards of public arts and culture institutions in what can be 
described as a ‘classic’ case of corporate and public arts governance. The 
present chapter strives to take a further step not by describing the elite world of 
arts funding and governance, but rather examine the institutional interplay at 
hand; nevertheless, the reoccurring appearance of a short list of names on the 
boards of several of Taipei’s most prestigious institutions (Taipei City Museum, 
Museum of Contemporary Art, Contemporary Art Foundation to name a few) 
serves to illustrate how relatively small and close-knit the world of corporate 
philanthropy, the arts and public arts and culture institutions actually is, with 
Taiwan being no exception.  
 
A broader comparative look at the role which corporate art foundations and 
sponsorships played in the western context is useful at this point. The political 
restructuring along a free-market doctrine in the United States and Britain for 
example, not only forced the logic of market competition on the art world, but 
also ostensibly relied on and supported corporate funding of the arts, with 
President Reagan regularly hosting galas to support this or that fundraising 
drive for the arts (Wu, 2003: 51). This shift, most visible in the United States 
and to a lesser extent Britain, is however not entirely applicable to the 
Taiwanese experience, where private funding and engagement with the arts 
was not so much relied upon as it was integrated into a complex web of 
public-private collaborations, the case of Taipei’s Museum of Contemporary 
Art being a case in point.8 A more comparable situation can be found closer to 
Taiwan, in the proliferation of corporate/family art foundations that have 
become a mainstay in Japan. Rita Chang, former curator and board member at 
the Fubon Art Foundation recalls how Fubon’s Tsai family took the setting up 
                                                                                                                               
 
http://international.fubonedu.org.tw/who.asp) 
8 Taipei’s Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA) was run from its inception in 2001 until 
2007 by the Contemporary Art Foundation (Dāngdài yìshù jījīn huì), a non-profit 
foundation established by TSMC Education and Culture Foundation, Quanta Computer 
Education Foundation, Acer Computer Co., Ltd., Sheng Daily Co., Ltd., Taiwan Microsoft 
Corporation and other five companies in order to run the MOCA for the city’s Department 
of Cultural Affairs, which finally took the museum over in December 2007.  
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of the Watari family’s Watarium Museum of Contemporary Art as an example of 
good practice. (Rita Chang. Director, Asian Cultural Council Taipei. Interview, 
24 June 2013). The Mori Art Museum meanwhile, founded by real-estate 
tycoon Minoru Mori, actively cooperates with the aforementioned JFAA, 
founded by fellow real-estate Li family. Apart from the prestige and adherence 
to notions of corporate social responsibility, the cases in point are set apart by 
their engagement in the politics of urban space, especially in introducing art 
into public and private space within the framework of the creative city 
discourse. Thus, Fubon Art Foundation’s annual art show ‘Very Fun Park’ (粉樂
園 Funleyuan) was instrumental not only in opening up both public and 
corporate spaces in Taipei’s eastern business district to art interventions, but 
also in cementing the notions of creativity within the political community, with 
Rita Chang guiding then Mayor Ma Ying-jiu around the area, pointing out the 
potential for art-led urban redevelopment in the Xinyi area, an effort for which 
the Foundation has received awards from the city in 2007 and 2012. The 
Foundation was instrumental in shaping the way in which corporate art 
foundations operate and intervene in urban space by pioneering not only the 
use of land-plots slated for development to stage temporary art projects, but 
also by using advertising budgets to fund such endeavours, which were 
beginning to be understood as more than charity or philanthropy and took the 
form of brand-building with an explicit didactic element, i.e. nurturing the 
public’s appreciation of the arts. It is especially the latter effort that dovetails 
with the municipal creative and cultural policies, with current Mayor Hau Lung-
bin summing up the Foundation’s efforts to put ‘art into life and life into art’ as 
cornerstones of Taipei’s cultural and creative policy.9 The target audience, form 
and curatorial decisions which shaped Very Fun Park (young Taiwanese artists 
with wide popular appeal, unconventional locations meant to revitalise urban 
areas, tie-ups with tourist attractions and urban lifestyle) are furthermore the 
very elements which are mirrored not only in the work of other arts 
foundations, but the city’s own efforts at introducing art and creativity into 
                                                
 
9 Taipei City Government, Secretariat Media Services Section. (2012) 15th Taipei Culture 
Award: Li Ganlang, Kang Wenhua, Fubon Art Foundation receive awards (??????
???????????????????????Dì shíwǔ jiè táiběi wénhuà jiǎng, li 
gānlǎng, táng wénhuá, fù bāng yìshù jījīn huì huòjiǎng) [press release]. Retreived from: 
http://www.wsdo.taipei.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=13538306&ctNode=36376&mp=104021]    
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public urban space, and have all featured prominently in Taipei’s bid to 
become World Design Capital in 2016. 
 
JFAA - JUT Foundation for Art and Architecture 
The Fubon Art Foundation may be the first to have engaged with the 
production of creative spaces within the creative city discourse, yet the JFAA, 
attached to high-end construction firm JUT or Zhongtai (忠泰), is the corporate 
foundation closely involved in the process of institutionalizing creative space 
production through the URS programme, which bears many similarities to the 
JFAA’s own work. Founded in 2007, the JFAA was financed using the 
construction business’s advertising budget and quickly began selecting and 
providing content for the construction firm’s empty building sites. A particularly 
noteworthy installation was Rice for Thoughts10 where a large rice paddy was 
constructed on a future building site in Dazhi, and where New York-based 
artist Aaron Lee lived for a season while exploring issues of Taiwanese identity 
in the transition from rural to urban - and growing rice. The Foundation quickly 
expanded to cover not only a narrow definition of ‘Art’, but more importantly 
tied a more dispersed notion of creativity with lifestyle: the design one 
consumes, the art one appreciates, the food one savours and, naturally, the 
kind of home one inhabits. This tendency is visible in the Foundation’s early 
platform, the “Museum of Tomorrow (MOT)”, which operated as a temporary 
private museum and from which sprang an online culture and style magazine 
(the MOT Times), cafe (MOT/KITCHEN), flower shop (MOT/FLOWER), as well 
as a furniture and design shop (MOT/CASA and MOT/ARTS). The issue here is 
not which organization, group or even individual first established this 
connection; rather, the research suggests that it was the JFAA which 
managed, using a platform-based approach, to transmit this link into the city’s 
own creative space production, which closely follows the basic themes of 
JFAA’s own spatial production. 
 
                                                
 
10 The original name of the installation is Qíng gēng yǔ dú (????), loosely translating 
as ‘farming when it’s sunny, reading when it rains’. Bearing a striking resemblance to 
Agnes Denes’ Wheatfield – A Confrontation, in which two acres of wheat were sown 
and harvested in downtown Manhattan, the work similarly explores contradictions 
between urban and rural land use, though the Taiwanese version’s attachment to a 
real-estate developer presents an interesting case of critical corporate art.  
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In exploring the influence of the JFAA on municipal creative space production, 
notions of ‘lifestyle’ are a reoccurring theme, not only as an aspirational 
trajectory, but also leading to the organizing principle defining the population 
that such policies and spaces target - the concept of the ‘village’. A platform-
like approach, the village in the incongruous context of modern urban space is 
a surprisingly resilient concept related to the post-modernist pushback against 
high-modernist visions of mass society. In invoking images of a self-organising, 
organic, independent group, it resonates with neo-liberal notions of an 
enterprise society as well. Lastly, the concept carries an additional image in 
Taiwan, one which the Foundation had already been exploring with the Rice for 
Thought project and which can loosely be described as an atavistic longing for 
a pre-urban life specific to the construction of Taiwanese identity. The village 
was first used during a 3-year collaborative project with Dutch architecture and 
urbanism studio MVRDV, which came to Taiwan to study the wealth of illegal, 
vernacular architectural forms which had developed alongside (or in opposition 
to) the official modernist vision of Taipei. In focusing on Taipei’s hitherto 
unappreciated urban forms, the collaboration between JFAA and MVRDV 
resulted in several publications and exhibitions which were often at odds with 
the accepted notions of urbanity on which Taipei’s Urban Regeneration Office 
(URO) was founded - according to the foundation’s chief of operations, what 
the city saw as ugly and chaotic, the MVRDV/JFAA project celebrated with 
great success. Ultimately, the project secured city-backing for a tour in Hong 
Kong as well as more recently to Hamburg’s prestigious urban development 
fair IBA, although the URO’s motivation was essentially to establish 
professional links with Hamburg’s corresponding department - such sub-
national links with foreign municipalities are especially important considering 
Taiwan’s ambiguous diplomatic status. 
 
The village as an organizing principle of creative communities was first put into 
practice by the JFAA at what later became the Foundation’s most controversial 
site - UrbanCore, a block of old residential housing between Chunghwa Rd. 
and Yanping South Rd. in the south-western corner of central Taipei. The block 
had been intended for redevelopment, yet the Foundation’s parent company 
was unable to obtain the rights to every single property and the vacant 
buildings were then used by the JFAA to house a total of 15 diverse “teams”, 
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as they were called, all of whom can be grouped in a loose conception of 
creative and cultural groups. Among them, the municipal URO also opened the 
URS 89/6 (Urban regeneration station) in the first formal collaboration between 
the city and the JFAA. Although this particular URS was in fact subsumed 
within the JFAA’s UrbanCore scheme, the city also included the entire space in 
its network of urban regeneration stations. One salient detail about this 
particular space is however the negative attention it attracted in the press, as 
well as from the remaining tenants in the street block, which accused the 
‘artists’ (as a seemingly catch-all term for UrbanCore teams) of attempting to 
drive them out by playing loud music, organizing parties and generally 
disturbing the peace of the old block. The media attention on the other hand 
presented the development as a real-estate ploy to inflate land prices, much to 
the Foundation’s frustration as it was cast as mere a tool of the construction 
business (Lea Lin, JFAA Secretary General. Interview, 13 June 2013). The 
brewing controversy around UrbanCore negatively affected not only the 
foundation, but on a more general level, brought into question the idea of using 
artists to bring about meaningful and equitable urban regeneration. Margaret 
Shiu, a Huashan veteran and first director of the Association of the Visual Arts 
in Taiwan, recalls the controversy as a conflict between real-estate developers 
and local tenants in which the artists became scapegoats for furious tenants: 
“That's when the problem came up and the local citizens were upset and we as 
artists became scapegoats. These were tenants, so if their landlord is holding 
out and asking for a high price, they will get kicked out. So they think that 
because of artists coming in, they are even more likely to get kicked out. …  
They don't see their landlord, they don't see Zhongtai, they only see the artists, 
who are there. And you want me to participate in your [Zhongtai’s] dialog? 
What dialog, so we decided to all leave. (Margaret Shiu, Bamboocurtain Space, 
Director. Interview, May 16 2013) 
 
The difficulty in negotiating transitional spaces’ is one of the reasons why the 
JFAA closed UrbanCore in March 2012, after it had negotiated with the city’s 
redevelopment office the conditions to take over, this time entirely within the 
URS programme as URS21, a large state-owned warehouse in the Zhongshan 
area. The lessons learnt at UrbanCore were not lost on the foundation: the 
difficulty in managing neighbourhood relations and press were certainly at the 
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top, though the JFAA Secretary General also underlines the creative 
atmosphere of the old space, comparing it with the organised yet somewhat 
more controlled environment of URS21. What is relevant for the present project 
however is the way in which the beliefs about art/culture-led regeneration, and 
more particularly the organisational framework required (physical space, 
“village” as organising principle, publications, lifestyle spinoffs), filtered through 
to the municipally run URS21, and by extension to the institutionalisation of art-
led urban redevelopment in Taipei. Seen from the perspective of the JFAA, the 
collaboration with the city is both a necessity and hindrance, wherein the city 
can offer a legitimising framework for their work, yet also imposes on the space 
its visions and ways of doing things, from biannual reports, the need to 
participate in public tenders, to minor issues such as maintenance contracts 
and ensuing delays. While the Foundation is committed to stay at the 
Zhongshan space for a total of three years, with the city strongly hinting they 
would favour an extension, the JFAA is also planning its own museum/creative 
space in Dazhi in northern Taipei. The potential difficulties in creating 
permanent relations between corporate foundations participating in the 
production of creative spaces do not however detract from the general trend, 
i.e. the integration of private-sector inputs into the city-led regenerative effort 
within the creative city discourse, quite the opposite: the relation between the 
municipality and the corporate sector is complex, dynamic and in many ways 
exhibits the reliance of the municipal state on non-state actors in the process 
of producing creative spaces in Taipei and by extension, in re-envisaging 
Taipei as a creative city. 
 
As the following section will show, the involvement of business actors has 
been complemented with civil society input into the city bureaucracy in a 
manner that is reminiscent both of corporatist developmental efforts (the 
designation by the state of semi-official partners such as trade unions, 
professional groups etc.), as well as ‘post-modern’ small-scale interventions 
aimed at stimulating market-led change favoured by the neoliberal planning 
paradigm, in which questions of lifestyle (i.e. the shaping of consumer habits), 
the plan as strategy (outlining broad outcomes) and participative planning 
(though favouring certain groups over others) play a prominent role. Unlike the 
case of Kaohsiung however, the Taipei municipality relies and factors in private 
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actors, be they corporate sponsored or civil society groupings. Apart from the 
collaborative projects discussed in the present research, the city is also 
beginning to use planning/development rights to stimulate ‘creative’ projects, 
following the template used in the run-up to the Taipei International Flora 
Exhibition of 2010.11 
 
  
                                                
 
11 As part of the city’s effort to make Taipei a verdant metropolis, developers were 
granted an increase in development rights if they constructed and maintained, for a 
year, small gardens or parks on their lots. Needless to say, many of these gardens were 
left to wilt once the increased development rights were granted. The city is currently 
looking into quantifying a similar increase for ‘creative spaces’, which currently count 
towards a qualitative bonus for developers but have not been formalised into a 
percentage. 
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4.4 Urban Regeneration Stations (URS) - a corporative 
approach to creative city production 
 
 
Taipei’s Urban Regeneration Office, occupying the 5th floor of an unassuming 
building near Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall, would seem like another neon-lit 
government office were it not for the stacks of magazine-style booklets, 
promotional material, books, and posters of various events, all designed with a 
modern aesthetic and more akin to the headquarters of an architecture and 
design magazine rather than a part of the city’s bureaucracy. This attention to 
design is unusual for a government department, which any intermittent 
connoisseur of Taipei’s government publications (especially English language 
ones) can confirm. Indeed, among the staff who welcomed me, Section Chief 
Lin Yu-Hsiu pointed out there has been a conscious choice to produce visually 
appealing material as the office was tasked with bringing about a change in 
Taipei’s urban space as well as the city’s presence in international and 
domestic discourse. (Lin Yu-Hsiu, URO Section Chief. Interview: 16 April 2013). 
 
Founded in 2004, the URO operates as an ‘office’ (處 chu) level organization 
within the city’s Urban Development Department (formerly The Office of Urban 
Planning); headed by an architect (rather than an urban planner), its mission is 
to promote smaller urban regeneration projects, public-private partnerships 
and coordinate community engagement and outreach programmes. In 
practice, the URO has focused on several economically and demographically 
weaker areas of Taipei such as the old western commercial area around Dihua 
Street, as well as several previously industrial facilities, which had become 
derelict in the past decades. 
 
At a cursory glance, a similarity with other cases of culture-led regeneration or 
redevelopment in Taipei is prominent, especially with the case of Treasure Hill 
as well as of Bopiliao, another old commercial area turned cultural-heritage site 
with strong creative industry links (Wang, 2013). The latter two cases were 
however ultimately handled by the cultural department within a heritage 
preservation discourse, often 
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Table 7 - URS locations in Taipei 
Number Name Location Range of activities 
URS 13 Reviewed 
Vanguard 
Nangang Bottle cap 
Factory, 
Nangang district 
Electronic music venue, digital 
art workshop, 
filming set 
URS 21 Chung Shan 
Creative Hub 
Minsheng E. Rd, 
Zhongshan District 
Creative industry hub, café and 
restaurant, 
JFAA head office 
URS 27 The Grand 
Green 
Huashan Park, 
Zhongshan District 
Outdoor exhibition and concert 
venue 
URS 44 Story House Dihua Street, 
Datong District 
Tourist information office, 
Historical Resources 
Management Institute 
URS 85/6 Urban Core 
URS 
Zhonghwa Rd., 
Wanhua District 
(defunct) URS office 
(JFAA run creative industry hub) 
URS 127 Design 
Gallery 
Dihua Street, 
Datong District 
Architect/design studio and 
exhibition space 
URS 155 Cooking 
Together 
Dihua Street, 
Datong District 
Shared workspace / food 
culture hub 
URS 27W Film Range Yanping N. Rd., 
Datong District 
Film set 
 
resulting in solutions which satisfy preservation demands at the cost of the 
communities that first contested the areas’ planned demolition. The case of 
URS is significantly different not in its stated commitment to engage with the 
local community (which other projects share in any case), but in that it is a 
repeatable, longer term scheme which is designed to accommodate civil 
society and private sector actors within its structure from the outset. As such, it 
incorporates both experiences from other departments, most notably the 
Department of Cultural Affairs, as well as those of civil society organisers such 
as Margaret Shiu and corporate art and urban culture foundations. The present 
research argues that the way in which this framework has been set up is an 
example of institution-building, more specifically a corporative effort where the 
state actor designates and leads a handful of associations and organisations. 
As such, the study of the URS programme falls within the perspective of state-
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society relations which has often been adopted in the study of urban 
redevelopment and regeneration programmes (Wang 2013; Kuo 2010; Paulsen 
2007; Henderson 2001; Jessop 1997). The study of the URS programme is 
thus set here as a case study of the municipal state’s ability and methods of 
aligning relevant actors within a wider policy framework of ‘creating the 
creative city’. The following analysis will focus on four distinct areas, each of 
which will develop in turn what is here termed an institutionalisation of creative 
city discourse, comprising concept development, participant selection, 
dissemination of creative city narratives and the use of global expertise as an 
isomorphic, legitimising tool. 
 
Urban acupuncture to soft urbanism - development of a concept for urban 
intervention 
The URS programme centres around two interlinked concepts: urban 
acupuncture, developed by Finnish architect Marco Casagrande and the 
Taipei-based Ruin Academy at Treasure Hill, and soft urbanism, a somewhat 
vaguer term which had been gaining cache in place-branding and urban 
planning in the 2000s (cf. Ind and Holm, 2012; Füller and Marquard, 2012; 
Sikiaridi and Vogelaar, 2003) as an alternative to the master-plan (perceived as 
‘hard’ urbanism) and heavily indebted to neoliberal concepts which had by 
then become an often unseen foundation of planning doxa: market-led, with 
decentralised decision-making and stakeholder involvement, often business-
oriented and based on assumptions of creating the right conditions for growth, 
rather than producing growth directly through planning. The former approach, 
urban acupuncture, serves as an example of a home-grown policy which 
travelled from the professional community into the city’s planning department, 
while the latter may be understood within a more global trend of adapting and 
complementing planning practice as a response to the perceived need to 
increase Taipei’s competitiveness and attractiveness in a post-industrial, 
regionally competitive set of cities such as Seoul, Yokohama, Singapore, which 
are also explicitly referenced in the URS literature as examples of good 
practice (Urban Regeneration Office, Taipei City Urban Development 
Department, 2011; 2012) Both are however crucial to understanding how and 
why the institutionalisation of creative space production in Taipei has been 
driven by a socialised state, a state which mimics and involves non-state 
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actors while ultimately regaining control over the regeneration format: creating 
the institutions (an institution) within the city bureaucracy that could be tasked 
with a broad spatial realignment of the city: both in terms of the physical 
space, as well as the abstract, social and everyday spaces of the city. 
 
For this endeavour to be successful, such an institution must act both as 
catalyst and platform, ultimately being able to influence the diverse array of 
actors, from residents, spatial professionals, corporate interests as well as 
other parts of the state. A useful concept encompassing this wide range of 
tasks and competencies is practical authority, an ability to influence the 
behaviour of other actors, which was developed by Abers and Keck in their 
study of Brazilian water politics (Abers and Keck, 2013). As Hsu Yen-Hsing, 
URO’s deputy Chief Engineer in charge of the operational side of the project 
explains, the question in the 1990s was whether to follow the example of cities 
like London and establish a large, semi-autonomous body such as a 
development corporation, or whether to incorporate redevelopment authority 
within the existing bureaucratic structure. The latter choice prevailed, leading 
to the elevation of the Office for Urban Planning to department status and the 
establishment of the URO within it. Initially, the review of other cities’ solutions 
focused only on planning regulation, not organizational issues. It was not until 
the URO was established that the emphasis shifted from planning in the classic 
sense to ‘thinking about institutions’ (Hsu Yen-Hsing, URO Deputy Chief 
Engineer. Interview, April 30 2013). With this change came an openness to 
policy recommendations from the professional and academic circles, opening 
the way also to the establishment of an experimental programme such as the 
URS. The ‘mission objective’ of the URS demonstrates well the need to work 
between the formal demands of urban planning (which is an articulation of 
state-led, technocratic control) and the fluid processes of creative city 
redevelopment (which are typically led by dispersed, non-state actors): 
“Urban redevelopment requires a blue ocean strategy while facing the 
challenges of globalization, city competition and new economy. A catalyst or an 
innovative hub is essential in a rigid urban development framework to expand 
regeneration vision, which is termed as “urban regeneration station (URS)”. 
URS is mission oriented, open-defined and society concerned regeneration 
strategy. URS is homonymic to ‘Yours” referring to yours, the public and free 
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and pre-defined subject and framework. URS is conceptually understood as a 
platform, a network or a movement. It is an urban peaceful revolution sparked 
by urban regeneration sectors. Each URS space is Named by its door number, 
URS function can be recognised as a workstation, community space, 
information hub, lounge for coterie, exhibition hall, experience action, shelter 
for city flâneur, as you define.” (Urban Regeneration Office, Taipei City Urban 
Development Department, 2012: 4) 
 
The URS programme is thus not a ‘hard’ regulatory or planning body able to 
impose by fiat its designs on the city’s creative and other communities; rather, 
it attempts to bridge the gap between the planning tools and practices of the 
state, and the changeable patchwork of interested actors participating in urban 
redevelopment, particularly in areas where the municipality is unable to enforce 
a comprehensive plan: while mega-projects such as the Songshan Cultural and 
Creative Park are cases of a closed state-led project, the URS is by design a 
participant in the field of state-society relations. Despite this objective however, 
the URS should not be seen merely as a passive platform where societal inputs 
freely shape urban planning policy and practice. The following sections show 
the city remains able to influence actors’ behaviour through a variety of means: 
from the selection of participants and distribution of funds, to the imposition of 
its own vision onto the framing of the programme as a whole, as well as 
deciding how it is included into the wider municipal efforts and endeavours. 
 
Urban Regeneration Stations at Dihua Street: creative preservation 
The project’s basic idea is ‘the revitalization of old and derelict buildings/sites’, 
but the URS sites can further be subdivided into those housed in public 
buildings and spread around Taipei, and those housed in private (or at least 
previously private) locations, most of which are on or around Dihua Street, an 
old commercial street which had been the subject of a protracted and sporadic 
effort of historic preservation that finally developed into Taipei’s most 
significant and complete historical preservation project through a combination 
of civil society and regulatory frameworks (cf. Huang, 2008). The URS thus 
deals both with other government departments (mainly the central Ministry of 
Finance which owns many previously state-owned enterprises’ properties), as 
well as smaller private property owners, and neither of these two partners are 
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guaranteed to have views which align with the wishes and plans of the Urban 
Regeneration Office. Dealing with other government bodies requires the URO 
to successfully frame the need for culture/creative-led regeneration of state-
owned property, an approach discussed in the following subsection. Dealing 
with unresponsive private owners however was rather a matter of selecting a 
mechanism of compensation, the ‘transfer of development rights’ or TDR. The 
Transfer of Development Rights system has traditionally been understood as a 
way to use the land market to fund planning and avoid conflicts arising from 
traditional zoning practices. The idea behind the TDR is that the municipality 
may step in and ‘swap’ development rights in two areas of the city, that is to 
take the assumed value of a potential development from one site and ‘credit’ 
the beneficiary with development rights elsewhere; the municipality in a way 
acts as a ‘central bank’, being able to influence the value of development rights 
by withholding or selling them to developers. While criticised as cumbersome, 
inefficient and inequitable, TDR is increasingly used around the world, 
especially around historical preservation issues (cf. Pruetz, 1997; Johnston and 
Madison, 1997; Micelli, 2002; Watson, 2009). 
 
Taipei’s system was adapted from similar practice in the United States, but 
their approach to TDR hints at the intentions of the URO: by taking over 
historical houses in key locations along Dihua Street, the mechanism is used 
specifically to complement preservations efforts (seeing how simple zoning of 
conservation has often led to neglect of properties by owners) in a way which 
also provides content and opens the spaces to the general public; in fact, the 
one unchanging requirement of all URS sites is that they remain/become open 
to visitors. Additionally, another organisation, the Taipei Urban Redevelopment 
Center (TURC, which operates as a foundation, rather than a governmental 
body) has emerged from the URO in 2012, after the preparatory group of URO 
employees handed over the running of the centre to the foundation. The 
foundation was established through a government donation, meaning it 
operates as a nominally independent entity tasked with facilitating the work of 
the URO, especially when faced with resistance from property-owners who 
often view government agencies with suspicion. The TURC is not strictly 
committed to creative space production, yet it can be seen within the 
proliferating activity of the URO (and of the municipal state) in creating 
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government-organised NGOs to complement the regulatory tools available to 
the office. 
 
The TDR is in Taipei’s case used as a compensation formula able to ‘remove’ 
locals which to do not want to become part of the city’s vision for the area as a 
whole (or are unable to maintain and use their properties to the appropriate 
standard). In their place, the URO has set up three URS sites, one of which is 
run entirely by the city (URS44, which acts as a shop/visitor centre), while 
URS127 and URS155 are run by Tamkang University’s Architecture 
Department and Campobag design studio, respectively. The street has been 
the focus of a preservation movement dedicated to preserving the formal 
architectural heritage of what in Taiwan is called ‘baroque architecture’, yet the 
URS programme added a specific content, one which aims to make the street 
a hub of a creative community - URS155 is a characteristic example, described 
as a “creative lifestyle base”, where “creative workers share space and 
creativity” and “take inspiration from neighbouring streets by interacting closely 
with local residents and businesses” (Urban Regeneration Office, n.d.). All three 
locations are geared toward inducing a culture/creative led regeneration and 
present a corporative effort by the city and selected non-state participants; the 
reaction of the local residents is as yet unclear, talk of community 
notwithstanding. During field visits to the sites in question, the URS operated 
mainly in isolation from the many traditional medicine shops for which the 
street is famous. URO section chief Lin Yu-hsiu admitted URS127 was used by 
locals mainly as a shortcut to get from Dihua Street to Minle Street, though 
many have since taken to sit in the space and chat, taking that as a sign of 
moderate success. By acting as a landlord of sorts, the URO has been able to 
‘seed’ small creative groups around Dihua Street, offering rent-free space in 
exchange for ‘rebranding’ the area with their presence and activities, 
countering the trend of an ageing population and waning commercial success 
of the street, which is fairly quiet apart from the period before Chinese New 
Year, when it hosts a popular bazaar attracting thousands of visitors. The 
youthful, creative shops introduced by the URO have thus complemented older 
efforts such as the Chinese New Year’s Bazaar, which most visitors assume is 
a century-old tradition, although it actually dates to the 1990s. While the 
bazaar and the small design galleries and creative spaces seem worlds apart, 
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both belong to sustained place-making activity on part of the city and with the 
help of civil society groups. The emphasis has shifted from a detailed master-
plan approach to creating a ‘creative milieu’, a concept introduced to Taiwan 
by Charles Landry (see following subsection), yet very importantly, the work 
remains within the bounds of municipal urban planning, wherein the role in 
selecting and managing creative spaces, previously played exclusively by civil 
society actors (such as in the case of Huashan’s early period) or dedicated 
cultural government bodies (such as Treasure Hill Artist Village or Huashan 
nowadays) has also become the domain of urban redevelopment and planning. 
The planner, sitting at the core of the state’s approach to urbanism, literally 
and figuratively descends onto the level of the street, attesting to the capacity 
of the Taiwanese state (be it municipal or local) to absorb and mimic the ways 
of doing things (i.e. the institutions and authority) from non-state actors. 
 
Charles Landry and the ‘Creative Imperative’ - legitimising role of global 
professional actors 
If the URO can rely on a mixture of regulatory incentives to guide the process 
of producing creative spaces on Dihua Street, it requires a different kind of 
authority vis-à-vis the various actors in the state hierarchy. Since the URO 
does not technically own any of the locations at which the URS programme is 
being rolled out, securing the cooperation of the state is crucial. A further 
complication is that while the URO is an office of the municipal state, many of 
the disused industrial facilities formerly owned by state-owned enterprises and 
monopolies (such as the tobacco or liquor monopolies) have reverted to central 
state ownership, meaning that the URO is separated by several degrees, both 
vertically and laterally, from the decision-makers it needs to address. The 
question it thus faces is finding ways to exert a professional or expert authority 
- ways which often rely on either creating narratives or successfully embedding 
itself within already existing ones. The creative city discourse, itself a wide and 
contested field of policy guidelines, consultancy reports and academic work, is 
one such narrative which the URO has successfully helped shape; a related if 
slightly less professional one is the competitiveness narrative, which has been 
resonating with Taiwanese elites as the island moves toward less intensive, 
more value-added ways of manufacturing - the latter being evident in the 
mixture of state guidance and private entrepreneurialism in the setting up of 
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Taiwan’s high-tech sector (Lin, 2012; 2014; Mathews, 1997), which has often 
been understood as a sector closely related to Taiwan’s creative and cultural 
industries. 
 
Charles Landry, author of several volumes on the creative city who has 
previously acted as consultant to cities as far afield as Bilbao, Canberra, 
Ghent, Paris, Penang or Seville was hired by Taipei city at the behest of the 
URO and in the organisation of Bamboo Curtain Space (headed by Margaret 
Shiu of Huashan fame). Landry has since produced a series of reports, talks 
and workshops in Taipei in the run-up to the city’s candidature to become the 
World Design Capital in 2016, adding a legitimising cache to both the ‘creative’ 
and ‘competitive’ narratives within which the URO’s work largely rests. Seen as 
a globally-known expert, Landry has been very warmly received by city and 
national officials eager to participate in a photo-opportunity with the visiting 
‘Godfather of the creative city’ (創意城市的教⽗父), or as Margaret Shiu put it, 
‘…they really want to use him for political purposes, show that they have 
sought the advice of the Godfather of the Creative City, but they never really 
apply his concept fully…’ (Interview with Margaret Shiu, 16 May 2013). Adding 
to this a candid remark by a city official admitting they would perhaps have 
preferred Richard Florida, who’s ‘more famous’ but turned out to be too 
expensive, it becomes apparent that Landry’s role in Taipei is not solely to 
produce reports and recommendations, but rather to add a patina of 
respectability to already existing policies. Nevertheless, active groups within 
the city bureaucracy, such as the URO, can also use such exogenous 
legitimacy to bolster their authority within the larger bureaucratic apparatus, as 
the publishing of Landry’s report has shown. Landry’s work, centred around a 
creative index mixing both exhortations towards competitiveness (as any index 
inherently does) and advice on how to create creative cities, culminated in the 
publishing of Talented Taipei & Creative Imperative, a 2012 publication 
commissioned by the URO (Landry, 2012), in which Landry sets out a case for 
a creative Taipei able to mobilise its talents through changes which are both 
administrative and regulatory, as well as grassroots-based and organic. The 
methodology in producing the index is essentially a compilation of the 
responses of four questionnaire groups: private and community stake-holders; 
younger professionals and officials; senior officials, and Charles Landry 
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himself. The exact numbers which a report of this nature produces gives 
weight to the recommendations Landry later gives, mainly to do with the lack 
of a ‘creative bureaucracy’ in Taipei, as well as the need to create platforms 
promoting creative growth, explicitly mentioning the URO and its potential role 
in this: 
“Identifying catalytic projects is vital to help generate critical mass and visibility. 
Here, the role of URO can be important. Developing a series of creative 
hotspots as part of a creative quarter strategy can change perceptions of Taipei 
and the mood of the city and help provide a focal point.” (Landry, 2012: 87) 
 
Indeed, since work on the report began, the URO has, through its URS project 
constructed such as platform, complete with its own strategy, community-
outreach programmes and a host of publications aimed at creating a virtual 
space where a creative city can be produced in Taipei. With its strong links to 
Taipei’s arts and culture community, the URO has became an advocate of their 
interests within the city bureaucracy, while simultaneously integrating their 
professional authority into the municipal state’s capacity to organise and 
manage urban space in line with globally transmitted ideas about the creative 
city, creative economy and ultimately, the ‘creative class’ as Florida (2002) 
called it. With the selection of Taipei as the 2016 World Design Capital, such 
activities seem to have been vindicated, though the URO is set to continue 
wrangling with more sceptical parts of civil society, which regard the URS 
programme as little more than a neoliberal programme gentrification or at best, 
‘just talk’ (Marco Casagrande, personal communication, March 18 2014). More 
perilous perhaps is the URO’s influence regarding the central state, as at least 
one of the URS locations is set for closure amid a sell-off of state assets, 
showing not all parts of the state apparatus are as convinced about the fiscal 
feasibility of creative spaces. The URS21, the largest of all the locations and 
run by the JFAA foundation is as of this March the site of an increasingly pitted 
disagreement between the city and the central state’s Ministry of Finance, in 
which Su Yaohua, the national Minister of Culture has also cautiously pitched 
in in an interview conducted by Village Taipei, the URO’s own online magazine. 
Whatever the fate of this particular site may be (speculation abounds, from 
imminent demolition, preservation until the 2016 WDC, etc.), the URS 
continues to produce not only physical space but shapes an abstract idea 
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about Taipei as a creative city, namely through talks, workshops, brochures, as 
well as Village Taipei, which acts as an events guide, opinion forum and, as 
was seen in the recent interviews and articles surrounding URS21, an advocate 
for the URO’s work and projects. 
 
Village Taipei - spreading the narrative of the creative city 
The last subsection looks more closely at the publicist and discursive work of 
the URO, which is understood as an important part of the process of 
institutionalising the production of creative spaces in Taipei by the municipal 
state and relevant societal actors. The basic concept of the publication, the 
village, suggests a relation stretching back to the village of Treasure Hill, the 
village of Taiwan’s pre-modern past, as well as other village-themed events in 
Taipei such as the MVRDV ‘Vertical Village’ exhibition held at URS21 - the 
village is of course also a crucial concept in creative city discourse, positing 
the organic, human-sized structure of the village over a the master-planned, 
dehumanising city of Le Corbusier. 
 
Village Taipei (臺北村落之聲 or “Taipei Village Voice” in the original) has, since 
2010, also published a yearly ‘book’ alongside the current information 
published on its website, with the yearly book presenting a compilation of 
articles on creative industries, heritage preservation, opinion pieces by 
domestic and global planning specialists, as well as some lighter content 
highlighting the year’s most successful projects. If the yearly booklet is aimed 
at the professional audience of architects, planners and academics, the 
monthly newsletter and website are aimed at all the residents and visitors of 
Taipei. Although operating as an independent section within the URO, Village 
Taipei has in essence become an urban magazine/publication in its own right, 
one that is consistently dedicated to promoting Taipei not only as a creative 
city, but a city where its citizens can and should also become creative 
themselves. The perspective of a government-run publication is especially 
instructive in the assumption that it’s audience are both readers and citizens, 
simultaneously presenting themselves as the hard, modernist subject of state 
rule and the softer, neoliberal consumer. In organizing photographic exhibitions 
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for example, when Village Taipei asks reader-citizens to take lomography12 
photos of old Taipei (the newsletter is also sponsored by Polaroid), or to submit 
their walking itineraries and ideas for urban strolls, it is with a curious mixture 
of an instructive state and an entrepreneurial magazine that this audience is 
addressed. The content emphasising leisure-time activities (workshops for 
children, seminars, exhibitions, guided tours, etc.) seems geared towards the 
younger generation of citizens eager to explore the city beyond the air-
conditioned halls of Xinyi’s shopping malls, while at the same time using the 
raw authenticity of West Taipei as the material from which this leisure activity is 
constructed. 
 
Here, insights from the anthropology of tourism (Urry and Larsen, 2011) as well 
as critical urban geography (Zukin, 2010) are useful analytical approaches to 
understand the ‘authenticating’ activities of Village Taipei both as local place-
making strategies hinging on culture-led regeneration, as well as a part of a 
Taiwan-wide vogue for ‘heritage nostalgia’ and the appropriation of vernacular 
history for commercial use (cf. Wang 2013 on similar processes underway in 
Bopiliao, another neighbourhood redeveloped/preserved in part with the 
URO’s involvement). A walking suggestion along Dihua street, where the 
largest cluster of URS locations is to be found, incorporates small print-shops 
reproducing 1920s postcards, a vintage arts and crafts shop, an art gallery, a 
shop selling Japanese-era merchandise as well as a handful of traditional 
workshops and medicine stores. Another tour focuses on ageing shop-signs, 
yet another on a veterans’ village. While non-locals may conceivably be 
interested in such tours, the “creative streets” promoted through the URO’s 
official publication are aimed at local tourists or shoppers. The streets remain 
living neighbourhoods where the city’s different inhabitants coexist, but the 
sense of direction is clear from the municipal side: complementing traditional 
content with culture-creative one has been adopted as a reliable approach and 
one in which the municipality has successfully involved artists, spatial 
professionals, corporate foundations, younger citizens and to some extent 
                                                
 
12 Although lomography or ‘lomo’ originally refers to photographs taken with an 
analogue lomographic camera, the nostalgic aesthetic of saturated colours and square 
formatting of photos has since spread to social networks such as Instagram, Facebook, 
Twitter or Weibo. Criticised widely for producing instant nostalgia and confected 
authenticity, the popularity of the medium nevertheless persists. 
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marginal groups such as the elderly. Beyond thinking merely about the content 
of the URS sites, they show the extent to which Taipei’s municipal state is 
socialised, i.e. able to insert itself in and be influenced by street-level activities. 
The underlying beliefs of creative city theory on how to stimulate (or produce) 
creative spaces traditionally separate between consumption and production 
oriented stimuli, yet the municipal planning bodies (and especially the URO) 
seem to be addressing both by providing the infrastructure (with experience 
stemming from previous economic development models) as well as the lifestyle 
and amenities which the ‘creative class’ is said to be attracted. Using a hybrid 
of Florida’s creative class approach and an industrial policy approach, the city 
is both a facilitator and instigator in defining the field within which the process 
of urban redevelopment is to take place. The production of an abstract space 
by publications such as Village Taipei is as critical as the construction of the 
physical space of the city when both are done by an institution which spans 
industrial policy and entrepreneurial drive, creative force and preservation, 
business and society, all the while remaining part of the municipal bureaucracy. 
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4.5 Conclusion: Corporative space production in a post-
developmental city 
 
 
To call the mode of spatial production in Taipei ‘corporatist’ first of all requires 
a return to the proposition made at the beginning of the chapter: that the 
municipal state is able to organise and arrange societal and business actors in 
a cohesive way and to a pre-defined purpose, in this case the production of 
so-called creative spaces. The preceding chapters have shown that the 
institutionalising tendency in urban space production in Taipei is precisely such 
a corporatist effort, though one in which state-organised institutions are just as 
permeable to the input of societal and business groups as the latter are 
susceptible to the prestige and safety of working within a state-led framework. 
Reacting to pressures for social equity, historical preservation, and a greater 
role for culture and creative sectors, the city turned to several key groups 
(preservation societies such as the OURs, social enterprises such as 
TsuiMama, or corporate foundations such as the JFAA) to design the 
institutions tasked with addressing what is understood here as culture-led 
urban regeneration. While several projects were ultimately brought back under 
municipal control or outsourced to selected operators, the general trend has 
been to construct practices/institutions spanning state and non-state sectors.  
 
The results must however be seen within the chosen area of research: small-
scale urban interventions at the intersection of heritage preservation, creative 
city discourse, civil society formation and the debate about Taiwanese identity, 
all areas where the interaction of state and society in space is complicated by 
the role of professional gate-keepers, expert communities and radical activists; 
the caution here would be against inferring from this field a total model of the 
(municipal) state. Nevertheless, two decades of democratization coupled with 
an increasingly adaptive local state, as well as a strong and socially active 
business sector, have produced a corporative approach to the production of 
creative spaces in Taipei. This type of creative space production can first be 
seen at Treasure Hill, where the state (in the guise of the Cultural Bureau) steps 
into a contested field to impose a social and spatial restructuring; supported by 
the epistemic community of experts, the site is legitimised not only through 
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local imaginaries (Taiwanese identity, nostalgia for village life etc.), but is 
coupled into a wider creative city discourse emphasising the valorisation of 
space. Other marginal spaces soon follow in the pattern wherein activist 
groups (largely made up of artists, architects and students) are able to force 
the issue onto the wider stage, but are ultimately unable to manage the space 
without the intervention of the state - municipal or national. While this is a 
source of disappointment to many participants, others have equally accepted 
the impossibility of running a completely autonomous space in central Taipei, 
as was the case with Huashan. The influence of such actors must however not 
be under-estimated; the struggles over public spaces in the 1990s have 
enabled them to eke out a space in the political arena, with some even joining 
professional politics, while others remain influential members of committees 
setting selection criteria and formalising the mode of reproducing creative 
spaces around the city. The inclusion of the private sector further points at a 
convergence in practice between all three actors to the point where a 
municipal government body publishes an opinion magazine for spatial 
professionals and a lifestyle newsletter for the ‘creatives’ of Taipei, while 
private foundations run urban redevelopment projects beyond the narrow 
interest of pushing up real-estate values. 
 
As for the evaluation of the resulting space, Treasure Hill again provides a 
cautionary tale. A closed and early case, I argue that the inclusion of the village 
into the city’s formal cultural frame has meant this former welfare and social 
justice issue is now subject to the same expectations and performance 
benchmarks as most cultural institutions in the city – ‘value for money’. It was 
not exposed to the dictate of the real-estate or art market, it was exposed 
rather to a market logic which had already been integrated into the municipal 
administration and the spatial professionals, both of which saw in Treasure Hill 
an opportunity to develop Taipei’s creative competitiveness. The village, 
though originating from a place- and time-specific arrangement, has served as 
a template and precedent for several later municipal endeavours (though none 
were as large), as well as a negative example for advocacy groups opposing 
relocation and demolition activities elsewhere (though they ironically often use 
Treasure Hill to hold their events and meetings). As this arrangement 
continues, the original inhabitants of the area are faced with a persistent doubt 
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surrounding their residency rights; their presence, hitherto a source of 
‘creativity’ for the artist community, is being replaced by a more calculable 
resource aimed at local tourists, problematizing the use of creative-cultural 
approaches to solve issues of social justice or to markedly improve the lives of 
slum-dwellers or other marginalised groups. Equally, the URS programme may 
yet fail to reach its lofty objective of preserving historical spaces, stoking 
creativity and involving the community, with the largest URS site currently 
scheduled to close in the before the end of 2014, while the cluster at Dihua 
street is looking increasingly more like a place-making exercise aimed at 
nostalgia tourism. 
 
In the absence of a clear definition both of what ‘creativity’ and ‘community’ 
mean, these terms present a tempting target for inclusion into the argot of not 
only the planning profession, but into political speech as well. This may be 
especially true in Taiwan, where the politics of identity have become absorbed 
into a political discourse on Taiwan(-eseness), meaning culture carries 
considerable cache on both sides of the political divide; if Treasure Hill is 
cultural preservation led by a Guomindang administration, so the cases in 
Kaohsiung point at the DPP’s equally enthusiastic use of culture-creative 
narratives in pushing through project of city beautification and redevelopment. 
While evaluating the projects’ success on their own merits is instrumental in 
developing tools of urban regeneration which transcend the issues often 
associated with culture-led schemes (authenticity erosion, gentrification, the 
extremes of elite and popular taste), the cases were analysed here from the 
standpoint of how and why creative space policies present variations across 
the selected cities; in the case of Taipei, the prevailing trend of a corporatist 
approach attests to the resilience of developmental approaches to social, 
economic and spatial questions while confirming the role of civil society actors 
in the institutionalization of this approach. 
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Chapter Five: Normative Creative Space in 
Deindustrialising Kaohsiung  
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction: Art, beautification and conflict in a port 
city 
 
 
“A yellow duckling hailing from overseas has generated a lot of concern 
recently, but I am naturally not talking about the H7N9 avian flu against which 
Taiwan is currently preparing itself. Rather, everyone is very interested in 
whether the “Rubber Duck”, designed by famous Dutch artist Florentijn Hofman 
and currently in Hong Kong harbour, will come to Taiwan or even Kaohsiung 
itself for all of you to see. Listening to all the news and rumours pointing at 
numerous possibilities, I know that everyone has very high expectations and the 
relevant city bureaus are also evaluating the proposals. Whatever helps the 
promotion of Kaohsiung and its tourist industry, we agree to take into serious 
consideration and will actively discuss the proposals sent in a flood of letters 
addressed to Huama [the Mayor’s nickname]. Huama understands everyone’s 
expectations and needs some time for both sides to come in contact and 
conclude the evaluation [of the proposal], while thanking everyone for their 
proposals! Kaohsiung is changing more and more because of your 
participation!” 
(Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu’s message on Facebook, 10 May 2013) 
 
Only a decade or two ago, it would have hardly been imaginable to hear the 
mayor of Taiwan’s second city personally expressing interest in a giant rubber 
duck, an artwork by Dutch artist Florentijn Hofman, which has been sailing 
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around the world since 2007. Mayor Chen Chu was not alone in her interest for 
floating fowl; representatives of New Taipei City, Keelung and Beijing also 
expressed their intention to host the duck, and the inflatable installation has 
now indeed been hosted by these cities as well. The Mayor’s own message on 
the social network Facebook earned her two or three times more ‘shares’ and 
‘likes’ than her pronouncements usually do, which might serve at least as a 
broad indicator of the interests of a significant part of her city’s population. The 
motivation seems clear enough, as media attention focusing on the art 
installation brings with it the promise of tourist revenue and international 
recognition, both sought-after results for leaders of less known cities 
attempting to re-brand their city’s image and reshape their urban fabric and 
rhythm. Art, and in a wider sense culture, far from being an add-on, an 
afterthought, or a matter for knowing elites, is increasingly becoming a central 
idea in urban planning in Kaohsiung. Aside from the its nominal role in adding 
value to projects large and small, it has become relevant in questions of 
preservation, demolition, and re-use of older neighbourhoods in the city. In 
doing so, it is fundamentally re-evaluating the ways in which urban space is 
produced, by whom, and to what purpose. The present chapter will evaluate 
three recent examples of significant incursion into an old urban area with three 
different outcomes: the demolition of a mile-long tract of ‘Hardware Street’ to 
create a new urban park, the culture-led regeneration around Pier-2 Art Zone, 
and the failed demolition of a block of historical housing intended to produce a 
parking lot, which resulted in community-led urban regeneration. Focusing 
specifically on the role of art, artists, creative-cultural workers and culture in 
urban space production, these three cases are set both within a larger global 
context of culture-led redevelopment, as well a narrative of city rebranding 
specific to Kaohsiung. 
 
The emphasis on creativity, art and culture as a crucial component of 
successful post-industrial city transformations often conjures up images of 
Bilbao, with Kaohsiung’s planning and policy-setting actors being no exception 
in their praise for the Basque port, and mayor Chen Chu visiting the city on 19 
April 2013 with the expressed purpose of studying its urban renewal policies, 
reiterating once more that Bilbao serves as a model for Kaohsiung. (Kaohsiung 
City Government Information Bureau, 23 May 2013). Not only confined to high-
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level exchanges, Bilbao was often cited by interviewees from different 
municipal bodies as the example that Kaohsiung is actively following. To a 
certain extent, one can understand their enthusiasm based on the similarities 
between the two cities: both being relatively small, de-industrializing ports, 
Bilbao, and its shiny Guggenheim gallery, are therefore seen (and often 
misinterpreted) as the perfect blueprint for a successful urban transformation, 
forgetting that the construction of the Guggenheim was preceded by a 
decade-long process of deindustrialization, heavy government and EU 
convergence fund investment, as well as specific institutional arrangements in 
the city itself (Ponzini, 2010). The Guggenheim is better seen as a culmination 
of a long process, rather than its instigator or even precondition. However, the 
increasing currency that the narrative of the ‘Bilbao Effect’ holds, as well as the 
drive towards service-sector or especially creative industries, continue to make 
a high-profile cultural turn an appealing set of solutions for policy-makers in 
lacklustre cities. In Taiwan, the most obvious attempt to replicate this 
perceived effect was in Taichung, where another star architect, Zaha Hadid, 
was commissioned to construct a new Guggenheim museum in the city; 
although the project was dropped in the end, Taichung is continuing with its 
policy of becoming a cultural city, and similar smaller investments are going 
ahead in other major Taiwanese cities. Kaohsiung hosts the largest of such 
projects at the time of writing, the Wei-Wu-Ying Center for the Arts, designed 
by a boutique Dutch architecture firm and valued at around 300 million USD 
(Preparatory Office for the Wei-Wu-Ying Center for the Arts, 2012). The role 
Bilbao plays in many cases is not only as an example to follow in terms of 
policy exchange, but as a successful example validating already negotiated 
and planned decisions; the visit by Kaohsiung’s mayor to Bilbao comes years 
after the $1 billion USD project of developing a new cultural area in Kaohsiung 
had already been agreed upon; the putative ‘lessons’ which the mayor talked 
about on her visit had, to a large extent, already been integrated into 
Kaohsiung’s overall development plan as a blueprint of a de-industrializing port 
city. The drive towards culture-led regeneration, the emphasis on large 
infrastructural projects, the rebranding efforts, all of these can be traced to 
neoliberal urban transformations of the 1980s and 1990s, which combined 
heavy state investment with business-friendly urban reform, within which the 
discourse of the creative city can also be located. Kaohsiung has embarked on 
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a process of urban transformation guided by the experiences of neoliberal 
urban planning, including the contradiction between massive state involvement 
on one side and the exhortation of entrepreneurialism on the other; the goal of 
such as transformation of urban space is no less than to change the lived, daily 
space of the city through the manipulation of demographic trends, the 
allocation of space to certain groups and communities over others, and the 
establishment of a better environment for the preferred, ideal new citizen. 
 
Kaohsiung’s own process of de-industrialisation, though painful for those who 
may lose employment, is often portrayed as an opportunity for the city to live a 
greener and more pleasant life in line with the modern neoliberal tendency to 
frame social changes in entrepreneurial terms. Certainly, Kaohsiung’s image as 
one of Taiwan’s most polluted cities has changed for the better in recent years. 
The government (both central and municipal), answering to an increasingly 
vocal and now enfranchised population (Hsiao, 1999; Kim, 2000) has been 
trying to ameliorate the worst excesses of Taiwan’s rapid development with a 
raft of large infrastructural projects, as well as ‘city-beautiful’ initiatives. In 
Kaohsiung’s case, these culminated in the cleaning up of Kaohsiung’s main 
waterway, the Love River (the cleaning up also included a strong marketing 
campaign to promote the name Love River, originally a Japanese-built 
transport canal, who only got the romantic name after a boat rental company 
bearing the name Love River, as well as a spate of lovers’ double-suicides 
which got national coverage at the time), as well as the construction of a 
metropolitan rail system and several new parks, though the largest, 
Metropolitan Park, is both remote and build atop a disused landfill. Apart from 
‘turf and trees’ projects, at the level of the city authorities’ communication with 
its citizens, certain telling keywords such as ‘green’, ‘creativeness’, ‘diversity’, 
‘lifestyle’, ‘culture’ and most importantly, ‘community’ entered the vocabulary. 
While the notion of community had been present in the Taiwanese political 
discourse on culture at least since Lee Teng-hui’s notion of ‘one community’ 
as a model for the Taiwanese nation, these national-level efforts aimed at 
creating a new Taiwanese identity fell short of a new way of governance, 
especially in terms of physical interventions, with many headline policies and 
projects scrapped after elections, as was the case in 2004 (Chang, 2006). 
Taken within the context of urban planning however, these point towards a 
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distinct way of governing, where the political authority no longer addresses a 
monolithic society, but rather a web of communities and individuals which may 
or may not share the municipality’s vision for Kaohsiung as a sustainable, 
maritime, green city of culture. It is therefore within the municipality’s way of 
exerting power within the micro-locales of a deindustrialising city that we can 
observe an approach to producing creative space that is normative in its 
adherence to a paternalistic idea of changing the citizen to fit an idea, i.e. the 
abstract space of the planned city. 
 
While headline projects occupy the media limelight and preoccupy politicians’ 
ambitions, Kaohsiung’s ‘cultural turn’ is, much like Bilbao’s, a complex, slow 
and on-going process of changing attitudes, evolving institutional 
arrangements and most importantly, new ways of governance. It implies a 
transformation of the city and its citizens; a transition from drab industrial port 
to Taiwan’s second city and maritime capital, which requires not only the hard 
infrastructure of concert halls, museums and galleries, but crucially, an 
audience to fill them. It is a policy that is both a result of a post-modernist 
consensus on the consequences of globalisation and the need to catch the 
tertiary sector train, as much as it is heir to high-modernist notions of shaping 
the citizen through the physical and ‘spiritual’ environment. Within this 
contradiction lie the particular ways in which the question of urban 
regeneration and deindustrialisation has become an issue of culture, of the role 
of art, and of the city’s identity and future. Perhaps the most salient 
characteristic present in Kaohsiung is the normative nature of the municipal 
project of building a creative city; while communities are indeed addressed, 
they are also being created by the city through a raft of projects and initiatives 
outlined in the continuation of this chapter. Some are brutish and direct, such 
as the demolition of a traditional metalworking community and its replacement 
with an art-themed park. Others, such as the Asia New Harbour project, are 
large infrastructural projects modelled on public-private partnerships such as 
the Bilbao Guggenheim, the redevelopment of the London Docklands or the 
substantial investment into Northern England’s cultural infrastructure and 
industry (cf. Minton, 2012; Jayne, 2004). All however carry within them a 
fundamental belief in the economic and cultural viability of ‘creativity’ which, 
treated as a resource, can be grown out of a designated cultural base and then 
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branded and exported. Herein lies the reason for the selection of Kaohsiung as 
a key case study: being a relatively new city, devoid either of the traditional 
Fujianese culture of Tainan or the émigré culture of Taipei, Kaohsiung has long 
suffered a perceived lack of ‘culture’. This notion is naturally itself a normative 
statement that ignores the rich vernacular traditions of a working class port 
city, preferring instead to leap from such humble beginnings to a vision of a 
cosmopolitan cultural and economic centre for Taiwan’s south, as well as a 
regionally relevant creative harbour. Needless to say, this view is in many ways 
counter-intuitive to the notions of creativity, which carry within them a 
expectation of spontaneity and organic association, yet the municipality has, 
through the Pier-2 Art Center, embarked on emulating precisely such 
spontaneity, raising the question of how an operationalization of creativity 
without significant input from the ‘creatives’ is possible and what underpins it. 
Lastly, the case of Hamasen’s self-organised heritage protection group shows 
there exists of late an alternative seeing of Kaohsiung’s cultural worth, one 
which simultaneously exposes the shallowness of the municipal vision as well 
as the potential for real community-led production of creative space by 
exploiting the narrative of redevelopment by culture used by the city. 
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5.2 The origins and formation of Kaohsiung’s ‘Cultural 
Turn’ 
 
With heavy industry and manufacturing increasingly moving to China, 
Kaohsiung had by the late 90s reached a developmental dilemma similar to 
one North America and Europe had seen a decade or two earlier. Not 
surprisingly, many policies aimed at combatting urban blight and reversing the 
city’s fortune are also similar, although their origin cannot be understood 
outside of the local context of Kaohsiung’s reputation as a ‘cultural desert’ and 
the party-political opposition between north and south Taiwan, which saw the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) consistently seeking to reinforce it vis-à-
vis Taipei. Though Kaohsiung’s last appointed and first elected mayor, Wu 
Den-yih, introduced a host of policies aimed at reversing the city’s 
environmental and cultural degradation, a permanent turn in Kaohsiung’s 
developmental trajectory was achieved with Frank Hsieh’s term in office as 
mayor. The city’s first DPP mayor, Hsieh ran on a platform of five pre-election 
promises, which included a commitment to improving Kaohsiung’s cultural 
standing (Wang, 2006). His term also coincided with the DPP’s first national 
government, which looked favourably on major infrastructural projects in its 
southern bastion, such as the Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transport system, 
allowing him to access resources unavailable to his predecessor. Indeed, the 
party-political background is a powerful source of policy thrust in Kaohsiung, 
as well as a complicating factor for planners. Kaohsiung is a policy laboratory 
for the DPP, as well as its retreat after losing national power in 2008; current 
mayor Chen Chu is one of the more powerful elected officials in the country 
and certainly within the DPP. This party-political component to Kaohsiung’s 
cultural turn is marked predominately by identity politics and a (unilateral) one-
upmanship with Taipei. The need to compete not only with an abstract ‘global 
environment’, but rather a very present brain-drain to Taiwan’s wealthier north 
were often cited by respondents as important factors in their motivations to 
improve Kaohsiung’s urban environment, which is often perceived as drab, 
lacking activities, or too ‘working class’ for young urban professionals, even 
two decades after the city began to improve its urban living environment. 
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The party-political pressures can also account for Kaohsiung’s emphasis on 
large, politically expedient, demand-side projects constructed using the build-
operate-transfer (BOT) formula: athletic arenas, the Kaohsiung mass rapid 
transit (KMRT) system, large outdoor public spaces, bike lanes and city-bike 
rental stations, waterfront promenades and cultural centres offering a range of 
(popular) cultural content have all been constructed in Kaohsiung in recent 
years, with the bulk of construction still scheduled for completion in the next 
few years as the various projects comprising the ‘Kaohsiung 2014’ plan break 
ground. In urban planning terms, the city’s main spatial policy is the so-called 
‘joining of port and city’ (市，港合⼀一 Shì, gǎng hé yī), which has seen the city 
take control of the Port Authority and the transferal of large tracts of brownfield 
waterfront sites under municipal control - a fact of great relevance to the 
development of creative urban spaces in a city where the port was 
administered under a separate provincial administration in an exercise of 
bureaucratic inefficiency and departmental conflict, all of which reflected itself 
very visibly in Kaohsiung’s cityscape (Williams, 2003). The institutional 
underpinnings and the flow of power, enabling Kaohsiung’s cultural turn and 
the implementation of creative city policies associated with it, are based on a 
centralisation and expansion of the municipality’s competences; this contrasts 
with the case of Taipei (where the city government has engaged in a 
corporative approach of engaging non-state bodies and devolving its 
responsibilities to newly-created quasi-NGOs), as well as the instances 
analysed in China, where creative city policies are propagated by a wide array 
of independent actors that are often in competition or even conflict with each 
other. 
 
The centralisation of power and expansion of the city’s ambition has meant 
that although larger projects are funded nationally, the municipality has in 
recent years taken on unprecedented levels of debt, reaching $7.5 billion USD 
or almost double the city’s annual budget in 2011 (Kaohsiung City Government 
Bureau of Finance, 2012). Additionally, a spate of allegations regarding 
mismanagement of public funds and unsuccessful BOT partnerships (such as 
in the case of the KMRT) can be taken as a context against which to evaluate 
the city’s recent shift towards lower-cost, high-impact cultural and urban 
renewal projects, such as festivals, smaller culture-led regeneration such as 
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the 2001 “Urban Light” project or the Pier-2 area, lobbying for national 
celebrations to be held in Kaohsiung (such as National Day fireworks), as well 
as inviting famous international stars such as Jose Carreras to perform in the 
city. While large infrastructural projects are set to continue with funding 
earmarked by the central government, the municipality has increasingly turned 
towards a policy of generating cultural demand by providing both capacity as 
well as content amid a generally weak (or even non-existent) art and cultural 
market in the private sphere. In such circumstances, it is not therefore 
surprising to detect a normative, almost didactic approach in the production of 
creative spaces, which need both the physical infrastructure and the content 
provided by ‘creative citizens’ – be they producers of consumers. 
 
Although such a market-economical view accounts for the mechanics of 
managing supply and demand, it cannot account for the motivation behind it. A 
closer look at city-generated ‘content’ will serve better, starting with the way in 
which public art has come into the city planners’ and politicians’ view. While 
Kaohsiung and other Taiwanese cities, especially Taipei, have established key 
cultural institutions such as galleries or museums in the period preceding the 
cultural turn, these were for the most part enclaves of elite or educational 
culture, and their effect on the surrounding urban space was minimal, if felt at 
all. Similarly, municipal authorities did not even have a dedicated cultural 
bureau1, relying instead on the central Ministry of Culture or the autonomous 
cultural institutions. As such, Kaohsiung lacked not only the capacity, but also 
an awareness of the added value of culture. It was not until the central 
government, following years of fierce debate in the artistic community (Ni, 
1997), promulgated the Regulations for the Sponsorship of Art and Culture 
(1992), in which the use of art and cultural value in public projects is mandated 
by way of commissioning public art at a value of at least 1% of the 
investment’s total worth. While this was often seen as an afterthought, 
especially in the first decade, every public investment suddenly required 
substantial spending on works of art, which in turn needed to be selected and 
their selection justified, precipitating thus the establishment of both ad-hoc and 
permanent committees, as well as private consultants and agents which would 
                                                
 
1 Taipei was first in 1999, Kaohsiung followed in 2003; the latter had formally 
established a bureau in 1995, but started operating de facto only in 2003. 
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offer lists of worthy artists to the responsible departments or other government 
bodies. Apart from establishing a thriving market for commissioning works of 
art (which mainly benefitted established, traditional artists), public art evolved 
from an expense enforced by the central state to an opportunity for local 
politicians to impress their (or their party’s) stamp on the physical environment 
through the selection of appropriate pieces of art2. While examples in 
Kaohsiung are numerous, from large and small sculptures, complicated water-
installations and murals, many of the works tend to deal with local identity 
issues of Kaohsiung, especially its industrial and maritime heritage. An 
illustration of this thematic tendency is one of Kaohsiung’s largest 
infrastructural projects, the KMRT, which boasts the world’s largest stained 
glass dome at its central Formosa Boulevard (美麗島站 Měilìdǎo zhàn) 
interchange station, at an estimated cost of over $2.5 million (Kaohsiung Rapid 
Transit Corporation, 2012). The political decisions involved in choosing both 
the station’s name, as well as the artwork (meant to symbolise the birth of 
Taiwanese democracy), fall squarely within the mayoral mandates of the DPP 
and also coincide with the DPP’s rise to national power between 2000 and 
2008. 
 
If the so-called ‘1% for Taiwanese Art’ law affected attitudes among the 
professional and political producers of urban space, changing the previously 
casual and hand-off approach to culture and bringing art to the very core of 
policy-making, it also helped form a new counterpart for the municipal 
authorities, the ‘art and cultural community’. Self-organization by ‘cultural 
workers’ in Kaohsiung started in the 1980s with various initiatives such as the 
still privately controlled Sin Pin Pier gallery and the associations for the 
regeneration of the Pier-2 art area and Qiaotou sugar refinery, both of which 
are now under municipal control. The foundation of the city’s creative 
community lies in the post-martial law proliferation of civil society groupings 
characteristic of all of Taiwan, while also coinciding with the ‘localisation’ 
                                                
 
2 Available artwork is most commonly advertised through a ‘market price index’ in the 
back pages of “Artist Magazine”, listing the author, their age, the work’s medium, price, 
and place of first exhibition. According to a local curator, these serve as an important 
source from which public art is selected, especially in minor projects, or when a quota 
has to be met last minute. (Interview with Yang Yao-jun, curator at SPP Absolutely Art 
Space gallery, 9 Nov 2012). 
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(Běntǔ huà 本⼟土化) movement, devolving in a sense both political power as well 
as cultural clout to provincial cities such as Kaohsiung. Although local artists 
and activists have established some successful and lasting spaces (most 
notably the SPP gallery, the Baiwu (White House) gallery at Qiaotou Sugar 
Refinery, as well as the Dogpig Café), the present research focuses on 
instances of state-society intersections, i.e. those spaces which have seen 
substantial state involvement and remain under direct municipal control. Of the 
ones mentioned above, only Qiaotou Sugar Refinery’s Baiwu comes close to 
the criteria; while I have spent substantial time at the space as a resident 
researcher, the decision to exclude that site from the selection of cases is a 
consequence of the remoteness and isolation of the space, both in terms of its 
geographic location as well as its management – while interesting in terms of 
local heritage preservation issues, the Qiaotou Sugar Refinery remains a 
landmark in itself with limited influence on the surrounding peri-urban 
landscape. 
 
The newly democratising Taiwanese society was left facing questions of 
identity, as well having as new opportunities for association and political 
action. One area of contention stemming from the intersection of these two 
new conditions was historical preservation, an issue where the artist and 
creative community became involved relatively early. Historical preservation 
was initially concerned with outstanding examples of cultural and historical 
heritage, remaining antiquarian in nature and without reach into wider urban 
space; only when questions of identity, memory and community surfaced, did 
it take on a wider appeal, particularly in the rapidly changing city centres such 
as Danshui (Lu, 2002), or certain areas in Taipei (Kuo, 2010). Additionally, the 
withdrawal of industry from central urban areas provided a new dimension, as 
disused brownfield sites and decaying relics of Taiwan’s old industries 
suddenly opened up large tracts of land, sometimes in very desirable areas. 
Being neither strictly cultural relics, nor bearers of a rural identity like many 
preserved farmhouses, the old industrial places of work were not initially seen 
to have any value past the land they occupied and would have been 
demolished without the interventions of squatting groups of artists, the most 
well-known case of which is the Huashan Distillery (now the Huashan 1914 
Creative Park) in Taipei. Kaohsiung’s industrial heritage sites were mainly 
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connected to the sugar industry and are as such were divided into suburban 
plants and refineries, extensive transport infrastructure, as well as port-side 
warehouses and other buildings, meaning most of the premier industrial sites 
such as the Qiaotou sugar refinery or the warehouses in Kaohsiung’s old port 
were owned by the state sugar monopoly, Taisugar. This in no small part 
helped the artists’ interventions aimed at converting them into cultural heritage 
sites, as the company proved open to a reuse which would also preserve 
Taiwan’s history of sugar production, especially as the plant celebrated its 
centenary (Jiang Yaoxian, Head of Baiwu Art Gallery at Qiaotou; interview, 23 
November 2012). Starting with the refinery area from 1994 onwards, and 
continuing downtown after 2000 with the efforts to regenerate the Pier-2 area, 
small, organised groups of artists and other cultural workers trod paths ranging 
from conflict with city authorities (as was the case with at the sugar refinery, 
where Jiang Yaoxian went as far as occupying trees within the refinery grounds 
to prevent their removal by the city, gaining national media coverage as one of 
Taiwan’s first tree-sitting incidents), to gradual acceptance of their ideas, as 
was the case in Pier-2, which has since become a feather in the city’s cultural 
cap and a regular stop on visiting officials’ tours since 2007. Whatever the 
specific case by case outcome (there are many failures too, with isolated or 
smaller historical buildings being demolished regularly), the artist community 
made its debut in the field of urban planning, partly out of an interest in 
aesthetics, a need for studio space, a wish to preserve local or national 
identity, but ended up also as the ‘designated experts’ on culture-led 
regeneration, sporadically invited by municipal authorities keen to rebrand their 
city. Unlike their counterparts in Taipei however, this early push had not led to 
a lasting cooperation with the city, but resulted instead in the city taking most 
of the locations over and integrating them to a far more ambitious and 
globalised vision of Kaohsiung as a creative harbour. Again, perhaps the only 
exception is the Baiwu gallery, isolated as it is from the fray by its almost 
suburban location in the disused sugar refinery. 
 
Apart from strictly political considerations, the case of the Kaohsiung Container 
Art Biennale illustrates well the underlying mentality, as well as the tools and 
organisation of the city’s early cultural turn, that is the municipalities 
interpretation of what the cultural turn could and should mean for the city. 
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Started in 2001, the festival attempted to fuse Kaohsiung’s maritime heritage 
with the nascent artistic and creative spirit that the municipality was trying to 
encourage in the city. Centred around the re-use of shipping containers as the 
name suggests, the festival sets biannual themes and regularly features around 
20-30 participating artists from Taiwan and abroad. The very first festival, 
themed simply as “101 Approaches to Containers”, produced works on cargo 
shipping, contraband, human trafficking and other unsavoury topics, so 
subsequent festivals have had their themes set more precisely and have in 
recent years included ‘Gamebox: Containers of Childhood Memory’ in 2005, 
‘Sustainable Cosmopolis’ in 2007, ’Ideas for an Ideal City’ in 2009, ‘Artbitat” in 
2011 and finally ‘The Inhabitables’ in 2013. The tendency towards themes of 
living, inhabiting and thinking about the city and its space is relevant 
considering the festival is organised by the city’s Cultural Affairs Bureau in 
cooperation with the city’s Museum of Fine Arts and Urban Development 
Bureau, making it wholly a part of municipal cultural and spatial policy and one 
of the first hybrid, cross-departmental efforts sitting squarely within the canon 
of creative city policies. By choosing containers as the main underlying theme 
of the festival, the organisers are providing an example of building a cultural 
event on the city’s longstanding policy of merging port and city, as well as 
using it to introduce voguish concepts characteristic of post-industrial thinking, 
underlining the importance of aesthetics, individual creativity and responsibility 
to the community: 
 
“Each work of container bears witness to the role of shipping in the advance of 
civilisation in Kaohsiung over the most recent decade. Thanks to the artists' 
versatile talents, each empty container is transformed from nothing to 
something, and the rust-filled, warped waste containers are neatened up and 
reused as unimaginably creative art. Apart from promoting the real 
environmental benefit of recycling, the use of scrap cargo containers as an 
artistic medium also invokes an even more important idea: That people can 
pursue spiritual fulfilment even in real, everyday life.” (Kaohsiung International 
Container Art Festival, 2009) 
 
As the festival moves increasingly towards its new role as a tourist, carnival-
like event, involving larger numbers of visitors, questions about the intended 
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outcome become increasingly relevant. As the number of festivals world-wide 
increases exponentially, cities have come to rely on festivals as a simple 
solution to urban blight and image-making, resulting in efforts of varying quality 
(Quinn, 2005). The festival in Kaohsiung is at least a success in becoming a 
regular and popular occurrence in Kaohsiung’s cultural calendar, this being all 
the more reason to underline its normative message: aimed at the citizens, it is 
an exercise in public art appreciation and closely tied to municipal policy-
speak on sustainability, creativity, the virtues of recycling and the value of 
culture in society. Viewed from this perspective, the festival is also a novel way 
of governance - addressing and inviting the creative individual to become part 
of an urban community, as well as a new locus for the articulation of the 
authorities’ exigencies - occupying and often creating public space. 
 
Beyond party political optics and the municipality’s policies, what is crucial 
here is to see the cultural turn both as the city’s power to assemble and align 
actors with its agenda – building municipal projects of culture-led 
redevelopment and regeneration, as well as the shift itself – a change in the 
way culture is perceived, valued and used within the context of space 
production. This point also served as a departure point for the following three 
case studies, each of which examines an aspect of the spatiality of the city’s 
cultural turn. Building on the ideas of a typology of approaches as the meeting 
point and consequence of state-society relations, the chapter will build an 
argument to view Kaohsiung’s production of creative space as predominately a 
statist, normative project. From the targeted removal of ‘the old’ analysed in 
the first case study to the targeted, thought-out insertion of ‘the new’, the 
spaces that represent Kaohsiung’s new self-image are made to order and 
share with their putative role-models (Soho, Shoreditch, etc.) only the vaguest 
of cultural references. Interestingly however, a truer expression of Lefebvre’s 
‘counter-space’ has appeared only some hundred meters away from the city’s 
cultural ground zero - the Hamasen historical street preservation project, which 
serves as the third case study and a ‘control sample’ against which to evaluate 
the spatial practice of the municipality. 
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5.3 Out with the old: Gongyuan Road3 
 
 
In 2005, Kaohsiung was awarded the role of hosting the 2009 World Games, an 
international sporting event for non-Olympic disciplines, and one of great 
diplomatic importance for Taiwan as it struggled to assert itself in a more 
independent way during the DPP-led premiership of Chen Shui-bian. The 
World Games, usually a fairly small event for which little in the way of new 
infrastructure is normally built, was taken very seriously, olympically even, in 
Kaohsiung. Apart from big construction projects such as the Toyo Ito designed 
stadium and the new metropolitan rail network, the city embarked on a 
massive beautification effort in preparation for the foreign visitors and domestic 
dignitaries. While the scale is certainly smaller, a comparison with Beijing’s 
frenzied pre-Olympic clean up is instructive; as a large, city-wide event in the 
administrative sense, the preparation for the World Games focused the 
attention of the city’s many offices and bureaus on a narrowly defined task 
subject to external deadlines, with emphasis given to quick cleaning up, rather 
than slow-moving neighbourhood or community improvements. Among the 
beautification efforts in Kaohsiung, a new landmark bridge over the first wharf, 
and another cyclist/pedestrian one over the mouth of the Love River flanked 
the old Yancheng neighbourhood. Between them, a single line of over 400 
hardware and metalwork shops, with living quarters attached, was demolished 
along the northern side of Gongyuan Road, the central spatial axis running 
through the old harbour neighbourhood. The area, over 4 hectares in size, has 
since become a mile-long park heavily adorned with public art commemorating 
the industrial past of Kaohsiung and its many hardware and metalwork shops - 
which the park displaced. The four-year demolition and resettlement plan by 
the municipality was not officially part of the World Games spending, though 
the connection between the two is far from tenuous, with the city recruiting 
4,652 local volunteers to serves as historical guides, translating the city’s 
industrial and maritime heritage to the visiting athletes and guests, as well as 
on official tours organised by the World Games committee, all of which passed 
                                                
 
3 ‘Gongyuan’ means ‘park’, therefore the street name could also be translated as Park 
Road. 
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along the new park on their way to Pier-2 and the former British consulate 
building above Sizihwan Bay  (Liu, 2012). 
 
While a recent visit to the area, not far from the new art and design shops of 
Pier-2, will still offer the visitor a glimpse into the dark workshop areas of the 
remaining few hardware stores, until 2008 the shopkeepers on ‘Wǔjīnjiē’ (五⾦金
街), or Hardware Street as it was known in the vernacular, occupied almost the 
entire stretch of Gongyuan Road. As occupiers of illegal structures built on 
public land however, they have been excluded almost entirely from the new 
vision for the area and the 4 year-long demolition and resettlement plan. In a 
demolition and park construction project stacked in 4 one-year tranches (see 
Figure 3), the Public Works Bureau has achieved a remarkable transformation 
of the space in question, with only a fraction of the businesses still operating in 
the area. While their resettlement was not a direct consequence of World 
Games, Pier-2 or Cultural Bureau policies, it is characterised by the prolific use 
of public art and city beautification infrastructure by the municipality, as well as 
an identical effort against ‘messiness’, which is analysed further in section 5.4. 
It sits squarely within the same area set aside for Kaohsiung’s new harbour 
front and as such, it is argued here that it belongs to the same new spatial 
practice of the (creative) city, emphasising city values through the expectation 
of spatial use.  
Before the park however, Gongyuan Road was the largest centre for family-
owned second hand hardware shops in Taiwan, selling and repairing small and 
medium machinery such as industrial grade pumps, winches, and hoists; a by-
product of the polluting if lucrative ship-dismantling industry that Kaohsiung 
was once known for. The space, which had once served as a wartime airfield, 
was built up during the first wave of industrialisation and settled by immigrants 
from Chiayi county - a fact relevant during the demolition as neighbours still 
saw the metalworkers as out-of-town immigrants, creating an additional 
obstacle in the metalworkers’ efforts to protect their homes. With their 
cluttered shop floors, oil slicks and loud noise of clunking metal, the street was 
earmarked for ‘beautification’ in the run up to the World Games in 2009 in 
order to create a tourist corridor towards Pier-2 and to complete a bicycle lane 
network across the Yancheng neighbourhood.  
 148 
 
 
Figure 3 Yancheng 'Green 8' green corridor development plan. Source: Kaohsiung 
City Public Works Department 
The demolition was divided in four stages (Figure 3), with the first one 
beginning in 2007 and the last one completed in 2011. (Kaohsiung Yancheng 
Green Corridor (Gāoxióng Yánchéng Lükuò). Kaohsiung Public Works Bureau, 
2011). Though the land is publicly owned and a park had been loosely 
envisaged in the area for decades, the issue here is not so much of legality – in 
any case the 1998 Urban Renewal Act grants municipal authorities ample 
powers to reconstruct urban areas, especially on publicly owned land. Nor is 
this a question of whether the city plan was legitimate or appropriate. Rather, 
the motivation for the decision is key to understanding the way in which a 
‘creative Kaohsiung’ is being constructed, not only as a physical space, but as 
a space of identity and a new authenticity for Kaohsiung, which includes some 
aspects of the city at the expense of others, as the government publications on 
the project emphasised: “Do you still remember when both sides of Park Road 
in Yancheng District were lined with metal scraps and hardware stores? With 
the change of times though, the old businesses no longer prospered and the 
illegal buildings were holding back the city’s development. 
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However, since 2009, Yancheng’s appearance has changed dramatically: the 
illegal buildings were gradually pulled down and removed, replaced by an open 
green space with blooming flowers and lush greenery. This space, which will 
grow in years to come, gives both residents and visitors the elements of a new 
culture of living – this is Kaohsiung’s “Yancheng Green Corridor”” 
(Kaohsiung Public Works Bureau, 2011) 
Historicization was an effective tool used by the authorities, emphasising the 
demise the industry has undergone and consigning it to a bygone era, a 
sentiment reflected in media reporting at the time. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests hardware repair remained (and remains to this day) a 
lucrative business, with new shops opening in the area right until the 
demolition plans were announced (and even after!). Although some of the 
relocated shops are flourishing in their new locations, all the interviewed 
shopkeepers complained of a lack of clustering effects and, most importantly, 
a change in their way of life, which judging from the pamphlet cited above, was 
the city’s intention. In any case, the city’s interpretation of history obscures the 
real picture, prompting questions as to why it was deemed necessary to 
accompany a straight-forward city beautification project with a floral yet 
normative narrative. When an association to preserve the unique character of 
the area was created in March 2007 (Historic Hardware Street Preservation 
Association, 老五金街保存協會 Lǎo Wǔjīnjiē Bǎocún Xiéhuì), their slogans 
addressed what they saw as the city’s misrepresentation and underlined the 
metalworkers’ right to a livelihood as much as the specificity of their trade in 
Kaohsiung’s history, urging the city to reconsider the blanket demolition plan 
and involve them in a community-led beautification they felt would ultimately 
benefit the area. The municipality paid scant attention to such loosely 
conveyed ideas, with the frenetic atmosphere of the upcoming World Games 
possibly spurring the city into rapid action. 
Interestingly, when asked about the reasons for their failure, many of the 
leading members blamed their inability to sufficiently galvanise all the hardware 
stores (due to the sectioning of the project in four stages, some shop-owners 
were reluctant to take part in protests supporting the areas demolished first, 
hoping for a settlement with the city government), as much as in their inability 
to translate their demands for livelihood into a wider social movement. Unlike 
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the environmental protests, or those to protect a historic block of houses 
discussed in section 5.4 of this chapter, the hardware stores in fact never 
attracted the attention of the middle class, students or even the artists 
commissioned to replace the stores with art commemorating their soon-to-be 
extinct way of life. What media coverage they gained was not necessarily 
flattering and the movement struggled even with conveying their message to 
immediate neighbours, who calculated the removal of the shops might raise 
the value of their homes and businesses. As a chuffed neighbour interviewed in 
a documentary dealing with the demolition says upon seeing the levelled 
expanse of rubble, “Kaohsiung has to overtake Taipei. We can’t have Taipei 
saying they are number one. With the clean up in Kaohsiung now, it’s even 
prettier than Taipei.” (Wu [video], 2007). 
According to a city councillor at the time, neither the city administration nor the 
council were prepared to back down unless they would be faced with ‘extreme 
opposition’, suggesting this is not so much a case study of the efficacy of 
social groupings, but rather of the determination which the city authorities 
showed throughout the drawn-out process of the demolition. A determination 
which, I suggest, was successfully translated into power through a process of 
framing the debate as a question of modernization and development, with the 
intention of ‘making Yanchengpu magnificent again’, as councilman An 
Pinglang put it during the second reading of the proposed demolition order 
(Kaohsiung City Council, Gongyuan Road Demolition Budget 2nd Reading, 23 
Jan 2008). Under this banner, the municipality assembled key actors from 
businesses, neighbours, later even including the artist community that filled the 
slowly expanding park with over 50 different pieces of art, all of which 
reference the historical heritage of the area (Figure 4). 
But if the question of who was replaced by the park is easier to answer, the 
question that remains is who this park is for, a question also central to two 
recent documentary films dealing first with the shopkeepers’ efforts to preserve 
their lived space (Wu Xinyu’s 2008 “Whose is the Park Road?”) and their lives 
after resettlement (Lu Yurui’s 2012 “A New Park”). The park, with its flowers, 
bicycle lane, a miniature ‘public event’ amphitheatre and variety of benches, is 
not out of the ordinary, but the few remaining metalworkers view it with 
suspicion, with some consciously avoiding it, and many denigrating it as 
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merely a place where dogs can relieve themselves. This mixture of frustration 
and lack of understanding for the new spatial form – a green park/avenue - is 
perhaps best expressed by an elderly resident interviewed in “Whose is the 
Park Road?”: 
“…the planning bosses, they planned a flower garden, lots of different plants… 
What they planned is all good to build a park for dogs to shit in. Going to the 
park: like it’s a matter of life and death. Who goes to the park, who has that kind 
of time on their hands, we’re all busy working, looking for work. Going to the 
park, only rich people do that, if your stomach’s full then it’s no problem.” (Wu 
[video], 2007). 
 
Figure 4 Benches constructed out of old machine parts. Photograph by author. 
 
Faced with questions of identity and the allocation of space, the ‘authenticity’ 
of the area also remains problematic, as Sharon Zukin has shown on the case 
of New York’s gentrifying neighbourhoods (Zukin, 2010). In this case, the lived 
authenticity of the chaotic metalworking shops and the illegible network of 
lanes and gaps in the organically (illegally) grown neighbourhood is substituted 
by a planned authenticity of a different kind. The industrial character of the area 
is translated through the instrument of public art into a dizzying array of street 
furniture and installations, all of which explicitly reference the history of the 
area and the city. The irony is not lost on the remaining shopkeepers: ‘They 
took the things that kept us alive and made them dead’ (Mr Bai, hardware shop 
owner. Interview, 3 January 2013). 
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Though not explicitly set out in city planning documents, the notion of 
authenticity is crucial to this neighbourhood from an economic standpoint. Not 
only is the city government promoting mass tourism in the area, but a planned 
creative industry park also relies on the area’s authenticity to attract investment 
- most recently a large Hollywood digital effect firm. The firm, Rhythm&Hues, 
was initially being groomed by the municipal economic development office to 
occupy a suburban software industry park, but decided to base itself in an old 
warehouse instead, embracing the ‘industrial feel’ of the old port, which was 
inaugurated by Ang Lee in November 2012  (Mike Yang, Rhythm&Hues Taiwan 
Co. Manager. Personal communication, 17 November 2012). With similar firms 
occupying old industrial spaces from around the world, it is not unusual the 
company preferred and understood the potential of disused industrial buildings 
in this way. The area thus gained a new role as a creative park and tourist 
attraction, though the many older residents are cool towards the weekend 
crowds and have found alternative uses for some of the artwork as chairs or 
even clothes-lines (Figure 5) in an entertaining display of life appropriating new 
spaces in unexpected ways. Nevertheless, the transformation is complete as 
far as the city is concerned and major reconstruction in the area has now given 
way to a slower place-making effort analysed in the following section. 
 
Figure 5 Laser-cut art installation used to dry clothes. Photograph by author. 
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Taking a wider look beyond the micro-politics of spatial use in a 
neighbourhood in Kaohsiung, the research problematizes the equity of major 
urban redevelopment in a unique socio-economic environment. The issue here 
is not one of forced relocation, of laws and due procedure being ignored. The 
Public Works Bureau remained within its authority to push the decision 
through, until it was finally confirmed by a vote in the city council. Quite the 
opposite, the issue here is the precision with which one social group had been 
extirpated – while the relocation meant an sizeable blow to the local economy, 
it was narrowly targeted at a very specific group of people, self-described in 
interviews as lǎobáixìng (⽼老百姓 ‘common folk’), but specifically working in the 
hardware business. The destruction of this dominant local industry has caused 
a knock-on effect on shops in the area, especially those servicing the hardware 
shops: cheap street eateries, betel nut sellers, small sundry shops: those who 
have already not seen any trickle-down benefits from increased tourist footfall 
in the area were also the ones most affected by the renewal of Gongyuan 
Road. While city brochures are replete with references to social inclusion, 
these often concern access ramps for the elderly or the disabled, rather than 
premium space for the undesirable or incompatible, categories eluding easy 
definition. On the other hand, the city’s updated urban plan for the area is quite 
unequivocal in its desire to transform (or as the jargon goes, regenerate) the 
area to become predominately high-grade residential housing with peripheral 
tourist industries using the ‘cultural resources’ of nearby Pier-2 and thus 
promote “Soho-style artistic spaces” (Kaohsiung City Government: Change to 
Kaohsiung Urban Plan (Yancheng District), Detailed Urban Plan (Third General 
Review Plan), February 2008). The image of New York’s “Soho” is thus 
introduced and formalised into the language of the plan, brought home like a 
souvenir which found practical use and reminiscent of Taipei’s drive to 
construct a ‘Manhattan’ in Xinyi District (Jou, 2005). Echoes of competition 
with Taipei, as well as a desire to see Yancheng District rise from its current 
doldrums (incidentally caused by decades of city policy promoting sprawl and 
an eastward expansion) frame the debate in local terms, while the language of 
creative city discourse provides the professional planning expertise necessary 
to secure funds and political backing. 
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While the research expectation of finding political power in new notions and 
uses of cultural themes was satisfied to a certain extent, certain paradoxes 
also presented itself, as well as questions about the applicability of terms such 
as gentrification, especially concerning the balance between the role of artists, 
the municipal state and (real-estate) entrepreneurs. Contrary to a long tradition 
of posing the connection between artists and gentrification as one where the 
surplus ‘meaning’ created by resident artists becomes the symbolic capital on 
which a real-estate gentrification can occur (Zukin, 1982, 2010; Ley, 2003; 
Cameron and Coaffee, 2005; Smith 2012), the research suggests what has 
occurred in Kaohsiung is more usefully explained as a concerted municipal 
effort to alter urban space, not a real-estate price led process of the influx of 
ever-richer newcomers who end up displacing the old. Though many of the 
results and even mechanics are identical, the presented case could better be 
described as a top-down deproletarization4 of the waterfront neighbourhood 
within a narrowly understood concept of culture and urban beautification. 
While a classic process of gentrification may occur, the change to the 
character of the neighbourhood attested by the relocation of long-term 
residents suggests that this was not collateral damage of the unavoidable, 
evolutionary changes that any city experiences, but rather, a planned and 
firmly executed redevelopment project, and was in fact correctly recognised as 
such by those directly affected. The subsequent rise in real-estate prices, 
estimated to be around 30%-40%, is well above the city average (You, 26 
March 2012), though it remains a consequence of the city’s actions rather than 
the impetus for regeneration, setting it apart from market-led gentrification. The 
rising value of real estate however can accelerates the regeneration drive, 
involving big private enterprises, mainly construction companies, as well as the 
establishment of public monopolies on tourist infrastructure. This certainly 
applied to the case of Gongyuan Road, but the same dynamics are visible in 
nearby Pier no.1, where a somewhat ‘messy’ fleet of private sampan operators 
from to Qijin Island was pushed out by a city-operated ferry service during 
another project of beautification, (Jerome Lanche. Interview, 12 November 
2012), suggesting that beautification on Kaohsiung’s waterfront is likely to 
                                                
 
4The working class character of the neighbourhood was best epitomised by the 
hardware shops, and while many areas of Yancheng remain untouched by the 
bulldozers, a wider effort to rebrand it has been underway since 2006, when the city 
took over nearby Pier-2 Art Center; see following section. 
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harm certain established local businesses at the expense of larger entities able 
to provide the standardised services the city authorities are eager to introduce. 
Looking at the question from the aspect of ‘authenticity’ and the plan to create 
a ‘creative’ Kaohsiung, it becomes apparent that both categories can be 
socially exclusive of groups and practices which do not conform to the visions 
delineated by the planning bodies and city politicians. While major industrial 
infrastructure projects of national importance continue being built with little 
opposition from the city, the family-owned industrial heritage is to be just that – 
heritage, with businesses pushed out of sight of tourists, while their remains 
take the role of relics that imbue the newly created spaces with an authentic 
‘Kaohsiung’ feel, the cultural capital on which the creative city of Kaohsiung is 
being produced. 
The last point to be underlined from the 4-year long process of contestation, 
demolition and finally art-led beautification is that the municipality, the 
hardware shopkeepers and the artist community all engaged in discussing art, 
local culture, and deindustrialisation, all of which became political topics in the 
city. Understood within the harsh terms of an economistic world-view, where 
culture can be calculated as capital, creativity is a resource, and the ultimate 
objective measure is the city’s GDP, the concern over public art and aesthetics 
has irreversibly entered city politics. I argue this is an important reason for the 
emergence of communities around issues of culture and urban renewal as 
‘counterparts’ to the municipality’s vision of the city: as was observed in the 
UK by Miller and Rose, such imagined communities can become the site of 
new contestations and demands on the political authority (Miller and Rose, 
2008: 94). A recent conflict over a block of Kaohsiung not far from Park Road 
shows that Kaohsiung city’s culture-led redevelopment efforts have indeed 
spawned culture-led resistance to redevelopment, frustrating the municipality’s 
effort at obtaining a monopoly on spatial production in the area. 
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5.4 In with the new: New Asia Harbour and the Pier-2 Art 
Center 
 
 
New Asia Harbour 
Although the scale of destruction and the mode of art-led redevelopment of 
Gongyuan Road were new to Kaohsiung, the following years have seen a 
steady increase in the size, cost and ambition of the city’s new cultural 
infrastructure. Many of these projects have been linked together by a harbour-
wide redevelopment project called ‘New Asia Harbour’, which in turn is part of 
the ‘Kaohsiung 2014’ vision proposed by Mayor Chu. 
The goals of the mega-project are clear enough: “Kaohsiung's future plans, 
under the new framework of cooperation between the port and the city, will 
transform the north part of the harbour using ‘Metropolitan Harbour Re-
construction’, based on the creative Pier-2 Art Zone, the multifunctional trade 
park, and the Kaohsiung Software Technology Park; together, these will for the 
basis on which to develop four main aspects of the new harbour zone: financial 
services, culture and creativity, tourism, and industry, thereby developing the 
harbour city’s soft power.” (Chu, 2012: 4) 
 
The area in question comprises most of Kaohsiung urbanised waterfront 
around the mouth of the Love River, connecting the older neighbourhoods of 
Hamasen with the newer developments in the South-east of the city, around 
Kaohsiung’s tallest building and biggest shopping malls. The aim, as outlined 
above by the mayor, is a text-book application of the type of large, public 
infrastructural projects which have characterised the neo-liberal turn in city 
planning since the 1980s onwards. While only parts of the proposed 
construction could be designated as ‘creative spaces’, they together occupy 
the majority of the land set aside, especially if we include tourist facilities 
(which the city categorises as a creative industry). Apart from the 
aforementioned Pier-2, which is already operating, the project also includes a 
80,000 sq.m. ‘Kaohsiung Cruise-ship Terminal’, a 75,000 sq.m. ‘Marine 
Cultural and Popular Music Center’, the Kaohsiung World Trade Centre 
(already constructed), a new city library and 23km of a light-rail system 
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connecting the area at a total estimated cost of over 20 billion NTD (£400 
million), most of which will be financed by the central government. The result, 
according to the Urban Development Bureau’s deputy chief, will be to 
“…transform Kaohsiung into a world city, and also to show Kaohsiung to the 
world and then to attract foreign investment.” (Wang Chichuan, Kaohsiung City 
Government Urban Development Bureau Deputy Director General. Interview, 
9th October 2012). Significantly, New Asia Harbour is a hybrid project 
encompassing both the cultural-creative as well as the active port, suggesting 
a new level of parity between these very different spaces which testifies to the 
central as well as local state’s resolve in bringing about a cultural turn. The 
mention of ‘soft power’ moreover ties the municipal effort with central 
government’s new-found panache for cultural exports as an important counter-
balance to Taiwan’s declining industrial base, as well as the stagnation of its 
hard power vis-à-vis the mainland. At this level, the de-industrialising, creative 
harbour of Kaohsiung is a function and metaphor of the island’s development 
and is in no way immune to the considerations of cross-strait issues which 
permeate Taiwanese politics. 
 
A closer examination of the particular projects comprising the development 
further emphasises the impression that Kaohsiung has chosen to emulate the 
path trodden by Bilbao and other cities seen as successful ‘redevelopers’; both 
the pop music centre and the cruise-ship terminal have been designed by 
famous global architectural firms, a fact which city officials often point out. 
Moreover, the first round of the competition for the pop music centre was 
cancelled a day after the final date for submission - rumour in the small world 
of international architectural offices has it that it was because nobody famous 
enough applied, although the official explanation cited difficulties in jury 
selection (Cliento, 2010). Furthermore, expensive public tenders and 
competitions need not lead to any actual construction. Although the Kaohsiung 
city government has so far made ample use of the various rendered 
architectural drawings and animations in its promotional material (from videos, 
websites, brochures…), most of the area is still under construction and I have 
not been able to verify whether they are being constructed in the same scope 
and design as the winning proposals. Despite that, the enthusiasm for the 
costly projects is evident: the pop music centre only recently broke ground (in 
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March 2014), but is already being compared by the government to Sydney’s 
Opera House (Executive Yuan Office of Information Services, March 17 2014). 
 
The lack of physical construction so far has been offset by the plentiful 
production of an abstract, conceived space in Lefebvrian terms - the city’s 
vision already exists and is therefore amenable to an analysis of the ways in 
which this city, with its spaces, has been constructed. While the 2014 vision 
builds on an existing project of linking the port and the city, symbolically 
tearing down the barriers that made Kaohsiung a port but not a harbour-front 
city along the lines of Sydney or Hong Kong, a fact often lamented upon during 
interviews with planning officials. Apart from this spatial reconfiguration 
however, the most conspicuous tool for achieving a shift in Kaohsiung’s image 
(and consequently, economic success) is a drive towards the elusive goal of 
creating a creative city, of transforming Kaohsiung in Bilbao’s image. As 
outlined in the beginning of this chapter, the cultural turn has local, identity 
driven roots, as much as it is also a policy mimesis by planning officials 
desperate to provide the economic and cultural boost that a city such as 
Kaohsiung allegedly needs. Faced with a consistent brain-drain to Taipei and 
the leeching of heavy industry to mainland China, creative industries and arts 
appear as a panacea, providing both the jobs and culture required to stop the 
emigration of Kaohsiung’s young and talented, as well as replacing a dwindling 
industrial base. Following the logic of what policy consultants call ‘blue sky 
thinking’ (referring to the creation of a new niche or specialisation in which one 
can then be the market leader), Kaohsiung has somewhat awkwardly 
combined its marine heritage with a desire to become a production site of pop 
music for the wider Chinese-speaking market, with the Maritime Cultural and 
Popular Music Center being the first and most obvious spatial manifestation of 
this goal. The function of creativity is here brought down to a bare economic 
dimension, a new industrial complex to replace the old, forging rhymes instead 
of steel. Once such a logic has taken hold, the municipality’s approach 
towards the production of creative spaces can be further analysed from this 
point of view; art education, the fostering of ‘Soho-style’ living as seen in the 
case of Gongyuan Road all serve to change or enhance the ‘human capital’ of 
the city from one appropriate for heavy industry (conformist, low wages, low 
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skills) to one which is more attuned to a perception of the ‘new economy’ - 
free-thinking, well-paid and abundantly skilled. 
 
In itself, this decision is not novel or particular to Kaohsiung; rather, what is of 
interest here is the way in which the city proceeded (and is proceeding) in a 
hugely expensive effort at ‘culturing’ the city and the enthusiasm with which 
the municipality has took it upon itself to construct creative spaces in the hope 
of re-educating the population. This question, which essentially is one of 
governance and of being governed, is examined on the case of Pier-2 Art 
District, the only link in the chain of creative spaces within the New Asia 
Harbour which has already been operating for over a decade, and thus 
presents a workable case study from which we can infer the governance 
approach of the Kaohsiung municipality, as well the extent to which other 
relevant groups participate in the process of creative space production. 
 
Pier-2 Art Center 
In 2000, during national celebrations which feature a fireworks display rotating 
from city to city (as part of an attempt to break Taipei’s monopoly on national 
celebrations), a site in Yancheng District, belonging to the Taiwan Sugar 
Corporation, was first brought to public attention as the location from which 
the fireworks were fired into the air above the city’s harbour. In following years, 
an independent organization, the Pier-2 Art Development Association, used the 
area as a platform for local artists as well as visiting exhibitions and events, 
helped by the nearby Sin Pin Pier Absolutely Art Space (SPP), a network node 
for ‘creatives’ in Kaohsiung since the late 1990s; many of its founders were 
involved in setting up the Pier-2 association as well, so it is possible to 
consider this space alongside Taipei’s Huashan or Beijing’s 798 art zones, 
both of which are dealt with in this research. What sets Pier-2 apart however is 
the way in which it passed under direct municipal control, unlike Taipei’s 
Huashan which has been outsourced to a private company, or Beijing’s 798 
which is run by a state-owned enterprise. While similarities exist with Treasure 
Hill and the URS programme, both of which have been analysed at length in 
the previous chapter, what sets these apart is the vertical integration of Pier-2 
into the city’s bureaucracy as well as its crucial place in the city’s 
developmental vision. While both of Taipei’s case studies are institutionalised 
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manifestations of the corporative approach typical of that city’s approach to 
the production of creative space (integrating both statist and civil society, as 
well as private sector efforts), Pier-2 is on the other hand a top-down effort 
which attempts to ‘play the roles’ of all of the actors or groups described in the 
chapter on Taipei. More crucially, Taipei’s Treasure Hill, similarly run by the 
municipal cultural bureau, is dedicated to the preservation of heritage – one 
designated by the city – to an almost exaggerated degree in the inclusion of 
living households within its bounds. Pier-2 one the other hand, strives to alter 
the built and lived space of the neighbourhood. 
 
From being a grassroots, artist-led space, Pier-2’s first transformation 
happened when it was handed over to Shude University. During this time, a 
more ambitious, but also more commercial use of space was introduced as the 
University was attempting to launch a creative industry zone while renting out 
the large, unused warehouses. After this brief stint, the centre became part of 
the city government in 2006, when the area was reconstituted as the Pier-2 Art 
District (駁⼆二藝術特區 Bó èr yìshù tèqū), operated by a dedicated centre within 
the Bureau of Cultural Affairs. In the next few years, the city acted mainly as 
custodian, letting outside actors provide content for the centre, as well as set 
the broad goals for its development. It was not until 2009 that a decision to 
develop the brand of Pier-2 was taken, meaning a more involved, direct 
approach was taken in terms of the centre’s content, style and its relations to 
the city. We can therefore say that at least since 2009, the space of Pier-2 is a 
direct manifestation of the municipality’s designs on the waterfront of 
Kaohsiung using the received notions of redevelopment by creativity, which 
were also applied not far away at Gongyuan Road. The two areas are linked 
not only by their physical proximity, but by their role both in the narrative (an 
informal side) as well as the urban plan (a more formal side) of Kaohsiung’s 
effort to become a creative city. 
 
Arriving for the first time at Pier-2 on a balmy Sunday evening, the area 
seemed more than anything extremely lively, and very loud. While the 
surrounding neighbourhood is dark and quiet, the Taiwanese metal concert 
happening that evening did not appear to bother the scores of couples, 
families with three generations, and other ‘tourists’ who invariably took pictures 
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in front of various pieces of art which dot the entire area. The art itself is 
curiously chosen - a photorealistic mural of a train-station reminiscent of 
Maoist iconography; a shiny metal sculpture that most elderly visitors interpret 
as a bench; several tall figures representing the workers of Kaohsiung. What 
they have in common is their age, having all been chosen, paid for and placed 
by the city in the space of a few years. Here, the art quite literally makes the 
place, taking references from municipal reports, politicians’ sentiments and 
building upon a consensus about the need to memorialise Kaohsiung’s 
industrial ‘past’ – something that had also been a theme at Gongyuan Road. 
The selection of art in Pier-2 is particularly amenable to such a reading, being 
neither a gallery nor an artist colony, but a municipal project administered by 
the Bureau of Cultural Affairs directly and very tightly knit into the city’s 
narrative about its rebirth, from industrial port to creative harbour. While mega-
developments such as the pop music centre or cruise-ship terminal set the 
context and illustrate the lengths to which the city may go in its ambition to 
become Asia’s new creative harbour, the present research has endeavoured 
instead to analyse the mundane, daily activities of the Pier-2 staff and 
management, the events that take place there, as well as observing the space 
with its visitors. To this end, I visited Pier-2 on fifteen different occasions, 
during different seasons and days of the week, to compile as accurate a set of 
field-notes as possible. From the material published by the art zone to the 
selection of the works exhibited, several tendencies emerge: first and foremost 
is the necessity of popular appeal, dovetailing also with the political narrative 
which has made it clear ‘cultural education’ of the city’s inhabitants to be of 
outmost importance. Second is the ubiquity of industrial themes: old 
machinery, recycled metal fittings and parts, the large worker statues 
symbolising hardy southern Taiwanese folk, balanced only by pop-culture 
references and matching the developmental narrative about an industrial city 
maturing to a post-industrial economy and culture. Remembering how actual 
industrial heritage is treated (and deleted as it was in Gongyuan Road), this 
again suggests a conscious effort to produce a post-industrial, art district by 
fiat and following the examples of not only Western cities (London being the 
go-to example because of the large and clear governmental input), but also 
neighbouring examples of which Yokohama’s ‘Minato Mirai’ is probably the 
most often cited. Thirdly, the space of Pier-2 also extends beyond its 
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boundaries by design, being a crucial and, for now at least, the only realised 
part of the creative-cultural harbour city. This linkage reflects itself in Pier-2’s 
connectedness into two ways. As a physical space, it is part of a new cycling 
network, a must-see stop on tourist bus-tours, a place showcasing 
government policy regarding creative industry etc.  As a social space, it is a 
place of cultural edification, a space where art and culture are made available 
for mass consumption, a space where art/culture consumption is linked with 
consumerist leisure activities - such as eating an expensive stone-baked pizza, 
enjoying German-style bread or shopping in one of the many design stores 
both within and outside the actual Art Zone. 
 
Its expansion into the surrounding neighbourhood is therefore a good example 
on which to observe the first effects of municipal planning policy when it 
comes to creative spaces in Kaohsiung, an example which leaves little doubt 
as to the nature of the city’s cultural turn - or at least this spatial manifestation 
of it. The space of Pier-2 is distinctly normative in its stated creativity - there is 
no doubt what creativity in Kaohsiung should look like, nor is there any doubt 
that the city is serious about transforming the city through the changes in 
space. Being normative, the space requires an audience; it requires a practice 
to be created from it. Being normative, it also contains a clear set of role-
models from which norms are extrapolated - the whole area around and 
between the warehouses is replete, almost saturated, with works of art 
designed to appear spontaneous (commissioned murals take the place of 
illegal graffiti and street art, sculptures are first designed into the lay-out and 
then commissioned…), yet this is not some organically grown, arty 
neighbourhood; it is simply a city-mandated ‘art zone’ where a handful of 
artists have been selected to create works fitting the pre-ordained vision - one 
which is incidentally almost identical to that used at Gongyuan Road: industrial 
port now reborn as creative harbour. 
 
Not as independent or closed as the city’s museums and galleries, Pier-2 is 
also a good case to study the preferences of the city authorities in terms of not 
only the exhibitions or shows it attracts, but the practice of using and creating 
space beyond the narrow understanding of art and culture. As the centre 
expanded, the running of many warehouses was outsourced (to a small 
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museum, a commercial music venue, a design shop, an upscale restaurant and 
bakery and two digital content producers), while the centre’s management 
focused on creating the brand of Pier-2 – not least because of the need to 
attract visitors/tourists and justify public spending on the site. The branding 
exercise, combined with a pursuit of a popular programme and an emphasis 
on making the space approachable to the general public has paid off in terms 
of visitor numbers, which stood at 2.3 million by November 2012 according to 
preliminary numbers provided by Pier-2 (Sun Meiling, Pier-2 Manager. Personal 
communication, 13 Dec 2012). While such numbers include non-ticket paying 
visitors and thus place Pier-2 somewhat implausibly alongside New York’s 
MoMA or the Uffizi in Florence, they nevertheless represent a huge increase 
from the 160,000 visitors in 2008, before the branding effort began in 2009. 
The changes were not only quantitative, but qualitative as well – while early 
visitors were mainly artists and youngsters, the average visitor profile has 
changed considerably to include families of tourists. The art centre presently 
relies on its tourist appeal, a fact which management readily admit (Sun 
Meiling. Interview, 21 November 2012). The reliance on numbers (of visitors, of 
exhibits, of warehouses converted) illustrates how the municipality evaluates 
this creative space. Rather than profit, which is the guiding principle of 
Beijing’s creative spaces, or the adherence to the details of the public tenders 
for Taipei’s public creative spaces, Kaohsiung’s creative spaces are seen as a 
public service provided by the city and subject to the same norms as the 
provision of public infrastructure. 
 
Apart from a quantitative increase in events, visitors and square footage, Pier-2 
has also begun with an informal effort to improve the ‘messy’5 (luàn 亂) 
streetscape that is a characteristic of this neighbourhood (and Taiwan in 
general) by engaging the community, helping them clean up the area around 
their houses, lay down turf, place flower pots and for example even change or 
remove the ubiquitous iron grates on windows. To this end, Pier-2 sends out 
groups of volunteers to approach neighbours with suggestions on what to do 
with their front gardens/patios, offer to paint their facades with murals, take 
                                                
 
5 The term “luan”, while often translated as messy or chaotic, denotes a specific type of 
Taiwanese streetscape, littered with incongruous shop-signs, illegal architecture, air-
conditioning units, tangled wires and iron grates on nearly every window.  
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away bulk waste, or sometimes liaise to set up more permanent art 
installations selected by Pier-2 in line with their concept for the wider area: 
“Contemporary, experimental, avant-garde, pluralistic, open, fun, welcoming, 
old warehouse new ideas, sky is blue, cooling sea breeze, easy to enlarge 
resident artists’ creative works.” (Pier-2 Art Center, 2012) 
 
Although ‘creativity’ is often connected to a messy, unorganised yet inspiring 
surroundings (cf. Törnqvist, 1983), the managers of Pier-2 leave no doubt as to 
their position on ‘messiness’ of their neighbours’ houses, which is not the 
acceptable ‘open and fun’ messiness of art: 
 
“They can look really messy. So this streetscape can seem, especially to people 
who've only recently come here, it can seem very bad. So we can coordinate 
with them, and replace [iron grates], or make them look nicer and so on. So in 
this respect, we deal with the locals directly. And they're all pretty happy too.” 
(Pier-2 manager, interview. 21 November 2012) 
 
The attention that municipal authorities devote to the control of chaotic 
streetscapes was in no way first documented at Pier-2; in his study of 
Kaohsiung’s New Kujiang shopping area, Hsu (2010) similarly notes the 
authorities felt the messy streetscape held back the area’s development (Hsu, 
2010). Such opposition is not without meaning, indicative as it is of the values 
attached to spatial forms imported from overseas: pedestrianized streets, 
shoppers leisurely strolling, uniform façades are not merely attractive images, 
but clash significantly with the existing streetscape typical of Kaohsiung (and 
other Taiwanese cities) as much as Hausmannian Paris clashed with the 
twisting lanes of ‘pre-modern’ Paris, to allude to Harvey’s work on the ‘capital 
of modernity’ (Harvey, 2003). Taking the comparison further, the normative 
approach typical both of 19th Century Paris and 21st Century Kaohsiung may on 
the surface differ, considering Harvey demonstrates on the example of Paris 
the centrality of capital in the creation of the modern city, while Kaohsiung’s 
own redevelopment is planned and funded by the state. Yet beneath this crude 
distinction lies the unifying belief in the necessity of spatial transformation for 
economic goals, a belief justifying the destruction of unwanted communities or 
at least their assimilation, one iron grate at a time. 
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The staff at Pier-2 report largely positive experiences with locals, a few noise 
and parking space complaints apart. One reason why the urban space created 
by this reconstruction remains popular with local residents is its effect on real-
estate values, which have gone bucked the trend of languishing house prices 
and rose between 30-40% according to agencies operating in the area. (You, 
26 March 2012). Apart from laying down turf or tidying and beautifying the 
area, Pier-2 has extensively used public art installations to change the 
surrounding space, linking it with beautification efforts around the old 
Kaohsiung Port Station in the west, and True Love Pier in the east. While 
operating within the city’s Cultural Bureau, Pier-2 has evolved into a key actor 
of spatial production in the wider area of the old city. Pulling in tourists, 
‘seeding’ art into the neighbourhood, it has done more than beautified the area, 
it has bent it to a new vision, rewarded and advised those who are willing to fit 
in, while bringing into stark contrast those spatial practices which do not 
conform with the new vision for the area. 
 
This is especially important since Pier-2 is at the centre of a planned creative 
industry cluster, as well as the mayor’s new vision for the entire ‘old port’ area 
of Kaohsiung. (Chu, 2012; Wang and Wu, 2012; Wu, 2012). The first major 
player was Sony PlayStation with an incubation centre within Pier-2, while 
2012 saw a Pier-2 (inadvertently) attracting a Hollywood digital effects 
company, Rhythm&Hues (You, 2012). The company had been negotiating with 
the city economic development department and was expected to move into a 
purpose built facility outside the city centre, when a delegation visiting the city 
on a tourist bus tour saw Pier-2, and decided to open a studio in an empty 
warehouse instead (Amber Lin, Pier-2 Spokesperson. Interview, 21 November 
2012). With the upgrading of the area from a tourist attraction to a creative 
industry site, the city is pushing ahead with its vision of wider change in the 
neighbourhood’s economic and demographic make-up. Digital companies are 
lured to the area using direct or indirect subsidies as traditional industries are 
being uprooted through beautification projects or redevelopment. While the 
tourist narrative emphasises the role of Kaohsiung’s industrial heritage as a 
base from which creative industries will spring, there is little empirical evidence 
to support this. Quite the opposite, the two world seem very far apart, a 
 166 
sentiment confirmed in informal conversations both with those working in the 
creative industry (such as Lu Luming, a record label start-up) as well as the 
remaining hardware shopkeepers that I spoke to about the demolition of 
Gongyuan Road. In true Taiwanese fashion, perhaps only street eateries have 
any sort of chance to transcend both socio-economic fields although some 
anecdotal evidence suggests many have closed since the neighbourhood 
started being redeveloped. The arrival of creative industries to the area is not 
built on its industrial heritage; it quite literally supplants it according to the 
design set out by the city. 
 
Another topic that changes in Yancheng District often bring up is that of 
gentrification, which is indeed a theme that has surfaced repeatedly throughout 
the various research sites, although what exactly respondents meant by 
gentrification also varied greatly. In Kaohsiung, gentrification is however 
perhaps not the best word, unless one includes ‘gentrification by fiat’ as 
already discussed in the section on Gongyuan Road. The standard markers of 
gentrification however, such as a large influx of resident newcomers with better 
economic and social standing, are not yet present. Nor has the area seen an 
influx of convenience stores such as 7-11, which is the Taiwanese equivalent 
of the ‘gourmet deli’, usually considered a classic sign of gentrification in the 
west. Gentrification in Kaohsiung does not look like gentrification in Brooklyn or 
Hackney, nor is it entirely comparable in terms of the market-led dynamic of 
demographic change typical of gentrification. It remains however a firmly 
rooted idea around which municipal policy in constructed. While the city 
cannot legislate to increase the number of convenience stores, the arrival of a 
7-11 or Family Mart is greeted as a success and seen as proof of amelioration 
of a neighbourhood’s environment. At the time of writing, the area around Pier-
2 was still a dark spot on the map as far as major convenience stores are 
concerned, though a spate of construction of new residential buildings along 
the fringes of what is now the long park beside Gongyuan Road may yet 
change that. 
 
The evaluation of Pier-2 is by no means a verdict on the role it plays, nor is this 
research intended to pass a verdict or recommendation of policy. Quite simply, 
Pier-2 Art Zone is a government-run creative zone emulating more 
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spontaneous predecessors (including its own predecessor, the Pier-2 Art 
Development Association) with a clearly stated intent of transforming the urban 
space of old Kaohsiung. While many of the centre’s activities mentioned here 
may seem banal or quotidian (choice of shops, fighting ‘messiness’) and others 
are expected (branding, insertion of new industries), it is precisely in such slow 
yet unyielding effort that this research locates the crux of Kaohsiung’s 
approach towards the use of ‘creativity’ in urban redevelopment - as a slow, 
concerted, top-down effort, the city aims to educate, reshape and remake the 
citizen and the city. Creative spaces in Kaohsiung may share with their Taipei 
or Beijing counterparts the underlying assumptions about the value of art and 
culture, yet differ in the explicitly high-modernist approach to their production. 
If the creative spaces of Taipei are characterised by negotiation and slow inter-
stitching of state, expert, artist and resident groups, which ultimately led to an 
institutionalised approach, Kaohsiung’s high modernism is evident in the short 
path from the abstract space of plans to the physical space of the city. 
Moreover, the ability of the city to impose its vision is evident in the undiluted 
messages attached to the physical representations of its creative city plan. 
This is not to say that the ability of the city to impose plans on urban 
landscapes is a sign of its strength or capacity, but rather testifies to the lack 
of an ability to co-opt different interests, as well as the inability (or lack of 
desire) on the part of civil society groups to engage with the city, an inability 
which was only recently being addressed by small, professional groups 
dedicated to questioning the underlying notions of culture, development and 
creativity on which the city’s cultural turn rests. 
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5.4 Hamasen – Community-led Preservation 
 
Only a few hundred meters west of Pier-2 and Gongyuan Road lies a block of 
nearly 30 houses dating to the Japanese colonial period. In varying states of 
disrepair, they are nonetheless sterling examples of a hybrid Japanese-Western 
architectural style, which Imperial Japan favoured in its colonial possession. 
The area, now considered outside the modern city centre, in in fact the original 
site from which the city of Kaohsiung expanded, the site of its first port and 
(then) main train station. The block of houses was formerly filled with 
businesses such as a hotel, a shipping company, the Kaohsiung bureau of 
Tainan Times, as well as several smaller shops and dwellings. As the Japanese-
owned businesses closed and the city centre shifted ever eastwards over the 
Love River, the area was largely forgotten, its ‘Japanese baroque’ houses left to 
decay.  Then, in late March 2012, the residents of the area, which is built on 
publicly owned land like Hardware Street, were informed by way of notices 
pasted to their doors that they have three months until their homes are 
demolished to make way for a ‘multi-functional’ parking lot meant to facilitate 
tourist access to Sizihwan (⻄西⼦子灣/Xiziwan), a small sandy bay which is being 
developed into another compulsory stop on tours of the city and has seen 
substantial city investment over the past decade. 
An important distinction with Hardware Street/Gongyuan Road is that one of 
the houses in the area was already occupied by a group of young architects, 
while another served as a teahouse and gallery. When I first visited the 
headquarters of the Takao Renaissance Association6 (TRA; original name 
Dagou Historical Cultural Renaissance Society - Dǎgǒu wénshǐ zàixìng shèhuì 
打狗⽂文史再興社會), I was met by a small group of its founding members, many of 
whom have been working in the office on the second floor. The space was 
immediately reminiscent of various arty squats and loft conversions, which 
have become somewhat synonymous with art and culture-led redevelopment. 
Although remaining quite undeveloped, the area has a socially diverse 
population, something which proved key in its capacity to mount a successful 
                                                
 
6 The name Takao Renaissance Association has been chosen at the request of the 
organizers. 
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resistance. Despite the residents having been taken off guard by the city’s 
sudden decision, the group have hinted the city may have felt its hand forced 
after initial inquiries were made by Jerome Lanche, a Kaohsiung-based 
architect and founding member of the TRA, regarding plans for the area, 
suggesting the city was not anticipating any community involvement from such 
an early stage. (Lin Weihe, Takao Renaissance Association. Interview, 8 
November 2012). After this initial inquiry, the local authorities moved with great 
speed, which, according to TRA members, had to do with election promises 
given by the local DPP councilwoman, Li Qiaoru. The congestion and parking 
issues plaguing Hamasen were to be solved by the construction of a large 
multi-storey car park, yet local opinion was anyhow divided as to whether this 
would benefit them or only the operators of tours for mainland Chinese 
tourists. Although faced with imminent demolition, the pre-existing channels of 
communication, especially a tea-house which Lin used to own, proved 
invaluable in the TRA’s initial drive to create momentum. In effect, their efforts 
had to ‘discover’ a community that had always existed in connection to the 
space, but had never been conceptualised as such until the decision of the city 
authorities to level the entire block. The contrast with Gongyuan Road, which 
had always existed as a tight-knit community of immigrant, working-class 
shops, could not be greater. The teahouse in particular was popular with locals 
as well as people from around Kaohsiung, creating an adaptable social space; 
being diverse in its clientele, it also broke through the constraints which 
hampered the metalworkers’ efforts and tapped into a pool of volunteering 
talent willing to fight for the preservation of the city’s history. Local filmmakers, 
university students and faculty, environmentalists stopping to enjoy tea after a 
trek on Chai Mountain, all these became important links in the formation of the 
neighbourhood movement. Among the people who frequented the teahouse 
and later helped with the formation of the movement was Yang Pingyu, head of 
the Kaohsiung’s Chaishan environmental movement, who was able to assist 
the fledgling activists with years of experience ‘battling’ the city: 
“Unlike environmentalists, people working in culture are not often in conflict 
with politics, they are more used to just asking for money. They had no 
experience, so we exchanged our experience with them, taught them about 
networking, about fighting with the city, about things like having to know when 
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every single small election is held.” (Yang Pingyu. Interview, 20 December 
2012) 
By March 27th 2012, the fledgling Takao Renaissance Association managed to 
mount a public protest with local residents and attracted significant support 
from students at Zhongshan University, as well as the attention of local media. 
National media exposure followed, both in print and broadcasting media, and 
the group also made ample use of social networking sites, attracting a 
following of nearly 13,000 people over a few main websites (current as of May 
2014). Only a few days later, the city government put demolition plans on hold, 
pending a full evaluation of the historic value of the neighbourhood by the 
Bureau of Cultural Affairs, which in turn tasked a group of architects from 
Zhongshan University to evaluate the area, including some with ties to the 
movement itself. According to Lin, a crucial factor in the speedy success has 
been a similar case in Taipei’s Shilin District, which had been demolished 
among public outrage a few days before; fearing loss of support, the local 
Democratic Progressive Party wanted to “differentiate itself” from the 
Guomindang-run Taipei (Lin Weihe; interview, 8 November 2012). While the 
case of the Takao Renaissance Association reveals the importance of pre-
existing networks which allowed the activists to quickly organise and raise the 
public profile of their actions, their actions were also legible to the city 
authorities and vice versa - something which sets this case aside from the 
previous one, where the hardware shops were unable to present a vision of 
themselves fitting in the new design of the neighbourhood. Furthermore, 
association members managed to frame the debate surrounding the demolition 
in terms favourable to them. The city plan was equated with ‘destroying 
culture’, and the group went as far as to compare the city’s plan with US 
firebombing of the area during World War II; the group also managed to ride on 
the back of a renewed appreciation of the island’s Japanese heritage, which 
had until recently been subject to mandated erasure or slow decay (Johnson, 
1994; Hsia, 2002). More importantly perhaps, the unanimity with which the 26 
households in the area supported the TRA’s work meant that a legitimate 
alternative plan for the area could be drawn up quickly while a preservation 
survey by the city’s Culture Bureau was being held. 
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In contrast to the decision on Gongyuan Road, a city councillor interviewed on 
the subject noted the city simply ‘didn’t have the power or will to get involved 
with this sort of resistance’ (Wu Yizheng, [Kaohsiung City Councillor]. Interview, 
8 November 2012), suggesting that the resolve for demolition was lower to 
begin with, and that the elderly residents carrying portraits of the city’s mayor 
emblazoned with slogans such as ‘culture-killer’ broadcast across Taiwan had 
an especially acute effect on city hall. Indeed, subsequent inquiry revealed that 
the parking lot was most likely a personal political project of councilwoman Li 
Qiaoru, rather than a city-level one, easing the way to consider alternative ways 
of redeveloping this valuable plot of public land, albeit at the expense of a local 
party member’s election promise. Nevertheless, the councilwoman provides an 
example of a dismissive and politically expedient attitude among Kaohsiung’s 
policy-makers towards old neighbourhoods, which are often targeted with 
either demolition, as the example of Gongyuan Road demonstrated, and as the 
on-going case of the Ljavek aboriginal tribe living in the shadow of Ikea and 
CostCo and currently facing resettlement also shows (Ljavek Tribal Self-help 
Organization, press release, 19 March 2013). At the other end of the policy 
frame of the imaginable we find mandated transformation into a tourist area, as 
is the case with Hongmaogang, an old fishing village at the southern entrance 
to the harbour. While some form of conservation is almost certainly to be 
adopted, models range from a house-by-house to a block approach, with the 
possibility of resettling the inhabitants in any case still hanging over the whole 
community, and wider developments along the waterfront regarding the city’s 
Kaohsiung 2014 vision placing the old houses right on the edge of the 
proposed new waterfront redevelopment. Ironically, the ability of the Takao 
Renaissance Association to place itself convincingly within the municipal vision 
may yet prove to be the undoing of their efforts to keep the neighbourhood 
intact in a physical as well as lived sense. As the city has increasingly warmed 
to the idea of a ‘Japanese commercial street’ theme, the fear of the wrecking 
ball has been replaced with a fear of a city-led museumification of the area, a 
trajectory reminiscent of Taipei’s Treasure Hill, analysed in Chapter Three. 
Whatever the ultimate reason for the city’s decision, the case is an example of 
successful, micro-level social mobilisation which is opposed to the 
modernising vision presented by the municipality while simultaneously using 
the notion of culture and creativity to claim a stake on the space in questions; 
 172 
where local DPP elected officials may see worthless houses occupying 
valuable land, the association has created a cultural hub dedicated to 
questions of historical preservation, local and city identity, staging events and 
organizing guided tours around the area. The very name and logo of the 
society emphasise the historical aspect, embracing Japanese colonial legacy 
rather than suppressing or ignoring it7. In Taiwan’s highly politicised identity 
discourse, the emphasis on Japanese heritage also serves to differentiate from 
the more Sino-centric outlook of Taipei, providing an additional point of 
reference for the municipal authorities. Another salient feature of the 
association is it’s reliance of small, local funding, with donations (both cash 
and services) accounting for almost 95% of its funding, with business and 
public grants sharing the remaining 5% (Zheng Yaoxiang, Interview. 8 October 
2012). Upon visiting their headquarters in an old Japanese-style house, the 
amount of effort put into the restoration of the almost decrepit buildings was 
immediately obvious. Toiling over a new toilet and bathroom that they were 
installing in the back garden, Jerome and Lin both confirmed curious 
neighbours had been contacting them about perhaps restoring their houses 
too. While the outcome of the government survey was not yet known at the 
time of writing, the association’s activities had already managed to lay claim to 
the lived space of the neighbourhood. By repairing decaying houses, installing 
infrastructure such as septic tanks and toilets, organising a ‘bazaar’ to raise the 
profile of the area, the association has managed to lay the foundations from 
which they are now expanding beyond their immediate surroundings, both by 
protesting demolitions of historical buildings across Kaohsiung, as well as 
collecting material and know-how from the sites consigned to demolition and 
even running courses in wooden architectural repair (Figure 4). In a city that 
has reduced the notion of heritage to a handful of landmarks, their work runs 
against the grain, but from being dismissed as a nuisance, they have grown 
into a permanent fixture. 
                                                
 
7 While the Chinese name is Dǎgǒu wénshǐ zàixìng shèhuì (打狗文史再興會社), the 
group uses the Japanese reading of the first and last two characters, Takao Kaisha. 
The logo of the society is then composed of stylised characters “ta” and “ka” from the 
Japanese katakana syllabary. 
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Figure 6 One of the woodworking workshops organised by the TRA to promote 
traditional architecture. Source: Takao Renaissance Association 
All of these are examples of small, but accumulating spatial action which de 
Certeau (2002) would call a tactic, but seen in light of the city’s cultural turn, it 
is also a tactic that has become more influential by addressing and using the 
language of the municipality. The association for example produced a map of 
the entire Hamasen area, linking their activity into a wider revival of 
Kaohsiung’s oldest parts and framing their demands upon the authorities 
within the tourist industry which the city is keen to develop; as the area 
becomes an attraction in its current state, the initiative remains with the 
association and the local residents in what is a rare example of non-
governmental production of space in Taiwan8. Another example of producing 
space in a Lefebvrian sense are the workshops and competitions for local 
residents, inviting them to photograph the neighbourhood for a competition, or 
to participate in a exhibition of old photographs; as the everyday spaces are 
reimagined and reinterpreted, they become dense with new and old meaning, 
the practical consequence of which is the support which the association 
receives from the local inhabitants. As newcomers, the association’s founders 
                                                
 
8 Similar examples can be found in Tainan, where an NGO consisting of academics, 
shopkeepers and residents guided the regeneration of the area around Shennong 
Street - a contrasting example is the restoration of Bopiliao or Dihua Street in Taipei, 
see Chapters Three and Four. 
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are aware of the ‘danger’ of themselves being instigators of gentrification 
(anathema to any social activist), yet they reiterate their aim to preserve not 
only the physical heritage of the area, but to also allow current residents to 
remain in their houses: many fear the city might exchange demolition for city-
led preservation and ultimately be unable to resist the temptation to develop 
the area as a tourist attraction at the expense of the tenants. Despite this fear, 
their actions continue being framed in ‘historical preservationist’ terms with 
special attention to cultural tourism, making it politically costly to ignore: a 
mayor bent on creating a culturally rich Kaohsiung can ill-afford to bulldoze a 
block of historical housing, especially when a troupe of local grandmothers are 
brandishing signs proclaiming her to be a ‘culture-killer’ with national media 
watching overhead. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
The political decision to change Kaohsiung into a hub of creativity coincides 
with the emergence of a globalised body of policy and theory on the role of 
‘creativity’, as a fusion of traditional culture and art with the sometimes 
intangible new economy, holding out the promise of sustainable, clean 
economic development and supported by a planning discourse including of 
(semi)academic, policy and media writing. The decision taken in Kaohsiung is 
as much a part of this transnational policy shift, introduced via academic and 
political channels, through exchanges, visits and translated into urban plans 
which have come to integrate the (economic) value of creativity into the city’s 
abstract and physical space. In terms of the underlying argument on the 
importance of examining the ‘inter-space’ between overarching discourse of 
policy and the contingent ways of making creative spaces, the normative 
approach to producing creative space in Kaohsiung may seem to be 
characterised by overwhelmingly by municipal practices, yet considering the 
recent organization of stakeholders, it compels us to consider the potential for 
future development in the port city. Alongside the evolution of the city’s 
institutions, chiefly within the planning bureau and the cultural bureau, the 
creative communities which the city’s economy is to be built upon have begun 
emerging, not only as passive and grateful participants of the city’s 
advancement, but as critical and often adversarial actors who contest the 
vague policy goals of the municipality. While their involvement remains tied to 
site-specific conflict over the value of preservation, recent events in Hamasen 
point towards a wider engagement with the city’s comprehensive reworking of 
urban space, which to date remains decidedly modernist and exclusive in its 
praise for large, Bilbao Guggenheim-like projects and homogenous spaces, 
peppered only with a filtered version of Kaohsiung’s authentic character. 
To summarise the characteristics of Kaohsiung’s transition from industrial to 
creative city, this cultural turn is firstly sustained both by new institutional 
arrangements as well as the professional and political position in identifying 
culture as a key resource in the city’s development, backed up by international 
comparisons, city rankings and validating examples. These do not so much 
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measure Kaohsiung’s success or failure, but rather testify to the political and 
professional reliance on objective measures, as well the shared assumptions 
about urban space that this entails. Whatever the improvements in liveability or 
the city’s position on Mercer’s Quality of Living ranking may suggest, it is the 
reliance and credence accorded to international rankings which illustrates how 
local politicians and planners have come to depend on ostensibly objective 
and quantifiable results in their decision-making process, and the effects which 
this exertion of power has on the city’s space. Seen from this perspective, the 
decision to significantly upgrade the city’s cultural infrastructure, to redevelop 
the waterfront are both examples of following best practice, as well as an 
attempt to redefine what Kaohsiung is through a rebranding of the city. While 
many spaces such as Pier-2 or the Qiaotou Sugar Refinery were in effect 
‘discovered’ by the local artist community, their subsequent development 
differs significantly from the case of Taipei by having been incorporated into a 
grand vision for the city, whereas Taipei’s creative spaces operate in a looser 
arrangement. 
Secondly, the new mode of governing the city emphasises community 
involvement and a concern for diversity, sustainability and a culturally rich and 
healthy lifestyle as seen in city government publications and plans. While this 
may again be understood as policy diffusion fuelled by professional 
exchanges, Kaohsiung’s own brand of community politics remains for the time 
being a top-down flow of power. While initially enforced from the national level 
with regulations for the commissioning of public art, it has since become an 
embedded municipal policy spanning town planning, economic development, 
as well as cultural affairs. This new approach has seen the construction not 
only of public art projects and the establishment of festivals, but also of 
amenities targeted at specific demographic groups: from big concert halls, art 
centres, harbour-front cafes and bars, cycling lanes, parks etc. In practice, this 
has meant Kaohsiung city began to address the concerns of certain specific 
groups in the city, be they middle class professionals, artists, cyclists, tourists 
and so on, but the division of the users of urban space between those that are 
seen as desirable and those which now constitute ‘the city’s past’ hints at the 
normative undertone of the creative city in Kaohsiung and questions the 
creative city policies’ assumed neutrality and objectiveness - not only in 
Kaohsiung, but on a general level as well. 
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Thirdly, the newfound importance of creativity (and by extension, a wider 
interpretation of culture) has secured a role for cultural producers within the 
process of urban space production. Moreover, it has of late opened up political 
space to groups using cultural themes as a strategy to oppose city plans 
alongside already established issues such as the environment. Indeed, the 
cooperation between heritage and culture oriented groups such as the Takao 
Renaissance Association and established environmental groups is by no 
means a coincidence, as the two groups share strategies and know-how on 
influencing city politics. Conversely, the fate of Gongyuan Road shows that not 
all communities are able to extract concessions from the city; quite the 
opposite, the messiness of which the director of Pier-2 spoke can be 
interpreted as a euphemism for the spatial manifestation of the working-class 
character of the neighbourhood, though admittedly it does stretch beyond a 
purely class-based division. Messiness as a category or marker of space is 
nevertheless contrasted with the clean, bright, creative spaces constructed 
around the old waterfront – the success of the Takao Renaissance Association 
can thus be seen as having happened because of a cultural turn in the city’s 
politics, rather than despite it. 
While lack of funds may ultimately prove to be the biggest obstacle to 
Kaohsiung’s comprehensive makeover, the adaptation of creative city policies 
looks set to continue in localised forms. Following the initial burst of non-state 
activity in the production of space, the vision of a creative Kaohsiung seems 
firmly under municipal control. Building on the classic tools of statist 
management such as planning, the municipality went further by subsuming 
processes such as gentrification, adaptive reuse, seeding art, even going as far 
as fashioning cultural actors such as Pier-2, which have taken on the role of 
community or civil society organisations. Examined from the perspective of 
governance as well as being governed, the port city presents a curious case of 
a municipality attempting to simultaneously play several roles, from planning 
authority to art curator and community regeneration group. The mix of large 
infrastructural projects, citizen edification and neighbourhood self-help 
furthermore transcends the demand vs. supply discussion present within the 
creative city discourse. While the city is apparently leading by example and 
clearing the scene for the arrival of a ‘creative class’, as Richard Florida would 
term it, it is providing infrastructure as well as content, performers as well as 
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audiences, all the while reinforcing a utilitarian understanding of culture and art 
as an economic category, a resource that can be sold to visiting tourists.  
 
 179 
Chapter Six: Entrepreneurial Creative Space 
in Beijing 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction: Culture and capital in the capital 
 
 
"The more they get involved, the worse it gets. The less they are involved, the 
better." 
(Ai Weiwei, asked about state efforts to support creative spaces in Beijing. 
Interview, June 5, 2014) 
 
 
When I visited China’s premier artist and ‘troublemaker’ Ai Weiwei for a short 
interview in June 2014, my intention was primarily to speak about his 
experience of transforming Caochangdi, a migrant village just outside the 5th 
Ring Road, into one of Beijing’s most acclaimed creative neighbourhoods. 
Instead, we ended up talking mainly about the thorny issue of the relationship 
between art and state in China. However brief, the conversation in many ways 
frames the central issue facing creative spaces in Beijing: how to avoid the 
state without aggravating it, how to achieve commercial success without 
selling out, and finally, how to accept that such spaces are, in Beijing at least, 
often transient, unstable and fragile in the face of the city’s rapid 
redevelopment and growth. Not only Beijing, cities around China have in recent 
years seen a phenomenal growth in areas claiming to be cultural, creative or 
most often, ‘culture-creative’, the latter term corresponding to the official 
designation for that particular economic category (⽂文化创意产业, wénhuà 
chuàngyì chǎnyè, ‘Cultural and Creative Industries’ or CCI). Far from being a 
product of top-down industrial policy however, many such spaces have a 
provenance that can be traced to the artist areas of early reform-period Beijing, 
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and have only later become associated with an urban planning approach 
based CCI clustering. The core question with which this chapter deals could 
thus be described as an inquiry into how and why the state has become 
invested in the production of creative spaces in Beijing; although many early 
creative spaces were non-state in origin, through their commercial success 
and increasing relevance of ‘soft power’ narratives, they have increasingly 
become a matter of state policy and intervention, as well as greater 
involvement by business actors as well. This chapter will argue that an 
examination of the re-articulation of art by the state is crucial in understanding 
the ways in which creative spaces in Beijing are produced: the state, from 
having been intimately involved in the arts during the Maoist period, had lost 
the grip on ‘unofficial artists’ during the reform period, only to re-enter the field 
of creative production as an entrepreneurial actor in its own right, as well as 
being a sort of ‘regulator of last resort’, keeping a watchful eye over China’s 
burgeoning art scene. Simultaneously, the astounding rise of Chinese art (not 
least in financial terms) has enabled the community of artists and other 
stakeholders to participate in the formation of new policies regarding creative 
spaces; unlike the case of Taipei however, the defining quality of these groups 
lies not so much in their ability to influence the state, but also in their ability to 
circumvent it.  
 
Such an approach is defined here as an entrepreneurial approach, i.e. one in 
which the roles played by various actors coalesce within the market-led, 
commodified field of ‘culture-led (re)development’. At the peril of terminological 
confusion with the concept of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ (Jessop, 1998; Jessop 
and Sum, 2000), defined through the presence of specific entrepreneurial 
behaviour of a city as unit (strategy, discourse and promotion of 
entrepreneurial images), the term nevertheless usefully captures the mode of 
production of creative spaces in Beijing in relation to the comparative cases of 
Taipei and Kaohsiung. Thus, the term entrepreneurial is taken here to denote 
the mode in which state and societal actors interact: as entrepreneurial entities 
or enterprises engaging in competitive spatial production regulated by market-
based mechanisms. Lastly, the term does not exclude or in any way deny the 
actuality of continued state involvement or the importance of the state project 
of developing cultural power through the establishment of creative zones as 
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primary loci of production. In turn, what the present chapter attempts to 
analyse are the ways in which the operationalization of creative strategies in 
China differs from those in Taiwan, suggesting that historical trajectories of 
state-society relations, state and societal capacity and governmental style 
have played a crucial role in adapting creative city strategies as a part of the 
national developmental project in China.  
 
The history of Beijing’s creative spaces is therefore one of the developing 
relations between the state, the local municipality and what is often termed 
‘civil society’, though caution must be applied when using the term in the 
Chinese context. In this case, ‘civil society’ corresponds best to the groups of 
non-state actors involved in the production of creative spaces, predominantly 
composed of ‘unofficial’ artists without formal state recognition, as well as a 
significant portion of collectors, gallerists and entrepreneurs, many of them 
foreign. The study of the formation of creative space in China, and especially 
Beijing, is thus a study of the evolving attitude and style of governing the arts, 
the creative industry, and urban space both from the perspective of the state 
as well as the fluid and self-defined ‘creatives’, ‘artists’ and ‘cultural workers’, 
who form an epistemic community of spatial professionals (when it comes to 
creative spaces). 
 
The main trait of this relationship is characterised by a shift from the late reform 
era towards a regime wherein legitimacy  - understood here as a stable claim 
on urban space - is conferred through a market-based mechanism. This is not 
to say that legitimacy is conferred by the private sector, or by an art market; 
rather, it is, to borrow Foucault’s term, a market ‘regime of veridiction’1, which 
has supplanted the previous, Maoist one. Whereas legitimacy was once 
conferred by official status and ideological concerns, the artists’ claim on 
space is now a function of their ability to operate in a commodified land and art 
market. Thus, the position of art and creativity is neither Maoist (art in the 
service of society), neither could it be characterised by what Terry Eagleton 
calls an ‘aesthetic ideology of the bourgeoisie’ (Eagleton, 1988), which places 
                                                
 
1 Foucault’s use of the concept emphasises a move from a history of the true or false to 
a history of veridiction, examining how it was possible in a given time to assert things 
as truths (Foucault, 2004: 36).  
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art on an ethereal pedestal separate from daily utility. The position of creative 
spaces in Beijing shows an altogether different situation, one where art and 
culture have become commodified in line with the moves seen in the west 
since the 1980s, but have also regained their position as a crucial element of a 
national developmental project – as a component of ‘soft power’. 
 
While the new double utility of art and culture as creativity does not necessarily 
herald closer interaction or co-operation between the state and the arts (being 
merely a basis of negotiation), the commercial success of many creative zones 
around China has also significantly influenced national and local policy towards 
the cultural and creative industries, which are now seen as a key element of 
China’s economic development. As the approach of producing new creative 
spaces (or legitimizing existing ones) moved in line with a market-based 
mechanism, so the understanding of what creative spaces are has moved with 
it, transforming once marginal (yet autonomous) spaces into central (yet 
dependent) ones. As creativity and its products became understood as a 
commodity, they began to fit neatly into the policy-makers’ understanding, 
accounting for the almost viral spread of various creative zones, clusters, 
areas, districts or even cities, which have spread from the metropolitan centres 
of China to the remotest provinces. 
 
The chapter first embarks on a historical analysis of the formation of Beijing’s 
creative zones within the changing relationship between (contemporary) art 
and the state, proceeding with the examination of Cultural-Creative Industries 
as a vehicle for the reintegration of a ‘creative agenda’ into national and 
municipal policy. These two themes are central to understanding the evolution 
of creative spaces in Beijing through their contribution to a resetting of state-
art relations along entrepreneurial lines, wherein the legitimation mechanism 
moved from an ideological one to a one based on a market for commodified 
space and art. This resetting is subsequently examined on two case studies, 
one concerning the now defunct art zones of Yuanmingyuan and Beijing East 
Village, and the other regarding the 798 Art Zone, all of which set the scene for 
the more ethnographic work in Chapter Seven. 
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6.2 Art and state in early reform China 
 
 
“The first problem is: literature and art for whom?” 
Mao Zedong, Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art (Mao, 1965: 77) 
 
The utility of literature and art as tools of the revolution was a primary concern 
in Maoist China, as Mao himself underlines at the Yan’an talks. Throughout the 
civil war and up to the reform period, art had a clearly defined place in Chinese 
society, a utility that certainly constrained its expression and autonomy. With 
the setting up of an expansive bureaucratic system of control and support, the 
artist was transformed into an employee of the state, which became virtually 
the only patron of the arts. The art world in Maoist China was thus materially 
secure, yet creatively controlled to serve the Party. As sweeping economic 
reforms of the Deng era advanced however, the link of patronage was 
loosened: artists were suddenly expected to rely on the market for their upkeep 
as well, although the state remains the largest patron of the arts to this day. 
What has certainly changed however is the conception of art’s utility; as polite 
amnesia among the country’s leadership removed Maoist fervour, it was the 
utility and role of art that was now open to question, just as ‘official’ art was 
also challenged by a new generation of unofficial artists. The link between art 
and state, typical not only of Maoist but Imperial China, had been temporarily 
broken to allow for a re-evaluation of art as an economic and cultural activity. 
 
The de-linking of art and state, traumatic as it was for artists in 1980s and 
1990s, has opened the way for a new ‘contract’ or relation between art and 
state to be established, upon which creative spaces in general are being 
produced in Beijing. Whether they are officially sanctioned, commercial, artistic 
or artisanal, such spaces are primarily valued on their economic performance 
as a primary criterion of their legitimacy, although the aforementioned concern 
with ‘soft power’ remains an important basis for cultural policy. In many ways, 
this move mirrors the processes of commodification in the west in the 1980s, 
when cultural industries overcame the contradiction between the use and 
exchange value of their products, allowing them to be integrated fully into the 
economy via intellectual property (Lash and Urry, 1993), and becoming 
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increasingly reliant on corporate funding (Kidd, 2011; Sholette, 2011). While 
similar, the native context must however be understood within the evolving 
relation between the state and the arts, which underwent a transformation from 
ideological tool of the Maoist state to a somewhat unreliable ally in the pursuit 
of China’s soft power and cultural prowess. 
 
Behind this change we find the transformation of artists’ and other cultural and 
spatial professionals’ position in society, which can broadly be understood as 
a commodifying process: the product of the artist’s work is sublimated into a 
commodity. This has two important consequences: the introduction of a 
market-based mechanism of legitimation, as well as a diversification of 
patronage links. While more conventional narratives posit this change as a shift 
from state totalitarianism to the dictate of the market, the present research will 
strive to look beyond this narrow explanation, borrowing primary concepts 
such as professionalism2 and patronage3 from Richard Kurt Kraus’s The Party 
and the Arty (2004) to better understand how the commodifying pressure 
impacts on the production of creative spaces in Beijing. It is important to 
understand artists not as passive recipients of either statist or commercial 
pressure, but rather as actors struggling not only for freedom, but for their 
professional status as well (Kraus, 2004: 4). By examining professionalism and 
patronage against the field of creative space, we can further elaborate on the 
underlying question of how creativity is operationalised through the activity of 
state and non-state actors, many of whom are ‘unofficial’ artists. Salmenkari 
for example defines unofficial art as one “…which relies on horizontal 
cooperation and networking while trying to avoid vertical dependency on the 
state and its resources” (Salmenkari, 2004: 236). This struggle for 
professionalism, which includes both freedom of expression as well a 
diversification of patronage links, has found expression in the spatial forms 
typical of Beijing’s creative zones: from the squalor and isolation of early-
reform communities, they have become wealthy, even ostentatiously so. At the 
same time, an acute sense of isolation has been preserved in the spatial form 
                                                
 
2 Professionalism understood as an ‘autonomy to make decisions about one’s work’ 
(Kraus 2004: 4) 
3 Patronage understood as ‘the institutional forms by which artists are employed to 
produce their work’ (Kraus: op.cit.: 5). 
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of the ‘art compound’, surrounded by walls and separating the world of art 
from the bustle of the street.4 
 
 
A prime example of this is the now globally famous 798 Art Zone in Dashanzi, 
NE Beijing. The old factory complex avoided redevelopment into a high-tech 
park through a campaign underlining the commercial value of the arts district. 
The campaign was aimed at the Beijing municipal government and against the 
designs of the state-owned enterprise that intended to redevelop the area. 
Benefitting from the support of eminent institutions and individuals, the 798 Art 
Zone avoided demolition, yet instead found itself facing intensive development 
and commercialisation, both through rising rents and official interventions. The 
798 Art Zone survived because of its commercial success, which in turn 
marked its transition from a space of cultural production to cultural 
consumption. 
 
 
Table 8 - Control and legitimacy mechanisms in Beijing’s art scene 
 
 
                                                
 
4 Duanfang Lu points out the ‘vicissitude of walls’ in his work on Chinese urban forms, 
emphasizing the historical ‘latency’ of this particular architectural feature (Lu, 2006). 
 Legitimacy 
 
Control mechanism Users Funding 
Maoist 
 
 
Hard 
ideological 
Campaigns / state 
resource distribution 
Official artists State-funded 
Early 
reform 
Soft 
ideological 
 
Distribution of state 
resources / periodic 
campaigns (post-’89) 
 
Official and 
unofficial 
artists 
Decline of state 
funding 
DIY art 
First commercial 
art 
Mature 
reform 
 
 
Commercial 
success 
Regulation 
Market-based 
Unofficial 
artists 
‘Creatives’ 
Dynamic art 
market funding 
core spaces 
Self-funded or 
foreign-funded 
marginal spaces 
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Nevertheless, this example also reminds us of the role the Chinese state has 
kept in pronouncing value-laden judgments on artistic production well into the 
reform era - and perhaps to this day, though such intervention is sometimes 
presented as a legal matter, with alleged tax offences being the weapon of 
choice against unruly artists such as Ai Weiwei (Wee, 2011). Direct 
interventions into artistic production remain rare, and even in Ai’s case these 
have not been directed against the artist village he largely created, with the 
concept of ‘artist village’ having been adopted by the village leadership and the 
Chaoyang council. This suggests the fate of creative spaces in Beijing is not 
strictly a question of political conformity, but is rather subject to a different 
mechanism of legitimation – that of the market – which has become the 
dominant one through a double process of commodification: of urban space 
and of art itself. 
 
Firstly, the commodification of urban space can be understood as an outlet to 
absorb surplus capital, provide a growth engine and thus avoid a crisis of over-
accumulation (Wu, 2003: 1333), but this process is also connected to the local 
state in a reinforcing loop, underlining the importance municipal bodies play in 
creative strategies. Indeed, field work conducted in Beijing in the spring of 
2013 revealed many of the important agents of culture-led regeneration have 
close links to municipal or other state institutions, ranging from villages, 
townships, municipal districts, holding companies, joint ventures and 
GONGOs: Caochangdi village and the Dashila(b) project are both such cases 
explored in the following chapter. Neither is such entrepreneurialism limited to 
the field of creative strategies; what Duckett (1996) called the ‘entrepreneurial 
state’, that is the emergence of entrepreneurial strategies pursed by local 
government bureaux, certainly precedes the current trend for creative space 
production, which appears as yet another in a string of schemes to extract 
value from urban space: unable to extract taxes in efficient ways, the local 
state is enticed to enter the highly lucrative real estate market, where its 
interests can become aligned with those of developers and not necessarily 
those of city residents, a state of affairs which has received both academic 
((Wank, 1999); (Broudehoux, 2004); (Huang, 2004); (Friedmann, 2005)) and 
media attention. The example of 798 Art Zone explored below clearly shows 
that creative spaces have joined the ranks of other types of redevelopment in 
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filling the local state’s budget. As the local state also entered the production or 
management of increasingly prominent creative spaces however, the relations 
between state and societal actors were re-established, underlining the need to 
for artists to build links with officials holding administrative monopolies on 
building permissions, redevelopment or decisions on demolition. All of these 
present a far greater hindrance to the artists’ work than ideological control; to 
avoid demolition and redevelopment of their spaces, an economic rather than 
ideological strategy is often most successful. 
 
This brings us to the question of how the commodification of the artists’ output 
has changed the mechanisms of control over their practice. As ‘unofficial’ art 
has flourished commercially, so its presence in the urban space of the city has 
become increasingly marked. When the ‘Stars’, China’s first group of unofficial 
artists, pinned their work on the wall outside the National Gallery building, they 
were perhaps unwittingly carving out a new physical space for their work, but it 
was not until their commercial success that new generations of unofficial artists 
could stake more permanent claims on urban space. The rise of Chinese art on 
the international auction circuit has been nothing but phenomenal; the first 
dedicated auction at Sotheby’s in Hong Kong was held in October 2004 and 
totalled just under $3million; the next over $5million, yet another in October 
2006 over $9million. By the time the famous Ullens Collection was put up for 
auction in 2011, it was sold for over $71million. The exponential growth of the 
prices some Chinese artists could command was followed by an increasing 
internationalisation of the market for art within China itself; after it joined the 
WTO in 2001, foreign auction houses soon entered its market, with Christie’s 
setting up shop in Beijing in 2005 and Sotheby’s following suit in 2007. The 
Chinese artist elite has since the early 2000s become wealthier and worldlier, 
expanding its network of patronage well beyond China. 
 
While the state remains the chief patron of the arts in China (as an aggregate 
‘sector’ which includes traditional visual arts, performance troupes, national 
institutions…), this dominance has waned in contemporary art, and in the 
production of smaller new creative spaces catering to an expanded definition 
of ‘creativity’ - including design, architecture, animation. Here the role of the 
central state often seems to be that of an overseer of a nation-wide 
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developmental project that relies on entrepreneurial cities, districts, towns and 
villages; both Oi (1992) and Walder (1995) for example argue local 
governments have become the most active proponents of local growth through 
the incentives posed by hardening budget constraints. According to 
expectations stemming from this argument, municipal and other para-state 
actors have become involved into the commercialised market for art and 
creative output, often as partners in joint ventures and various culture-creative 
enterprises that have sprung up in the years following Hu’s exhortations to 
establish a competitive national industry. In many ways, the recent proliferation 
of municipally-backed creative zones and other spaces reflects the way in 
which policy trickles down; after Songzhuang township, Caochangdi village is 
now also pursuing the goal of becoming a creative zone. This process of 
emulation and policy spread continues further down the pecking order of cities, 
with Zhangzhou in Fujian Province for example emulating nearby Xiamen’s 
efforts, which in turn were based on Beijing’s (Huang Liangcai, 798 Times 
Space Planning Director. Interview, 24 February 2013). 
 
Successful creative spaces such as 798 or Caochangdi have of late received 
official approval, setting off a slew of imitation projects across the country. 
While the approval of the state brings with it limits to autonomy, these are in 
most instances not severe since it is overzealous landlords, rather than the 
central or municipal authorities, who conduct most of the censorship. In this 
vein, several exhibitions in the 798 Art Zone have been interfered with by the 
Seven Star Group which manages the space, with interventions such as 
removing works with depictions of Chairman Mao, although the works were 
still available for private views (Van Elzen, 2009: 136). It seems the landlord, 
ultimately responsible in the vertical hierarchy of the state, felt compelled to err 
on the side of caution. Rather than ideological control, the intervention of the 
state often intensifies the processes of commercialisation and the inexorable 
drift towards satisfying popular taste - creative spaces are being made to ‘earn 
their keep’ by either establishing and maintaining a broad appeal (as happened 
in 798), or by approximating an industrial cluster. The state is back in the art 
business, but on revised terms, as both an entrepreneurial actor in its own 
right, as well as regulator-of-last-resort. 
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6.3 Cultural-Creative Industries: Culture and state meet 
again 
 
 
When former General Secretary Hu Jintao delivered his keynote speech at the 
17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), remarking on 
culture and creativity as important factors ‘in the competition in overall national 
strength’ (Hu, 2007), the discourse on the value of creativity in China had 
achieved its ultimate recognition in the central government. The wider context 
of his remarks, marked by an increasing attention to ‘soft power’, has by that 
time become a topic of academic discussion, though understood mainly from 
an international relations perspective (cf. (Paradise, 2009); (Wang, 2008); 
(Kurlantzick, 2007); (Nye: 2004, 2005). A somewhat voguish concept, ‘soft-
power’ encompasses both high and low expression, both elite art and popular 
creative production, yet the tangible, measurable and economically more 
quantifiable element of soft power (number of pop music hits exported, 
Confucius Institutes founded, etc.) has found a clearer expression in 
governmental policy, conflating artistic expression with cultural mass-
production in the drive to bolster the value-added share of cultural and creative 
industry. Moreover, the term soft power, now favoured by policy-makers on 
both sides of the Taiwan Straits, obscures the rather more ‘hard’ power 
relations at work in the production of creative space in China, which are most 
usefully understood within the context of the commodification of space, a topic 
explored in the second chapter.  
 
It is argued here that the notions of soft power and the re-valorisation of 
creative expression a profitable activity has enabled the unlikely return of state 
interest into the world of the arts, and by extension, into the production of 
creative spaces. This in turn sets the scene for the exploration of the research 
question in Beijing’s case, looking at the meeting of state and non-state 
practices, which can to a large extent be understood as a consequence of a 
turn towards creative industries in policy-making circles. Repackaged as 
cultural-creative industry (CCI), the arts became a respectable industrial sector, 
encouraging already highly entrepreneurial municipal authorities to become 
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invested in the success of creative spaces as the primary loci of cultural and 
creative production.  
 
The currently favoured term ‘cultural and creative industries’ itself has a rather 
short history, having been introduced to Beijing around 2005, when a 
symposium on the subject was held as part of the 6th Chaoyang Business 
Festival; a report commissioned by the Chaoyang District government initially 
had the word ‘creative’ removed on the behest of senior officials, only for it to 
be reintroduced in the final publication (Hui, 2006: 320). This event is not 
without importance, indicating that a merging of cultural and industrial policies 
was first considered by a municipal authority. The resulting shift in the 
understanding of cultural and creative practice is to a great extent responsible 
for Chaoyang becoming the home of several of Beijing’s key creative zones or 
clusters: 798 Art Zone, Caochangdi, Heiqiaocun Art District and Huantie Art 
City. Moreover, Keane emphasises the reluctance and occasional hostility that 
the national Ministry of Culture has shown towards a mongrelisation of cultural 
industry with notions of creativity, which remain suspect in the Ministry’s more 
conservative circles (Keane, 2009: 433), suggesting the importance of 
analysing sub-national actors in any comparison of creative space production. 
 
That being said, some facet of cultural and creative industries has featured 
prominently in the last three National Five-Year Plans (2001-5, 2006-10 and the 
current plan for 2011-15), with the recent plan devoting three chapters to the 
promotion of cultural innovation, undertakings and industry (State Council, 
2011). Similarly, Beijing’s own Five-Year plan for the same period emphasises 
the need for, and benefits of, developing creative and cultural industry in 
conjunction with a renewed focus on redeveloping historical areas of Beijing 
(Beijing Municipality, 2011), providing the basis on which an exploration of 
creative space and heritage protection is undertaken in the next chapter. 
Beijing and Shanghai, and to a lesser extent Guangzhou and Shenzhen, had by 
the time Hu made his speech already become centres of a flourishing array 
CCI projects, with the category including everything from design and 
architecture, contemporary art to mass-produced reproductions of classical 
art, and is typically realised through the construction of creative and cultural 
clusters. With more than 20 such clusters in Beijing, and more than 75 in 
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Shanghai (Ren, 2013: 189), their presence in China’s urban space is 
increasingly prominent and it seems beyond doubt that China’s leaders have 
bought into the culture-creative discourse. While some culture-creative areas 
are genuine clusters of cultural and artistic production, many are on the other 
hand purely industrial in character, reflecting what Keane (2009) calls the 
‘planned marriage’ of culture and innovation, the latter understood mainly as 
scientific progress (Keane, 2009: 9). Creative spaces in Beijing are, by virtue of 
the permeability between the national and local levels of government in the 
capital, especially susceptible to a top-down understanding of their role in the 
development of the national economy, meaning their analysis covers not only 
the area of local, but also national politics. 
 
The drive towards the establishment of culture-creative industries is, as already 
mentioned, not without complications due to differing conceptions of the field 
by state actors such as the Ministry of Culture, municipal or district 
governments, or state-owned enterprises. A shared vision nevertheless exists; 
as Li Wuwei, the chief theoretician and proponent of ‘creativity’ in China has 
summarised it, China must move from the model of ‘Made in China’ to 
‘Created in China’ (Li, 2011). Li’s book on the subject, How Creativity is 
Changing China, represents a clear overview of how the concept of creativity is 
being promoted in China, with attention paid not only to the economic side of 
creative development, but is replete with allusions to national policy 
preferences such as ‘harmonious society’ by suggesting creativity promotes 
social cohesion and might upgrade China’s development model (Li, op.cit.: 11). 
 
As Grodach (2012) has demonstrated on the case of Austin (Texas) however, 
the adoption of larger policy trends such as creativity strategies produces 
policy outcomes mediated by specific contextual factors, such as the relation 
between municipal and non-governmental actors or a city’s cultural economy 
(Grodach, 2012: 81). This example chimes in with the general spirit of the 
present work, and In a similar spirit, this research has endeavoured to explore 
the production of Chinese creative zones and spaces given the recognised 
multi-polarity of the Chinese state. 
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Interestingly, the support for cultural and creative industries and related spatial 
strategies comes chiefly from the sub-national level, particularly municipal and 
district governments with close ties to the epistemic community of ‘creativity’ 
experts and consultants, which had, as already mentioned, introduced the idea 
in Beijing in the mid 2000s. This argument however ignores the spatial 
precursors which had existed in Beijing far before talk of ‘creativity’ ever hit the 
boardrooms of the Central Business District; the question thus remains in what 
ways (if any), the existing creative spaces have influenced or been influenced 
by the adoption of the creativity discourse. To this end, the research in Beijing 
has focused on both spontaneously organised artist villages of the 1980s, 90s 
and early 2000s, as well as top-down clustering policies, with the extant 
spaces forming the main subject of ethnographic examination. If a 
spontaneous formation of culture-creative clusters in China originated from 
without the state, and these were only recognised as such by the state in the 
mid 2000s, a crucial question that must be posed is how the spontaneous 
spatial patterns are being integrated into the official creative strategies: how 
are the loci of such cultural creative production built? When did the informal 
artist clusters and the industrial clusters ‘merge’? What is the role of the state 
in the production of these spaces and their legitimation/success? Such 
questions present the departure point from which the present chapter analyses 
the trends and approaches to the production of creative spaces in Beijing. An 
analysis of top-level policy announcements does not sufficiently explain how 
‘creativity’ is operationalised on the ground, beginning from the question of 
how creative spaces in Beijing are validated or legitimised; the entrepreneurial 
approach to the production of creative space is the consequence of a meeting 
of grassroots and top-down initiatives. 
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6.4 From Yuanmingyuan Artist Village to Beijing East 
Village: creativity as marginal practice 
 
 
From its beginnings in the artist community in Beijing’s Yuanmingyuan, the 
relation between independent creative spaces and the state has not been a 
simple one. Implicated in the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the capital’s first artist 
village has long since been cleared, with its veteran contemporary artists 
scattered across the city and overseas. Yet the idea of a remote, village-like 
community of artistic producers1 remains very much the norm in Beijing, with 
places such as Songzhuang, Caochangdi, Huantie Art City, even the now 
famous 798 Art Zone all conforming to the trend of clustering in the city’s 
periphery. While many of these new zones have gradually achieved some level 
of official recognition (ranging from full endorsement to tacit tolerance), many 
other smaller ones have recently been slated for demolition as the city expands 
beyond yet another ring road (Liu et al., 2013). The proliferation also hides an 
increasing diversity of purpose, with some spaces becoming commercial 
exhibition and tourist destinations, others remaining spaces of creative 
production, and some moving in the direction of hosting creative industries. 
Even those that remain loci of artistic production are highly diverse, with some 
being seen as alternative or cutting edge, others still merely sites of artisan-
style reproduction. 
 
These categories are deeply engrained in the art community’s own views on 
these spaces - a view often ignored in literature on the topic due to the 
subjective nature any such taxonomy entails. Crucially, the distinctions also 
begin to blur in the field of policy, making any negotiation between the top-
down planning perspective and the bottom-up perspective of the space’s user 
very dependent on the framing, timing and mutual understanding of the two 
sides: what constitutes creativity, what makes a good creative space are  
                                                
 
1 Such villages are called Yìshù cūn (艺术村, art village) or huàjiā cūn (画家村, painters’ 
village). 
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always difficult questions, so much more so when the actors on both sides 
seldom engage in collaborative work, and when the state is not faced with a 
single, coherent community, but rather an atomised network of divergent 
interests.  
 
Table 9 - Beijing's art and space in the reform period 
 
To better understand the reasons behind this dearth of collaboration, a focus 
exclusively on the planning, policy-making, top-down perspective is 
insufficient. It was thus necessary to take on board the experience and practice 
1979 The Stars, a group of artists outside the official circle including now 
famous artists such as Ai Weiwei and Huang Rui and Ma Desheng 
hang up their work on the fence of the National Gallery building 
 
1985 Fine Arts in China magazine founded 
Feb 1989 China/Avant-Garde exhibition opens and is promptly shut down by 
authorities 
 
Jun 1989 Tiananmen massacre takes place with implications for contemporary 
art and marginal spaces from subsequent crackdown on non-official 
art and expression 
 
May 
1990 
Purge of ‘bourgeois liberalization tendencies’ in art begins, with 
regime artists heavily criticising the avant-garde movement. Final 
severing of links between the state and the art world. Many prominent 
artists leave China. 
 
Early 
1990s 
“Apartment art” movement as a reaction to the lack of open public 
space 
1995 First artist activity at Dashanzi (later known as 798 Art District) with 
Central Academy of Fine Arts (CAFA) faculty setting up studios in the 
abandoned factory 
2000 Beijing Tokyo Art Projects opens at 798 Art District, marking the 
beginning of large galleries setting up spaces in the area and 
subsequent commercial success 
 
Ai Weiwei and score of other artists move into Caochangdi village 
Spring 
2002 
First officially condoned ‘unofficial’ artist exhibition takes place 
Oct 2004 Sotheby’s Hong Kong organises first dedicated Chinese contemporary 
art auction 
Dec 2005 Last attempt to clear 798 Art District by SOE landlord (Seven-Star 
Group) 
2005 ~ Central Beijing’s hutongs begin attracting art/creative industry 
2007 798 Art District formally recognised by Chaoyang District Government 
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of the various artists and creative communities in Beijing. Their experiences 
and impressions, disjointed as they may seem, have been instrumental in 
imbibing a chronological, historical narrative of the development of creative 
spaces in Beijing with a richer texture in order to better observe the ways in 
which different creative spaces have fared in their negotiation with the state, 
how their spatial forms were settled, how and when they became the pattern 
from which numerous new creative zones are now being planned and 
constructed. Such a timeline of the development of creative spaces in Beijing 
enables an analysis of the relation between the state and such spaces (and 
how they are produced): namely, how after the links between the authorities 
and the art/creative world were first severed following end of Maoism and the 
rise of unofficial art in China, and then re-established following a new 
mechanism of legitimation, that of commercial success (or promise thereof) 
conforming to the newly commodified relations between the creative 
communities’ work and the role of the state as the overseer of the national 
developmental project. While these links have been explored in general terms 
(most notably by (Gao, 2011);  (Salmenkari, 2004); (Lu, 1997) and (Clark, 1992)), 
the present research maintains the process of restructuring state-art links has 
been equally important for the way creative spaces are formed in Beijing. From 
self-organised, autonomous enclaves viewed with suspicion by the authorities, 
several variants have developed, each an expression of the relationship 
between the state, capital and art in contemporary China. 
 
The creative zones in Beijing are furthermore at the heart of an urban 
development that has seen Chinese metropoli consolidated administratively by 
absorbing the surrounding countryside (Hsing, 2010). The 798 Art Zone has 
become urbanised as the city expands outwards, while Caochangdi and 
Songzhuang still stand out as an examples of village entrepreneurialism, 
though the former is currently in a process of urbanization. The latter, due to its 
administrative divide with Beijing municipality, present a case of in-situ 
urbanization as the once poor rural township has transformed to the home of 
about 100,000 people, 40% of whom are ‘artists’ (Ren and Sun, 2012: 512). 
While Songzhuang has a high concentration of artists as well as studios (many 
of which have been constructed by villagers eager to attract rent-paying 
artists), and several layers of Beijing’s government have recently become 
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involved in planning a culture-creative industry cluster in the township (op.cit.: 
513), the area’s reputation as a site of art production is somewhat lacklustre, 
with many interviewees from other prominent spaces quietly dismissing it as 
provincial or naive - “more artisanry than art” (“Ms. Fang”, FAKE studios. 
Interview, 4 June 2013). Be that as it may, Songzhuang presents an interesting 
offshoot of Beijing’s first artist village, Yuanmingyuan (or Summer Palace), 
blending village politics and municipal efforts to first control and then support 
the construction of a creative cluster, though recent central government policy 
on preserving agricultural land has complicated the construction of studios, 
with some being demolished as a consequence (Li, 2014). Songzhuang has not 
been included in the case selection due to material and time constraints and 
no fieldwork has been conducted at the village; nevertheless, many of the 
characteristics of interaction seen in Beijing proper are also at work in 
Songzhuang and vice-versa. In both locales, art has moved from marginal 
activity to lucrative business, with Songzhuang’s studio construction rush 
presenting a particularly obvious example of village entrepreneurs trying to get 
on the creativity bandwagon. 
 
Yuanmingyuan Artist Village 
The first artist village in Beijing sprang up around the ruins of the Old Summer 
Palace, burnt down by the Anglo-French expeditionary force in 1860 as 
retaliation for the capture and execution of their envoys. Seen as a powerful 
reminder of China’s fate at the hands of Western powers, no attempts have 
been made to rebuild the palace, with the ruins slowly being surrounded by an 
expanding city. During the end of the 1980s, local farmers built the first 
structures, which later came to house artists escaping the tense atmosphere in 
central Beijing following the Tiananmen massacre. Their decision was also 
practical: many of the unofficial artists, not belonging to a work unit or 
institution, did not qualify for state housing. Visiting the village in 1993, New 
York Times Magazine writer Andrew Solomon describes the village as: “…rows 
of one-story houses, each with a small courtyard and a tiled roof. There is one 
toilet shed and one telephone for everyone. Vines grow on some of the houses 
and screen doors are always slamming. Nearby there are farms and a park. In 
one direction are the vast grounds of the Beijing University and in the other, the 
Summer Palace itself.” (Solomon, 1993: 48). 
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The almost bucolic village may have seen the first artists moving in in the mid-
1980s, when so-called mangliu (migrant) artists appeared in several villages in 
the area. The term itself was apparently coined by videographer Wen Pulin and 
introduced in Chen Weihe’s 1988 article “Impressions of Beijing's migrant 
artists” published in Zhongguo Meishubao, an avant-garde magazine shut 
down in late 1989 following the crackdown against ‘bourgeois liberal’ art. The 
term itself should most certainly not be taken literally; while some were indeed 
migrants from the provinces, many were graduates of Beijing’s elite art schools 
(Chen, 1988: 2). Defining artists as reform China’s freest and least stable group 
however, speaks volumes about the artists’ own views on their place in 
society: removed, perhaps aloof, certainly unappreciated by the authorities. In 
the years after June 4th 1989, the number of such migrant artists swelled as 
Beijing’s art scene reeled from the crackdown on contemporary art. Beginning 
in May 1990, a purge against artists believed to have taken part in or 
contributed to the June 4th movement was ordered. Apart from removing 
undesirable elements from the official art world, Party stalwarts were brought 
out to rehash Maoist-Dengist lines on literature and art, on the basis of which 
guidelines for the approval of future art-works were clarified (Clark, 1992). 
 
Interpreted from the perspective of the relation between state and art, the 
move had two important consequences: the clustering and withdrawal of 
contemporary artists from the mainstream public sphere to closed, private 
spaces, and the shattering of any final ideological links between the Chinese 
state and the contemporary art world. The way to produce art was to withdraw 
from society, to pursue strategies of evasion reminiscent of Ai Weiwei’s quote 
at the beginning of this chapter, strategies still pursued by many of China’s 
most prominent artists. The stage was thus set for the unofficial artists to 
regroup and re-establish the contemporary art scene; while many left China for 
the United States and Europe, others retreated to Yuanmingyuan and Beijing 
East Village. Those remaining in China pursued less public forms of 
expressions, with the artists’ living quarters playing a big role - what Gao 
Minglu calls ‘apartment art’ (Gao, 2011) - further reinforcing the tendency 
towards ‘art behind walls’ still evident in creative spaces such as Caochangdi 
or even the courtyards of central Beijing. The final denial of state support and 
recognition meant the art world in Beijing began to rely on foreign benefactors, 
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from embassy staff to increasingly frequent visitors, as well as returning 
Chinese artists such as Ai Weiwei, infusing into the movement a new aesthetic, 
with some works produced specifically for the foreign art market (most notably 
the cynic realist and pop movements), while others experimented with forms 
previously not present in China, all of which contributed significantly to the 
development of Beijing’s creative scene and consequently on the landscape of 
the city, as young artists from the provinces began to form the first ‘creative 
clusters’ - though the often gritty conditions in which they lived are a fry cry 
from today’s creative spaces. 
 
Beijing East Village 
One such unofficial cluster, Beijing East Village (Běijīng dōng cūn, 北京东村), 
was the first artist village in the Chaoyang district (now the home of glitzy 
galleries and sprawling CCI clusters) and more importantly, the first creative are 
where traditional boundaries of art were transcended to create a more varied 
space. East Village, in whose name we find both an invocation of New York’s 
famous arty neighbourhood as well as an opposition to Yuanmingyuan (also 
know as West Village), was where the notion of ‘the creative’ first emerged, 
years before district officials began using the term. Photographers, musicians 
and performers worked together and achieved a radical shift in their practice 
and thinking: the very definition of what the creative city discourse might call 
’synergy’. As Rong Rong, now a well-known photographer and head of China’s 
premier photography gallery located in Caochangdi says in a letter to his sister: 
“Sis, you know, an art village has existed near Yuanmingyuan for years. They 
call it the “West Village” where most of the artists are painters. But in the East 
Village of ours, we use all kinds of media. Curse plays rock and roll and writes 
poems. Kong Bu is an art critic and curates exhibitions. Zhang Huan, Ma 
Liuming and Zhu Ming are performance artists … I’m the only photographer 
here. We’re such a diverse but united community. I believe we can do 
something meaningful.” (Rong Rong’s letter to Yali, May 4 1994. In Hung, 2003: 
59) 
 
While many of the group went on to become successful artists, creating some 
of the most iconic works of Chinese contemporary art as well as being key 
members of the Caochangdi cluster, the village itself was finally shut down in 
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June 1994, when police arrested two prominent members on obscenity 
charges and forced the others to leave (Hung, 2003). Yuanmingyuan or West 
Village suffered a similar fate, with members also experiencing harassment and 
outright violence by the police. Significantly, many other migrant villages were 
also cleared in the mid 1990s (cf. Jeong, 2002), with Salmenkari (2004) 
suggesting the authorities may have viewed unofficial artist villages in the same 
light as migrant villages: as disturbances of a social kind, rather than political 
ones (Salmenkari, 2004). Their end also reflects this reality, as both 
Yuanmingyuan and East Village were removed not so much because of the 
authorities’ objection to the artists’ political role, but because of a combination 
of urban redevelopment and social control policies more akin to slum 
clearance; the role of art and creativity in urban change had not yet entered the 
vocabulary of urban planning or cultural policy and any early commercial 
success the artists may have had was in any case not noticed by the city 
authorities - for better or worse. Their practice was not understood either as a 
political challenge, nor as useful economic activity, yet the personal career 
trajectories of the village’s founders, as well as the subsequent development of 
creative spaces in Chaoyang underline the precedent set by East Village as a 
self-organised, ad-hoc space integrating ideas about creative spaces years 
before they made it into the planning language of the local or even national 
state. Both spaces have long since been eaten up by the city, but many more 
followed nearby as direct descendants of these early self-organised artist 
communities. Among them, the 798 Art Zone illustrates best the radically 
different role creative spaces play in late reform China, having achieved both 
commercial success as well as the recognition of the state. 
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6.5 798 Art Zone – mainstreaming creative space 
 
 
The first action to establish the half-abandoned 798 Factory as an artist zone 
took place not long after the clearing of Yuanmingyuan and East Village; in 
contrast to the previous two artists villages however, the development of 798 
already reflects the changes in the mechanism of legitimation and by 
extension, the role of the state in the production of creative spaces in Beijing. 
Firstly, 798 was from the very beginning a space with a certain amount of 
institutional protection, having first been ‘discovered’ by the faculty and 
students of the Chinese Academy of Fine Arts (CAFA). At the time, the 
sprawling industrial plant in Dashanzi was abandoned following the plant’s 
closure during the early reform era. Once one of the most modern electronics 
plants in Maoist China, built in a ‘Bauhaus’2 style by East German engineers in 
the 1950s, the area was now owned by the Seven Star Group, a state-owned 
enterprise formed out of the old factory and tasked with redeveloping the area. 
The Seven Star Group, which remains in the field of electronics, intended to 
develop the area into a high-tech industrial cluster and marketplace along the 
lines of Zhongguancun, Beijing’s largest electronics neighbourhood. Their 
plans however, were foiled by an increasingly vocal and well-connected group 
of artist-tenants who not only secured the sprawling complex for use as a 
creative/arts zone, but practically affirmed the idea of ‘creativity as business’ in 
policy-making circles, setting off a slew of imitations and variations on the 798 
Art Zone across China3. 
 
The factory complex, originally called Complex 718, was a military factory 
producing electronic radio components. The time of its construction holds 
many curious stories of disputes between Soviet and German advisors, as well 
as the attitudes of the Soviets towards the Chinese, foretelling the dispute 
                                                
 
2 Although the industrial architecture of the 718 Complex, as it was originally formed, 
owes its aesthetic to the East German planners, it could not strictly be considered an 
example of Bauhaus architecture. Nevertheless, this understanding of the industrial 
halls has become a mainstay of official presentation and brochures emphasising the 
international character of 798. 
3 Many of these spaces also use a numerical designation as a marker of their function, 
for example the ‘M50’ in Shanghai, the ‘1912’ in Nanjing or the ‘7801’ group in Xiamen. 
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between the two socialist countries. Upon its completion however, the factory 
was a model of Maoist urban space. An industrial facility and city rolled into 
one, the 718 Factory was considered the finest danwei in China, with state-of-
the-art medical equipment, theatres, schools, even an internal militia armed 
with anti-aircraft guns. The self-contained, compound nature of the complex is 
still evident in the area, indeed it has fused successfully with the self-isolating 
tendencies of Beijing’s artist communities, and later with the planning doctrine 
of clustering, which has found expression not only in creative clusters, but 
other spatial types characteristic for China: high-tech clusters, export zone 
clusters, industry incubators - the policy of industrial agglomeration has been 
used extensively in China’s planning circles and it is no surprise to have it 
applied to the emerging creative field. 
 
The transformation of the industrial complex in the reform era also makes it 
symbolically important, and indeed this symbolism has not been lost on the 
factory’s new tenants, emphasising the area’s history through selective 
preservation of Maoist slogans, machines and other equipment, and also with 
the use of the few remaining working industrial units and their workers in art 
projects focusing on the life of the declining danwei. While the move from 
industrial to post-industrial space with a stint as an artist area is by no means 
exceptional to Beijing or China (cf. Zukin (1982) on New York’s experience), the 
details of this transition are highly relevant to the research question at hand; 
what is queried is not the appearance of art-led regeneration, but rather the 
institutional framework employed, the operationalization of the concept by the 
various actors involved, which in this case include the Chaoyang District 
administration, the Seven Star Group SOE, and the loose community of artists, 
gallerists and shop-owners - in other words, the tenants. The key to 
understanding the transition of this space from industrial relic to a flagship 
creative space of Beijing lies in the aforementioned re-establishment of links 
between the state and the arts based on a commodified, market-based 
mechanism of legitimation, which also has significant consequences for this 
particular space. 
 
The artist-tenants first started moving into the cheap, abandoned production 
halls from the mid 1990s onwards. With the mediation and support of CAFA, 
 202 
faculty and students of the academy set up the first studios, followed in 2000 
by the Dean of the Department of Sculpture, and in 2001 by the area’s first 
foreign tenant, Robert Barnell and his publishing company/bookstore. The first 
gallery opened in 2002, when one of the area’s principal artists, Huang Rui, 
asked his friend and Japanese gallerist Yukio Tabata to open a gallery at 
Dashanzi instead of Shanghai (Wang: 2012). What distinguishes the 798 area 
from Yuanmingyuan and East Village is certainly the professional level and 
embeddedness into the global arts scene; while the previous two were 
essentially retreats for unofficial artists to create unnoticed by the state, 798 
was developing in the opposite direction, claiming more attention, drawing in 
more returning artists as well as foreign galleries and businesses on the back 
of already existing networks and entirely outside of the purvey of either the 
municipal state or the area’s owners, the Seven Star Group. Once the 
inevitable conflict with the Seven Star Group arose, it was not a conflict over 
the value of artistic production, but would be better characterised as a conflict 
over resources - in this case plentiful space in what was rapidly becoming a 
more expensive neighbourhood lying directly on the important traffic corridor 
to Beijing’s new airport. When Seven Stars refused to extend the artists’ leases 
at the end of 2004 to expand its high-tech production area, the artist/creative 
community resorted to appeals to the central and municipal government. This 
marks a crucial moment in the development of state-art relations in Beijing, not 
only in terms of physical space, but also the space afforded to contemporary 
art and creative practices/industries in the realm of policy and planning, or 
what we may call the abstract urban space. Faced with an uncertain future, the 
artist-tenants organised a series of acclaimed art festivals, with foreign 
dignitaries attending some of the events amid great media attention, including 
two French Ministers of Culture, the EU culture commissioner and former 
German Chancellor Schröder. Ironically, the success of the area was what 
spurred the Seven Star Group to try and evict the artists amid fears of losing 
control (Wang and Li, 2011: 878). Apart from generating foreign and media 
attention, the artist community crucially intervened with the municipal 
government through Li Xiangqun, a distinguished professor and Committee 
member at the Beijing Municipal People’s Congress (the municipal organ the 
state). In 2004, Li put forward a proposal to protect the area not only for its 
architectural and heritage value, but for its potential to develop into a centre for 
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Chinese art akin to a central business district, just like Soho has become the 
art centre of New York. It was on these terms and using the ‘SOHO concept’ (a 
term which carries great symbolic value in China) that the Municipality 
accepted the proposal, including the area in its creative industry development 
plan within the 11th Five-Year Plan; the Dashanzi area was still managed by the 
Seven Star Group, but they were now tasked with developing a hotbed of 
creativity and art in lieu of an IT one. This marks an important point in the 
analysis of creative space in Beijing; from being (self-)exiled to the fringes of 
society, the artist community had returned, rebranded as a creative one, to the 
domain of policy-making. No longer subject to ideological veridiction, Beijing’s 
creative spaces were now part of an economic horizon of policy which was 
implemented through the commodification of the artists’ (or creatives’) work as 
either objects of consumption by the public or goods for export abroad, with 
the added value of boosting China’s image on the world stage. The state 
remains involved as the ultimate arbiter of creative spaces’ survival through 
administrative means, as well as retaining the capacity for ‘extraordinary 
intervention’ against any threats to its legitimacy and power, as Ai Weiwei has 
witnessed following his criticism of the Communist Party’s handling of the 
2008 Sichuan earthquake (The Economist, 5 May 2012). While the artist and his 
design studio have been the subject of a tax evasion investigation, the 
neighbourhood that he largely created has in fact achieved recognition by the 
authorities, demonstrating how the mechanism of legitimizing creative spaces 
can operate even amidst conflictual relations between the planning state and 
the practicing actors on the ground, and explored in further detail in the 
following chapter. 
 
The governance of the arts and of creative space is of course no exception to a 
legacy of what Liu (1992) called ‘sporadic totalitarianism’, i.e. a state with 
strong despotic power and weak infrastructural power, evidenced in the way in 
which the authorities handled the post-Tiananmen purge of the arts, but also in 
the lack of infrastructural power to engage with subsequent generations of 
unofficial artists. Only as the infrastructural power of the Chinese (local) state 
increased, so the mechanisms governing and overseeing creative spaces in 
Beijing have moved towards an administrative-regulatory model, though one 
which still retains some ‘campaign’ characteristics visible in occasional bursts 
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of policy enforcement. The 798 Art Zone as such has become a template for 
creative districts around the country despite its own creative output 
diminishing amid rent inflation and rampant commercialisation of space to suit 
the needs of tourists. The commercial success of the 798 Art Zone may have 
spurred imitation in other Chinese cities as a positive ‘judgement’ on the 
viability of creative, yet its success has not had beneficial effects on 
surrounding creative spaces, as the Chaoyang District government now has 
less interest in their preservation, preferring instead to redevelop their land for 
other uses (Ren and Sun, 2012: 511). 
 
798 has survived attempts to demolish or relocate it precisely because of the 
artists’ skilful navigation between the Scylla of the Seven Star Group and 
Charybdis of the Chaoyang District Government. Similar to Taipei’s Huashan 
1913 and Kaohsiung’s Pier-2, it presented too large and too coveted a plot of 
land to survive in any form which would not be conducive to commercial 
development; unlike Taipei’s case, where the decision to commercialise was 
taken by a joint body of government and civil society (see Chapter Four), or 
that of Kaohsiung, where the municipality completely absorbed the area as a 
vertically integrated part of the city bureaucracy (Chapter Five), Beijing’s case 
is one of civil society relying on one state body - the district government, to 
resist the predation of another - the Seven Star SOE.  By presenting itself as a 
reliable source of income in the first place, and international landmark in the 
second instance, the artist community at 798 has succeeded in creating 
China’s foremost ‘art zone’, derailing the plans of the Sever Star Group to 
exploit the area as a high-tech cluster. This was only possible by invoking the 
(central and municipal) government’s priorities through official channels, 
framing their activity as part of the national developmental project, a high-
profile display of soft power. Ironically, it was precisely by invoking these 
priorities that they have subjected themselves to a process of 
commercialisation that will ultimately remove all but the largest of players. 
Thus, the market-based mechanism of legitimation is not merely a lever in 
negotiation with the state, but has also transformed the essence of what 798 
Art Zone is: by favouring larger established groups, galleries over studios, by 
the move towards large mainstream events which further bolster the reputation 
of the space, further pushing it into the direction of an exclusive exhibition 
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space/tourist attraction. While this may seem an obvious statement, it carries 
significant analytical value for interpreting how ways of doing things transform 
space; the invocation of commodified value led to the adoption of a market-
based mechanism of legitimation, which finally exceeded the original scope 
and intent of the artist-tenants. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
The production of creative space in Beijing confronts us with the need to look 
into the black box of spatial restructuring in China; while macroeconomic 
explanations such as commodification go a long way to account for the 
dynamic land market in which state, local state, private and joint ventures are 
all competing for a share of wealth, the same processes are also affecting the 
production of art, as well as the understanding of what ‘creativity’ actually is. 
No longer merely understood as artistic output, its debut as an economic and 
national category of utmost importance has joined entrenched tendencies 
towards self-imposed isolation and reliance on commercial benefactors and 
endeavours (domestic and foreign), rather than state support of creative 
output. At the same time, the blurring of boundaries between art and creative 
industries (typical not only for China, but within the creative city discourse as a 
whole) has further emphasised the links creative spaces maintain with industry, 
as well as opened a new line of approach for state intervention and control, 
though within the bounds of a dynamic market for the ‘products’ of the 
creatives’ work. The central state’s role on the other hand seems limited to the 
broad setting of the ‘rules of the game’. Creative spaces in Beijing can 
therefore best be understood within a market-led dynamic which does not 
exclude the influence of the state, but rather subjects its style of governance to 
a commodifying logic: whereas Taipei’s municipality developed non-
commercial public institutions of creative space production, this same role is 
taken up by the municipal state as one of the commercial actors alongside 
non-state actors such as artist collectives, galleries or real-estate developers, 
SOHO China being the most notorious. 
 
This process is further nuanced by the large variety of state actors and bodies 
involved in processes of urban redevelopment: townships, villages, districts, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), various danwei of public institutions such as 
schools or museums, municipal bodies’ holding companies. Hsing for example 
points out how SOEs have been engaging in competition with each other, as 
well as the municipal and central state and other institutions such as 
universities and schools (Hsing, 2010). In fact, the formation of the 798 Art 
Zone presents such a case where competing (para)state agents with conflicting 
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views on how the derelict factory should be used clashed, finally resulting in 
the municipal government siding with the artist community which had been 
using the space (though the artists eventually lost the “struggle” against the 
commercialisation of the area). The central state meanwhile remains present as 
an overseer and ultimate arbiter, maintaining a hands-off stance with the 
exception of events which relate directly to its rule: either in a positive way, as 
was the case during the Beijing Olympics when the 798 Art Zone was elevated 
to a symbolic status matching Beijing’s other great attractions, or negatively, 
as the crackdown after Ai Weiwei’s challenge to Party rule and legitimacy has 
shown. 
 
Apart from the roles different state actors and poles play, a common problem 
one faces when attempting to analyse creative spaces in China is how to 
distinguish between the roles art/culture and creative industries play in the 
setting up of creative spaces. While it is argued here that the artist community 
in Beijing has often been at the forefront of such spatial development (798 Art 
Zone being one well-known example), government support and private funding 
has been directed more towards creative industries, which may ultimately be 
credited with achieving official recognition of the sector as a whole, no longer 
seen only as artist “opt-outs” and troublemakers, but productive contributors 
to China’s peaceful rise. This corresponds to the move in the west towards an 
economic re-evaluation of cultural activities in the 1980s, as the added value of 
‘symbolic consumption’ (cf. Chapter One) made culture a marketable 
commodity. Hu’s remarks on culture and creativity can thus be taken both as a 
recognition of the field of creative production, while simultaneously reinforcing 
the understanding of art, culture and creative industries as a single economic 
sector, though much opacity remains regarding interpretations by various 
Ministries and city-level institutions. 
 
As for the role, capacity and style of state intervention in creative spaces, the 
chapter argues that while the state is heavily invested in the culture-creative 
discourse as an urban development strategy and source of ‘soft power’, the 
approach on the ground to the production of creative space in Beijing is driven 
by a process of commodification and shaped by path-dependencies particular 
to the art scene in Beijing. Effectively, the practice of making creative spaces 
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(be they zones, clusters, villages) subjects the creative and cultural field (and 
the actors within it, be they state or non-state) to a logic of the marketplace 
and the form of the cluster/compound. While the existence of such an 
approach is not surprising considering well-documented cases of spatial 
commodification in the reform era (Wu, 2002, 2003; Hsing, 2010;), the dynamic, 
market-led production of creative space nevertheless also indicates the 
limitations of state capacity resulting in a particular style of governance, which 
allows openings for non-state actors to become directly involved in what has 
become a spatial transformation of large proportions, of which 798 Art Zone is 
the most obvious example. Simultaneously, the ideological restrictions and 
challenges to the setting up of creative spaces and practices that have existed 
in the pre-reform era have largely become regulations rather than value 
judgements applied post festum. Lastly, the trend of clustering/compounds, 
with roots in both historical conceptions of Chinese space ranging from the 
imperial to the Maoist (cf. Lu, 2006; Knapp et al., 2005; Xu, 2000; Chan, 1994), 
has facilitated a fusion of industrial policies (which have long favoured 
clustering) with the organically grown artist clusters. Thus, latent notions of the 
benefits of clustering were transferred seamlessly to art zones, notwithstanding 
that such zones emerged out of the spatial forms of the danwei work unit, as 
well as the influence of a history of self-imposed seclusion in the art and 
creative communities of Beijing. 
 
A comparative perspective with Taiwan may serve at this point to underline the 
significant variation in the operationalization of creative strategies. Firstly and in 
regards to the style and capacity of governing, Taiwan’s case is set apart by 
the presence of an adaptive, integrating state vis-à-vis small groups of 
activists, experts and artists, especially in Taipei’s case. There, a corporative 
project managed by the state has developed institutions of creative space 
production which link artists, planners, corporate interests and academics 
under a coherent, state-led body. In comparison, China’s creativity strategies 
are characterised by a multi-layered state composed of national, provincial and 
municipal authorities, state-owned enterprises, joint ventures and holding 
companies, and organisations such as elite universities and schools (and their 
associated work-units), all of which are often in competition with each other 
over their right to use urban space. Such a ‘disaggregated’ state presents 
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several obstacles and opportunities in the production of creative space; 
legitimation of creative spaces may thus occur as a result of actors exploiting 
the competitive relations between different (para-)state institutions, as 
happened in the case of 798 Art Zone. On the other hand, the often-obscure 
relations between influential and unaccountable state actors result in the 
transient, unstable nature of many creative spaces in China. 
 
Secondly, on the other end of the state-society spectrum, we find 
internationally acclaimed and financially hugely successful artists such as Ai 
Weiwei, Xu Bing or Huang Rui, whose autonomy cannot be exaggerated in 
comparison to Taiwan’s relatively isolated and overlooked art scene, 
dependent almost entirely on the benevolence of the state and its institutions. 
While the production of creative zones and spaces has in recent years become 
the purvey of planning departments, this research maintains that crucial 
differences between Taiwan and China can be traced to these spaces’ 
formative years and usefully explained by looking at not only governing 
patterns, but also the ways in which relevant groups respond to downward 
pressure, i.e. their capacity to ignore, circumvent or even challenge the state’s 
efforts. Unlike Kaohsiung therefore, the state in China is not as able to impose 
freely its vision of what creativity means due to a lack of vertical, direct power 
flows, with national plans being diluted and reinterpreted before the shovel hits 
the ground. Analogous to the problems and solutions deployed to control 
China’s officialdom, relying on normative appeals and mechanisms rather than 
direct control, so the national policies on soft power can often result in a mere 
‘artwash’ of what are essentially urban redevelopment projects filling the 
coffers of the local state. 
 
Moreover, in Beijing and Shanghai at least, the understanding of creativity and 
its spatial manifestation was often framed by non-state actors able to steer the 
development of such spaces to the point where local authorities have begun 
copying their solutions  - sometimes brick by brick, as is the case of 
Caochangdi, examined in the following chapter. On the other hand, the central 
state in China is also unable (or unwilling at any rate) to significantly integrate 
the expertise and demands of the epistemic community of artists, experts and 
academia – what I have called ‘spatial professionals’ in the work on Taipei. 
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Thus, the situation remains characterised by distrust and avoidance of the 
state’s influence by the creative communities, though one which is increasingly 
being challenged by para-state actors and lower levels of the state (such as 
villages and townships), able to engage directly in the emulation and 
reproduction of successful creative spaces such as the 798 Art Zone or the 
Caochangdi and Songzhuang artists villages. 
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Chapter Seven: Beijing’s Creative Spaces in 
Flux 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The experience of Beijing’s newest (semi) official creative neighbourhoods has 
clear implications for the exploration of state-art relations within the larger topic 
of creative space production in China and Taiwan. Firstly, open support by the 
state, while often unwelcomed by the artists themselves, suggests a high level 
of priority is being attached by policy-makers to the creation, nurturing and 
export of China’s nascent ‘culture-creative’ sector. Just as Caochangdi village 
has embraced its artists, so Xicheng and Dongcheng districts are attempting to 
reinvent its old neighbourhoods as hotbeds of creativity and cultural 
production, while the central state has also lent its support and legitimation to 
the role of art and culture as a cornerstone of national development. Although 
the tools used may be crude and reminiscent of industrial chains of production, 
the very vagueness and voguisheness of ‘creativity’ as a concept also allows 
artist spaces to operate under the assumption of being productive members of 
an economic and cultural drive from the national level. Creative zones such as 
Caochangdi or innovative community-oriented projects like Dashila(b) thus 
profit from the trickling down of national policies called for by the leadership: 
not necessarily translating into direct support (which is in any case not always 
welcomed), the policies allow for a legitimation of artist communities such as 
Caochangdi in spite of the formally illegal nature of many of the physical 
aspects of the space. Put simply, it is the abstract space of their activity, of 
their practice, that has been legitimised rather than the physical spaces of the 
studios they inhabit. 
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Secondly, the transformation of the relationship between the state and the arts, 
from one fraught with ideological obstacles to one regulated largely via market-
based mechanisms, has brought fresh instability and opportunity. Creative 
zones, villages, districts, or neighbourhoods have been appearing with great 
speed an vigour all across Beijing, spurred on by huge international and 
domestic demand for Chinese art, as well as an increasingly liberal 
environment permissive of minor transgressions against Party doxa. While red 
lines remain, these do not interfere as acutely with the process of creative 
space production, which remains firmly rooted in the logic of art-led 
redevelopment, followed by local government acceptance (as was the case in 
798 as well as Songzhuang and Caochangdi) and commercial development, a 
pattern described in detail by Zukin in the case of New York (Zukin: 1982; 
2010). Indeed, the local state and its SOEs have begun participating in art-led 
redevelopment in terms of planning and policy, as examples from Dongcheng 
and Xicheng show, indicating that the state is aware of, and understands art-
led redevelopment as a form of urban restructuring aimed at creating the ‘right 
kind’ of authenticity. The example of laozihao, or old brands, clearly marks the 
understanding of cultural capital as an economic category, subject to a market 
logic of expansion. The commodification of culture should not have a strictly 
negative connotation either; as ideas about the value of culture and heritage 
gain momentum, it has become possible for a project such as 
Dashila(b)/Dashilar Platform to attract state investment in previously neglected 
aspects of community development through art and culture development. As 
the low-hanging fruit of wholesale redevelopment becomes less attainable, so 
we should not be surprised that the local state, in its many guises, is becoming 
more enthusiastic about smaller art/culture-led redevelopment which can 
nonetheless provide a significant return on what are usually relatively small 
investments. Adding to this the cadre management system rewarding success 
with career advancement (cf. Landry, 2008; Edin, 2003), the involvement in 
high-profile projects such as the Venice Biennale also highlights the personal 
value which art and culture-led redevelopment can hold for Beijing’s municipal 
cadres. To summarize, it is against these incentives and conditions that this 
chapter aims to examine the contemporary situation, locating a site in the 
periphery and two in central Beijing as key creative spaces from which further 
trends are emerging.   
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7.2 Caochangdi: from one artist’s village to one village’s 
art zone 
 
If the 798 Art Zone presents a case of the creative community engaging 
directly with the state to secure concessions and space, neighbouring 
Caochangdi is rooted firmly in the tactics of avoidance. Two main findings 
come from the work on Caochangdi: firstly, the reinterpretation of social 
control as market regulation (explored in the previous chapter) has was 
reaffirmed on the ground. Secondly, the emulation by the village cadres of 
spontaneous creative spaces produced by artists demonstrates the 
possibilities for the uptake of such strategies and practices by the local state, 
its small scale notwithstanding. Whether this may result in increased control of 
artist practice or provide some institutional cover owing to the incorporation of 
the village as a International Artist Village is at the moment unclear, yet the 
value of having an artist community has been clearly recognised by the village. 
 
Having served first as an Imperial hunting ground, Caochangdi was found to 
have good feng-shui and subsequently converted into a grave-site and garden, 
around which a village sprang, marking the beginning of Caochangdi as a 
specific locale in Beijing’s then rural surroundings. The gardens having been 
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, the village was transformed into an 
agricultural commune; interestingly, it was considered so remote from Beijing it 
received youth sent down to the countryside during the ‘Shangshan Xiaxiang’ 
campaign (Mangurian and Ray, 2009: 425). As the Chinese economy opened 
up and Beijing spread beyond the confines of the old imperial city, Caochangdi 
remained a rural village, though increasingly also following the trend of village 
enterprises and in-situ urbanisation caused by a rapid influx of population, as 
well as demand for industrial spaces in the vicinity of the capital. As the 798 Art 
Zone in nearby Dashanzi was taking-off in the early 2000s with visits from 
foreign dignitaries and famous artists, Caochangdi was nevertheless still firmly 
off the map until an ever increasing amount of attention was drawn to the 
village by its first artist-resident, Ai Weiwei, who together with Frank 
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Uytterhaegen established the ‘China Art Archive Warehouse’1 in Caochangdi in 
1999. Ai Weiwei, who has remained in the village since, has also acted as its 
unofficial urban planner, designer and architect, setting off a slew of imitations 
of his trademark grey-brick architecture. So much so, he has recently switched 
to red bricks to elude the copy-cats of the village (op.cit, 432). The growth in 
the creative and cultural sectors of Caochangdi has been nothing short of 
remarkable, especially considering that virtually no support or plan existed to 
facilitate the clustering of galleries, studios and cultural enterprises in an area 
as remote as Caochangdi. While the relative vicinity of 798 Art Zone does 
account for the general flow of art and culture organizations to Northeast 
Beijing, Caochangdi was borne primarily out of Ai Weiwei’s relocation, with 
around 50 arts and cultural organizations based there so far. 
 
Despite this fast growth, many artists and galleries, as well as other inhabitants 
of the area, were served demolition and resettlement notices on 14 April 2010 
as part of a wider plan to redevelop the 14 villages which make up 
Cuigezhuang Township under the rubric of ‘city and town integration’ (城乡⼀一体
化 chéngxiāng yītǐhuà). After further inquiry and pressure organised by the 
villages art studios and galleries, the township authorities later denied that 
Caochangdi would be included, adding to the confusion regarding its future (Li, 
23 April 2010). Previously, only one other township in the district, Dawangjing, 
has been integrated in the same way in a pilot project, which has had a 
significant effect on Caochangdi as well. Widely seen as a model resettlement 
plan, it covered nearly 1700 households and was completed 43 days ahead of 
schedule, prompting Beijing Party Secretary Liu Qi to go as far as calling it ‘a 
miracle’ (Li, 2009 August 24). One reason for the relative ease with which the 
villagers were relocated is the markedly improved system of compensation 
piloted at Dawangjing, which saw villagers receiving an urban hukou, 
compensation, as well as a collective 50,000 square meter share of the future 
development from which former villagers will receive rental income (Li, 2009 17 
April). According to data gathered by Ray and Mangurian, around 600 
                                                
 
1 Interestingly, Ai called his operation a ‘warehouse’ to avoid raising doubts about 
whether this was a studio or gallery; a warehouse being an industrial building the likes 
of which cover China’s industrial landscape, it was likely to remain unnoticed, while 
also avoiding the legal barriers to registering a gallery, which are subject to a specific 
set of registration rules (Mangurian and Ray, 2009: 444).  
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compensated villagers bought new cars following their resettlement, bringing 
attention to the often less-research side of urban village demolitions: the 
incentive to leave. In Caochangdi, rumours of a similarly generous resettlement 
programme set off a construction frenzy in which almost 80% of the existing 
residential stock was upgraded to 3-storey buildings (Mangurian and Ray, 
Lecture, October 2009). Clearly, the demolition of the creative spaces of 
Caochangdi could bring financial benefits to the villagers, so it is especially 
interesting that the village authorities have stuck steadfast to the promotion of 
the International Art Village as a way to forestall demolition or at least increase 
its cost. While the loss of personal position is one reason for the village 
leadership to avoid integration (village level organisations are absorbed or 
disbanded according to the urban-rural integration plan), the present research 
also argues that the village authorities independently recognised the economic 
potential of supporting the transformation of Caochangdi into an International 
Art Village. 
 
New Socialist Countryside, New International Art Village 
The village, apart from being distinguished by the large and ever rising number 
of galleries, artist studios and creative companies, has also been designated a 
Socialist New Countryside Village as part of the 11th Five Year Plan, which 
promoted the construction of a New Socialist Countryside (NSC), a policy 
spearheaded by Premier Wen. Constituting a separate entity of local 
government, the village was an especially conspicuous testing ground for a mix 
of self-organised creative enterprise, Maoist-style campaigning, as well as the 
organic growth of the village to service the spree of construction related to the 
setting up of creative spaces. The village entrepreneurialism fostered by the 
policy may go a long way towards explaining why Caochangdi seems to have 
become an exception in Cuigezhuang Township, having been excluded from 
demolition. Moreover, it is important to underline that the growth of creative 
spaces in the village was not expected or planned, meaning any involvement 
by the local cadres can be seen as a reaction to outside conditions within the 
confines of their mandate as a model village, as well as their own 
entrepreneurial agency. Bearing this in mind, it is essential to draw attention to 
the conclusions of Schubert and Ahlers’ study of the NSC policies, which 
found the setting up of model villages is both an element of ‘strategic agency’ 
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for local cadres eager to escape top-down control, as well as being embedded 
in ‘…development strategies that concretise XNCJS [NSC] guidelines passed 
down from higher levels, often based on a local “thinking” that gives special 
legitimation to modelling strategies by functioning as an ideological “unifier” 
among the local bureaucracy.’ (Schubert and Ahlers, 2013: 846-7). 
 
Applying this approach to Caochangdi’s creative spaces, the support of the 
local village leadership to the activities of the artist community serves both as a 
tool to profile their village (and their leadership), as well as allowing an 
integration of the village into a national, top-down scheme of constructing a 
national cultural industry without the village being administratively and 
physically integrated (or rather, demolished). In short, the creative space 
strategy allowed the village to capitalise both in terms of state support and 
increased autonomy as the success of the village economy legitimates their 
stance towards the creative communities in the village. While demolition and 
integration into the city remain a possibility, newer plans and business 
investment material issued by the Chaoyang District suggest Caochangdi is to 
remain a cultural-creative zone in some way or another, having been included 
in the ‘Dahuan Tourist Cultural Area’, one of the district’s priority areas of 
creative and cultural development2. By betting on the creative spaces’ 
success, the village leadership has clearly taken on board the importance of 
the sector to their village’s development, affording the galleries and studios a 
level of local protection and entering the market as a creative space producer 
in its own right, with the construction of the “East End Art Zone” complete and 
further construction underway. The village is even looking beyond brick and 
mortar projects towards collaborative projects with London, Dubai and New 
York to cement its legitimacy as a creative zone with international credentials. 
 
The village’s promotional video3 makes the entrepreneurial stance of the 
leadership abundantly clear. Set to a karaoke version of John Lennon’s 
Imagine, the short film first clarifies the value of culture in today’s global 
economy as well as for China’s national aspirations and development. Intended 
                                                
 
2 Chaoyang District Government website: Cultural and Creative Industry. Accessible at 
http://www.bjchy.gov.cn/business/zhdchy/whchychy/. Accessed 7 May 2013.  
3 Accessible at http://www.caochangdi.com.cn/. Accessed 15 May 2013.  
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to showcase the developmental niche that Caochangdi has been so good at 
exploiting, the film introduces local cadres and their efforts to promote and set 
up the Caochangdi International Art Village (草场地国际艺术村 Cǎochǎngdì guójì 
yìshù cūn) under the slogan of the New Socialist Countryside policy. While the 
video does not go as far as to say the development of the village’s culture-
creative industry was entirely planned to coincide with the NSC, other local 
Party publications are not so reserved. An article on Village Party Branch 
Secretary Zhang Gengqi for example suggests the village’s success is down to 
Secretary Zhang’s ‘deep understanding and acknowledgment of culture-
creativity’ (Wang, 2009). The integration of the pre-existing ‘creative capital’ 
into the village’s own entrepreneurial strategy emphasises the mode of 
production typical of Beijing’s creative spaces. Seen within this context, the 
presence of a creative zone was a serendipitous find for the village leaders, 
allowing them to use it as bargaining chip and avoid the fate of Dawangjing 
village just across the Airport Expressway. Based on a twin discourse of 
national cultural development and economic success, creative spaces such as 
those constructed in Caochangdi by Ai Weiwei are legible as such to multiple 
levels of municipal government, despite their original designer certainly not 
being a desirable character. The uptake of creative strategies at the grassroots 
level is facilitated by the incentive for place-making and entrepreneurialism, 
both of which are features of Chinese governance patterns. While Treasure Hill, 
Taipei’s own illegally built village was only integrated through a process of 
museumification over which the residents had little say, Caochangdi avoided 
wholesale demolition through a successful place-making process which has 
secured its survival for the time being. Importantly, with the village surviving, so 
do the positions occupied by the current village leadership. 
 
Songzhuang, Beijing’s largest and most remote creative cluster, presents a 
similar case (cf. Ren and Sun, 2012). Caochangdi shares with Songzhuang 
another characteristic in that both have set up village shareholding enterprises, 
an instrument of wealth distribution that remains relatively rare in northern 
China, though frequently found in the south of the country. Hsing (2010), 
referring to this system as ‘village corporatism’, points out the relative 
autonomy afforded to the village by virtue of shareholding companies and real 
estate operations; as collective owners of the land, villages can engage in 
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negotiation with urban governments, with the shareholding enterprise 
representing a method of distributing wealth, as well as participating in 
lucrative land-deals (Hsing, 2010: 123-5). What sets Caochangdi or 
Songzhuang apart however is that these villages have zealously taken up a 
model that originates from the private sector (specifically art-led construction), 
re-establishing a tentative link between state and art via the local village. Seen 
from the analytical framework informing this chapter, the village serves as an 
example of a low-level contact between the arts and the local state, just as 798 
was an example of a higher-level one. While Caochangdi does not command 
nearly as much attention or resources as the 798 Art Zone, it has nonetheless 
managed to escape the fate of many other creative spaces in the Chaoyang 
District by virtue of the village’s more independent status, while many other 
areas have been razed or slated for demolition by the Chaoyang District 
government; thus, protection of the immediate level of local state remains 
important and may yet lead to closer collaboration between the state and the 
artist communities engaged in the production of creative spaces. 
 
Avoiding state approval 
For the time being, the tactic of avoiding the state that had served Chinese 
artists since the late 1980s remains visible in the private walled compounds 
scattered around Caochangdi, protected both from prying eyes and secure in 
the administrative grey zone of the village. Having brought a great deal of 
economic gain to the village, as well as enabling the village to re-brand itself as 
an art village, local cadres in Caochangdi remain welcoming of the artists’ 
presence. The artist community presents mainly an economic opportunity and 
is understood almost entirely within the narrow scope of China’s 
developmentalist thought: culture is a commodity and is treated as such by the 
village’s new policy of “One institute, one product; One house, one product” (
⼀一宅⼀一品，⼀一院⼀一品), meant to diversify and specialise the numerous culture-
creative organizations in the village. How an artist community that is both 
financially independent and globalised will react to such a simplified view of 
their work is however not entirely clear, though the expectation is that such a 
policy will be used mainly to regulate and promote the village’s own cultural-
creative endeavours as a branding, place-profiling strategy, rather than a 
curatorial or control mechanism over the artists’ output. Ultimately, the 
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incorporation of the village and its new life as an artist village may yet spell the 
end of a more free-wheeling version of Caochangdi, as official recognition 
seldom comes without increased interference, as Ren and Sun have also 
pointed out on the case of Songzhuang (Ren and Sun, 2012). 
 
Despite the endorsement for the existence of a creative cluster in the village by 
the local cadres, it remains to be seen what form that this would take place, 
reopening the question of the autonomy of creative spaces in Beijing. The 
physical structures of the village’s creative spaces are mostly illegally built, 
providing a stark contrast between the official endorsement of the village as a 
space of creative production, and the continuing illegality of what are arguably 
Beijing’s most avant-garde and world-famous spaces: Ai Weiwei’s FAKE 
Design studios, Galerie Urs Meile Beijing, and Rong Rong’s Three Shadows 
photography gallery (the latter being a veteran of Beijing East Village). A map 
compiled by Mangurian and Ray (Figure 5) clearly shows that the vast majority 
of the village is illegally built. The formal illegality of much of the creative 
spaces in the village therefore retains its role as the Sword of Damocles 
hanging over the artists’ heads, ready to be used to regain the space should 
the local or central government feel the need to do so - demolitions of this sort 
are not at all uncommon, especially considering conflicts between policies on 
urbanization versus agricultural land preservation. While certainty with regards 
to official support for the creative spaces of Caochangdi is impossible to arrive 
at (indeed many respondents during interviews conducted in April 2013 felt the 
municipal government may yet go on a demolishing/redeveloping spree), two 
American architects working in the village are convinced the observation of 
physical space may offer a satisfactory answer: taking the example of a 
planned on-ramp for the 5th Ring Road as an example, they point out its 
construction would have wiped out most of the village, yet the ramp was not 
built according to plan, sparing the ‘illegal’ creative spaces of the village and 
allowing the spontaneous growth to continue (Mangurian and Ray, 2009: 426). 
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Figure 7 - Illegal structures are shown in black. Source: BASEBeijing Caochangdi, 
2012 
 
Caochangdi escaped wholesale demolition for the time being, yet the 
uncertainty attests to the continuing oppositional relationship between the 
state (even at the level of the village) and the creative community (in 
Caochangdi’s case a motley mix of Chinese artists, foreign architects, 
international galleries and farmer-landlord imitators). Although activist-artists 
such as Ai often emphasise the totalitarian nature of the Chinese authorities in 
interviews with foreign media, state control over creative spaces is not purely 
political; most demolitions and resettlement of artists’ studios in eastern Beijing 
happen for economic reasons, underlining the extent to which the relation 
between state and art has been depoliticised in terms of ideological struggles. 
The political having become the economic, state-art relations have also been 
subsumed within the mechanism of the market in most cases, leaving only 
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outright brazen protest as the truly risky business for Chinese artist-activists. In 
2010, Wu Yuren, the head of the now defunct 008 Art Zone, was arrested 
following a protest on Chang’an Boulevard past Tiananmen Square earlier in 
the year. Similarly, Ai has faced tax evasion charges and house arrest. While 
modern art and the practice of living as an artist is no longer seen as a social ill 
per se, the authorities have evidently drawn the line at being directly 
challenged, with most Chinese artists and communities also refraining from 
irking the state, preferring instead tactics of avoidance and isolation. 
 
Meanwhile in the village, while his presence is tolerated, Ai Weiwei is clearly 
seen by the village leadership as a troublemaker. The village publications and 
official histories are careful to avoid any mention of the rogue artists’ presence 
or role in the establishment of the International Art Village, emphasising instead 
their own cultural acumen, safer modes of expression, and especially the 
commercial and developmental value of art and creativity for their village. The 
ironic result of this replication is that municipal creative zones are based on the 
self-made, isolated communities constructed by China’s contemporary artists, 
yet are devoid of the content which made those spaces attractive to emulate in 
the first place. With overwhelming attention being directed at the economic 
consequence of creativity, they are also likely to continue operating as for-hire 
units for small start-ups and companies in the creative sectors, though rent 
increases may out-price all but the most successful. 
 
Caochangdi remains a complex and varied village, with haphazard migrant 
housing only metres away from the quiet gardens of the galleries, many hidden 
behind high walls or obscured from the busy streets by virtue of their design. 
The layout of the village is somewhat telling of the way in which creative 
spaces in Beijing are produced: the art-world newcomers work behind walls, 
among manicured lawns and tended flowerbeds, rather than the ever-present 
Beijing dust and smell of construction. Seemingly closer to the international art 
circuit than a Chinese streetscape, they are nevertheless not isolated, existing 
instead in a hybrid, transient space. In a Lefebvrian sense, the ‘gatedness’ of 
the Maoist urban space persists in these configurations as much as the 
courtyard form of imperial China has crept into the form of the danwei work 
unit. In Lu Duanfang’s words, we are dealing with the ‘vicissitude of walls’ (Lu: 
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2006), which quite literally limit and shape the creative spaces in Beijing, 
contributing also to the replication of closed art compounds in other Chinese 
cities. Such walls could be interpreted as a physical manifestation of the divide 
between the concerns of the globalised elite and the daily grind of the migrant 
worker, but they are equally a testament to the autonomy and outright disdain 
that many artists feel towards the state. Ultimately, through its control over 
land and the systemic collusion between political and business elites, the 
decision about the death or survival of creative zones such as Caochangdi 
remains with the state. As a four-letter obscenity pasted on the inside of the 
wall of Ai Weiwei’s compound shows however, the creative community in 
China may not be as malleable as the state desires. 
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7.3 Back to the Hutong – creative space, preservation and 
‘gentrification’ in Beijing’s historical neighbourhoods 
 
 
798 Art Zone, Caochangdi, even Songzhuang and the former clusters at 
Yuanmingyuan or Beijing East Village were all characterised by a tendency 
towards isolation in the form of a compound or cluster. As explored in previous 
sections, this tendency was borne out of several historical trajectories: the 
traditional courtyard form of classic architecture, a historical break between the 
state and the arts, the hybridization of space within the ‘culture-creative’ 
cluster favoured by the Chinese state, as well as by the continued distrust of 
artist communities towards the intentions of the authorities. In central Beijing 
however, recent years have seen an increasingly open model of ‘creative 
space’, one which takes cues from adaptive reuse of older structures, favours 
tie-ins with tourism and historical preservation, and invites comparisons with 
similar projects/processes in Taiwan, as well as further afield. Unlike Taiwan 
however, the locations examined in Beijing are set apart by the ways in which 
different actors, especially the state (more specifically in its planning authority) 
and the creative communities (as the predominant producers and users of the 
spaces) engage in collaborative projects (as was the case in Dashilar) or 
operate parallel to each other (as is the case in the Gulou area). Aside from 
continuing the theme of state-arts relationship explored already in previous 
case studies, the present segment of the research retains a more forward-
looking, perhaps even speculative gaze in attempting to identify potential new 
meeting points between the actors involved - be they conflictual or 
collaborative - within the overlapping fields of historical preservation and 
creative space production. 
 
Two findings stem from the field research in central Beijing; firstly, the spatial 
limitations (a combination of historical preservation rules, small plots for 
development, high developing costs) have allowed for a more dispersed 
conception of ‘creative space’, one which is proving to be fertile ground for a 
novel way of collaboration between non-governmental actors and the 
municipality, especially its investment companies. As such projects gather 
momentum however, a crucial question becomes the increased administrative 
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intervention in accordance to the top-down flow of policies on cultural and 
creative industries, cultural capital and the development of soft power. 
Secondly, and stemming from the first point, the way in which the (local) state 
has integrated non-governmental inputs, as demonstrated on the case of 
Dashilar, presents an interesting point of comparison with Taipei’s URS 
programme; while the increase in the Chinese state’s capacity to 
accommodate social movements is significant, the underlying incentive 
structure stemming from the entrepreneurial imperative and cadre 
management system nevertheless means the Chinese municipal state is more 
likely to encroach on, rather than integrate non-governmental efforts in creative 
space production. With the exception of smaller, dispersed projects, any 
(commercially) successful project or initiative can potentially become the target 
either of a take-over, of emulation, or outright predation. 
 
Authenticity and development 
Beijing’s hutongs are in many ways the one urban landscape that continues to 
be seen as an authentic space specific to the city. Authenticity as defined by 
Zukin (2010), i.e. a space saturated with cultural capital, yet also one whose 
very authenticity is being re-examined and transformed, is a key analytical 
concept for understanding the changes in Beijing’s old neighbourhoods. 
Especially in the context of creative space development and creative city 
discourse, authenticity is understood as a manifestation of power when state 
and business interests (often two aspects of the same group) take it upon 
themselves to transform urban space using culture-creative approaches. 
Authenticity, being a claim to a normative, primary state, can therefore be seen 
as an exercise of cultural, economic and political power, by which “…a group 
that imposes its own tastes on urban space—on the look of a street, say, or the 
feeling of a neighborhood—can make a claim to that space that displaces 
longtime residents” (Zukin, 2010: 3-4). 
 
Zukin was writing about her home city of New York and while the concept is 
certainly applicable in Beijing, fieldwork data also suggests a more nuanced 
view of ‘displacement’ is essential; living conditions in the hutongs being what 
they are, displacement is often a goal for many long-time residents, tenants 
and landlords alike. The question rather is under what conditions and with what 
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compensation, as well as what is to replace the current residents: shops, 
galleries, hotels? Displacement is not limited to the ‘long-time’ residents; many 
new-comers in central Beijing are arguably more at risk: small cafes, galleries 
and alternative concert venues which sprang up throughout the 1990s and 
2000s are being overwhelmed in places by confected, mass-produced 
‘cultural’ industry shops or chased out by landlords eager to increase rent. 
Many lamentations on hutong living are directed equally at, or written by, the 
foreign and Chinese urbanites, which were in retrospect responsible for 
popularising the idea of ‘hutong chic’ - a seemingly clear cut case of 
gentrification, though one ‘with Chinese characteristics’. While many old 
hutongs have been demolished and replaced with high-density, high-rise 
buildings, these cases are not the subject of the present research. Rather, the 
cases and the scope of fieldwork was based on extant hutongs: some have 
been refurbished, ranging from socially inclusive early experiments in the Ju’er 
Hutong (cf. Wu, 1994) to more outlandish luxury units with underground 
garages and swimming pools around Nanluoguxiang, where many hutong 
houses have also been converted to luxury hotels. Others still have been 
developed to cater for tourist-oriented consumption (most notably areas close 
to the Forbidden City such as Shichahai, as well as ‘cultural industry clusters’ 
such as Liulichang which specialise in (re)producing Beijing’s authenticity for 
domestic tourists), while some in the North East of the city have become 
production sites for a host of creative industries, most notable music 
production and design (Keane, 2009). 
 
The most notorious redevelopment project in the old city core, and one 
symptomatic of the real-estate frenzy gripping the capital, is the proposed 
redevelopment of Qianmen, an area south of Tiananmen Square and the 
Qianmen gates, which was historically one of the busiest and liveliest parts of 
Imperial Beijing. In contrast to the orderly rows of courtyard houses in the Inner 
City, the area outside of the old city walls was a bustling commercial hub to 
which Han Chinese elites were expelled from the Inner City by the Manchu 
newcomers, adding another social layer to the already complex area. Apart 
from legal commerce (the area is still home to many traditional stores and 
workshops), Qianmen was famous for its iniquitous establishments ranging 
from opium dens to brothels. As the Communist forces took Beijing, Qianmen 
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changed forever; during the big clean-up in 1949, most brothels were closed 
and the prostitutes sent off to be re-educated - an early sign of things yet to 
come (Smith, 2013). The relative poverty of the area also meant is was one of 
the most preserved, if dilapidated, parts of old Beijing, but by the mature 
reform era it had also become Beijing’s most apparent slum. Overcrowded and 
marred by poor hygiene, hazardous construction and a thriving business of 
renting tiny rooms to ‘illegal’ migrants from the countryside, Qianmen has been 
the target of several redevelopment programmes. 
 
SOHO China, one of Beijing’s premium developers known for hiring foreign 
‘starchitects’ such as Zaha Hadid, has been hoping to acquire over 130,000 
square meters of land in 33 parcels to be redeveloped into a commercial area 
with a mix of preservation and faux-Qing style architecture (Toh, 2009). The 
project, which was squarely within the area designated for heritage 
conservation in 2004, was criticised heavily by heritage advocacy groups for 
the apparent destruction of heritage and its replacement with a sanitised space 
‘which completes the state vision for Beijing, that of a modern city with a past’ 
(Layton, 2007). SOHO was ultimately awarded less than half of the initial 
redevelopment rights, although it remains unclear whether this was due to 
heritage concerns or a tightening of national policy on the overheating real-
estate market (Johnson and Leow, 2008). Even in its reduced scope, the 
redevelopment of Qianmen became a ‘negative example’ for the historical 
preservationist movement, as the old commercial street was finally 
reconstructed in faux-Qing architecture, and populated with brand such as 
Zara, H&M, Häagen-Dazs, in time for the 2008 Olympic Games. Moreover, the 
area as a whole is still being redeveloped at a considerable pace. 
Although certainly reminiscent of Kaohsiung’s own effort at historicising space 
through demolition and reconstruction, the crucial difference remains in the 
intertwining of state and business interest in Beijing’s case, which has 
supplanted the previous model of state-led redevelopment used at nearby 
Liulichang. There, a central government led renovation occurred during the 
1980s, when over eighteen million RMB was invested in the area to recreate 
the Qing-dynasty storefronts (Sun, 2010). 
 
 227 
Hutongs as a space of micro-politics 
Beijing’s other ‘up and coming’ creative neighbourhood, Gulou, suggests the 
local municipalities are still often unwilling to work closely with non-state actors 
other than large developers. Thus, although a high degree of imitation and 
incorporation of general notions about the value of culture and preservation in 
redevelopment is taking place, this happens without the costly and time-
consuming legwork that has been the hallmark of successful redevelopment or 
regeneration projects. An example of this is the ‘Time Cultural City’ project, 
commissioned by Dongcheng District and entrusted to a Sino-American 
designer group, the Boston International Design Group. According to the 
Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Center (BJCHP), an NGO based in the 
neighbourhood, the proposed plan was in danger of repeating the destruction 
wrought on Qianmen, resulting in a marginal upgrade of living standards 
alongside irreversible damage to the area’s historical, environmental and 
commercial value, not to mention that the chosen contractor had no 
experience in historic preservation (Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Center: 
2010). 
 
At the other end of the scape, the Gulou area has also seen a grassroots 
revitalization effort, mainly in the form of small NGOs, studios and other spaces 
which have contributed to a kind of burgeoning of culture-creative spaces 
closer to Brooklyn’s Williamsburg or London’s Shoreditch, where a steady flow 
of creative industry-related offices has changed the once economically 
depressed neighbourhoods into by-words for creative or culture-led renewal. 
While the Gulou area is peppered with design studios, clothing stores, 
architecture offices and alternative venues such as the Zajia Lab, housed in a 
disused Taoist Temple, one particular project space encapsulates the potential 
for community-led redevelopment and reflection on Beijing’s hutongs. 
HomeShop, a ‘storefront residence and artist initiative’ as their online 
presentation states, was opened in 2008 in an old hutong alleyway not far from 
the old Gulou towers. HomeShop was established with an explicit intention of 
fostering private/public collaboration as an exploration of the ‘micropolitical’ 
life of the neighbourhood. In practice, HomeShop engaged both with the local 
residents as well as acted as an entry point for newcomers from the creative 
industries and art. Stemming from ethnographic fieldwork conducted during 
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my two-week stay there, HomeShop can be described as a node, connecting 
disparate actors and creating a practice-based community. While their actions 
are dwarfed by big redevelopment projects, an example of their work is the 
organisation of the Games 2008 project, which invited neighbouring residents 
to participate in a Wii console games projected on a screen in the street. Such 
small interventions into the ‘lived space’ of Beijing’s neighbourhoods may have 
a limited effect; HomeShop ultimately closed in 2014 after the landlord of its 
second location increased the rent threefold after the expiration of their lease, 
somewhat ironic considering part of the increase can be attributed to rising 
demand for hutong living. What remains however are the connections and 
networks emerging from such spaces; the presence of epistemic communities 
of spatial professionals is a crucial element in the corporative spatial 
production in Taipei for example, and the case of the Takao Renaissance 
Association in Kaohsiung equally demonstrates the potential mobilizational 
power stemming from innocuous-looking shared community spaces. 
 
Simultaneously, the Beijing government has also adopted policies aimed at 
creating a culture-creative cluster in the old part of the city, or ‘culture service 
function zones’, as the language of the 12th Five-Year plan puts it. Apart from 
exhortations to build a ‘spiritual compass’ for the citizens, the plan is 
remarkably clear cut in its approach: the marketization of cultural institutions 
into enterprises, experimental zones for painting, art and fashion, the creation 
of an art market and the development of cultural and creative tourism all attest 
to the entrepreneurial approach the municipal government is taking in its 
efforts to transform the old city into a culture-creative zone. (The Twelfth Five-
Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of Beijing, 2011). 
Speaking with HomeShop’s Michael Eddy (one of the its organisers) however, 
evidence of this on the ground seemed to have been sparse at the time: 
“We knew it was amiss, but the larger examples kind of seemed like pork-barrel 
projects rather than viable initiatives. But it was also ‘natural’ gentrification to 
some degree, as many architecture firms and creative offices really preferred 
such spaces in which to work.” (Michael Eddy, HomeShop organiser. Personal 
communication, 28 April 2014) 
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Eddy’s remarks highlight the recurring theme of gentrification, which has 
become closely associated with market-led demographic changes in creative 
or ‘arty’ neighbourhoods. In many ways, Beijing’s central areas are 
simultaneously exhibiting many features associated with gentrification (or 
different ‘stages’ of it), although the term must be used carefully here. 
Gentrification in the hutongs is both extremely uneven, as well as not always 
market-led in Beijing, prompting observers to talk of redevelopment instead. 
Indeed the question of what may or may not constitute gentrification in the field 
of historic preservation is not a simple one; just as Herzfeld (2010) insists on 
links between gentrification and historic preservation on the cases of Greece, 
Italy, and Thailand, so Potuoglu-Cook (2006) sees gentrification in the 
neoliberalization of night-time space in Istanbul. The loose definition of 
gentrification which has been applied to processes as varied as those 
mentioned above may rather be described as forms of biopolitics, intervening 
in the demographics and daily lives of the target population. To avoid such a 
problematic, gentrification is here treated merely as a specific mode of spatial 
development dependent on the use of cultural as well as other capital to 
instigate long-lasting and self-reinforcing changes. It is therefore a subordinate 
process to the re-evaluation of culture as an asset and the commodification of 
urban space.  
 
Discussions over the technicalities of whether gentrification in Beijing is a real-
estate led supplanting of poorer residents with newcomer ‘gentry’ or whether it 
is a top-down development scheme that is encouraging the demographic and 
economic change are highly relevant, yet the situation in Beijing’s hutongs 
seems to fit both criteria. As the municipal government moves toward a 
marketization and privatization of cultural institutions, so it reinforces the 
understanding of culture as capital, as well as the shift in approaching 
questions of urban space through the mechanism of the market  - even when it 
operates within the state’s institutions. Gentrification presents itself mainly as a 
lens through which the hutongs’ new residents understand the changes in their 
surroundings: from cafe-owners, small galleries and other ‘well-intentioned 
BoBos’, to borrow the Eddy’s term. Ultimately however, the question central to 
both the artist clusters as well as more recent transformations in the hutongs 
has to do with the capacity and style of governance of the state, as well as the 
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capacity of the groups involved at being taken into account. While clusters 
such as 798 Art Zone or Songzhuang have veered from autonomy to 
commercialisation and integration into the state discourse on creativity, the 
spatially fractured nature of central Beijing precludes easy solutions, meaning 
all the actors involved have had to negotiate different, ad-hoc ways of 
producing creative spaces, though it remains to be seen whether they will 
amount to radically new developments or reinforce current trajectories of 
commercialisation and redevelopment by dispossession. 
 
Dashilar4 – the ‘platform’ as integration of non-governmental inputs in 
culture-led regeneration 
While the interplay of private and state initiatives analysed above have not yet 
led to any larger or more permanent collaborative projects between the 
dispersed groups of spatial professionals and the municipal state characteristic 
of Taiwan’s experience, the following case study on Dashilar highlights recent 
moves towards a platform-based approach to culture-led redevelopment in the 
old city. While the Qianmen area east of Qianmen Street has seen radical 
redevelopment stalled by last-minute concerns over heritage preservations, 
Dashilar has seen a less comprehensive, patchy approach made up of several 
typical modes of urban reconstruction, from large commercial projects formed 
by a collaboration of local government and big real-estate, to top-down efforts 
at historical preservation. Dashilar is a historic commercial area of around one 
square kilometre, bordered by Qianmen West Street to the north, Qianmen 
Street to the east, South Xinhua Street to the west, and Zhushikou West Street 
to the south. While areas such as Liulichang have become tourist attractions 
through large top-down preservation projects, much of central Dashilar has 
seen only piecemeal redevelopment mainly centred on its main thoroughfare. 
 
Apart from physical reconstruction projects, the area has been the target of 
central and local government policies on supporting traditional shops to cater 
for increasingly large tourist inflow. Using the ‘time-honoured brand’ or 
laozihao (⽼老字号) designation scheme created by the central government, the 
                                                
 
4 “Dashilar” refers to the local pronounciation of what is called ‘Dazhalan’ in standard 
Mandarin. The vernacular is used here as it was also used on both the Dashila(b) and 
Dashilar Platform projects.  
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Xicheng local government also launched its own initiative. As Beijing’s old 
commercial district, quite a few of the laozihao are located around Dashilar, 
prompting the district to issue a directive to protect and support the time-
honoured brands in Xicheng. The directive, while ostensibly aimed at 
preserving or rekindling skills and crafts lost during the Cultural Revolution, is 
more akin to a statist decree, stipulating areas of ‘support’ and 
‘encouragement’ such as administration, production, marketing, cultural value 
and human resources, outlining the areas in which the old businesses are to 
receive support in order to achieve rapid growth (Xicheng District People’s 
Government: 2011). The government-run scheme has predictably seen a move 
towards mass-production and a drop in quality, with many shop-owners told 
by state-appointed advisors to ramp-up production, even if it means shifting it 
to the suburbs. The directive also carries spatial considerations, especially due 
to the emphasis on categorising laozihao as part of the culture-creative offering 
of the city – through its rigid planning approach (stipulating that 50 or more 
shops must constitute a cluster; that they must be Chinese or ‘regionally’ 
owned, i.e. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwanese; that they must promote a 
‘Chinese way of life’ etc.) and faux-historicist facades mandated by the district 
government, the scheme has already significantly altered the Shichahai area 
west of the Forbidden City with miles of identikit ‘traditional shops’ satisfying 
demand for cheap souvenirs, many of which are owned by Taiwanese 
investors. While not directly connected to the production of creative spaces in 
the area, such policies have important repercussions in limiting the boundaries 
of the possible and the expected; one such development increases the 
likelihood of similar projects being done in other parts of the district, as policy-
makers rely on familiar ways of upgrading old neighbourhoods. 
 
Amid this heterodox redevelopment and regeneration, a new platform-based 
project “Dashila(b)”, jointly founded by Guang’an Holdings (the local state 
asset management company for Xicheng District), its subsidiary Beijing 
Dashilar Investment Limited, and Beijing-based architectural firm Approach 
Architecture, began operating in 2009. While the scope of their work is small in 
comparison to some of the projects mentioned above (such as SOHO China’s 
Qianmen Avenue), the case was selected due to its comparative value with the 
URS project in Taipei (see chapter 2.2), which similarly employs a targeted, 
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plot-by-plot approach, rather than comprehensively redeveloping the whole 
area. In contrast to URS however, Dashila(b) was a public-private partnership 
outside of the municipal planning department. While following Xicheng 
District’s vision for developing cultural heritage as its unique selling point, the 
format was agreed informally through meetings between the local authorities 
and the architecture firm. The entire initiative was thus an ad-hoc, limited time 
project: while the integration of private initiative and know-how was 
characterised by a corporative approach in Taiwan, the case of Dashilar points 
towards an altogether different approach, one characterised by the state as an 
entrepreneurial actor; once the concept and basic workings have been set up 
by Dashila(b) however, the municipal state promptly transferred the project 
under its full control, renaming it to Dashilar Platform, while keeping the bulk of 
the activities (and know-how) intact. 
 
The main concept behind Dashila(b) was finding an efficient way to redevelop 
the area in the presence of two policy imperatives: heritage preservation and 
upgrading of infrastructure. The decay of the area was thought to be largely 
ascribable to fragmented and complicated property rights; while business 
premises and family-owned houses were on the whole better maintained, 
those owned by the city were mostly in extremely bad condition. Due to the 
structure of rental agreements between the Beijing Municipal Commission of 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development and its tenants, unauthorised upgrades 
by the tenants are not be compensated in the case of resettlement, meaning 
there is no financial incentive for the already poor residents to invest in their 
rented properties. Adding to this the immigration pressure from the 
countryside, many such properties have furthermore been sub-divided and 
sub-let, further compromising the survival of a coherent ‘community’, which 
was the notion an initiative such as Dashila(b). 
 
While a wholesale redevelopment may have been possible in previous years, 
the creeping realisation of the (economic and cultural) value of China’s historic 
urban fabric has allowed alternative ways of redevelopment to take hold in 
municipal offices. Much like the cases of Treasure Hill in Taipei, or Hamasen in 
Kaohsiung, the effectiveness of a community-based heritage and revival efforts 
was however dependent as much on state capacity as it was on the existence 
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of community networks. Although attendance by local residents was relatively 
encouraging, the project ultimately progressed towards a model of art-led 
redevelopment, as the tie-in with the Beijing Design Week had demonstrated. 
As a project-based initiative, Dashila(b) serves as a good case study of the 
evolving nature of spatial reconfiguration in central Beijing beyond the usual 
wrecking ball approach. Any enthusiasm here must be tempered by the size of 
this case study, which pales in comparison to the extensive redevelopment of 
historical neighbourhoods into luxury housing or premium office space; nor 
would it be entirely correct to say Dashila(b) has succeeded in empowering the 
community of residents, many of which are tenants to absentee landlords 
chasing large compensation awards rather than the painstaking work of 
regeneration by involvement (Dashila(b) project staff; Interview, 3 June 2013). 
 
From being a relatively small and experimental project, the current scope of 
Dashilar Platform is considerably wider; from 2011, the involvement of Beijing 
Design Week (BJDW), organised by another municipal investment company, 
Gehua from Dongcheng District, has considerably expanded the international 
reach of the work. From hosting around 20 venues at the 2012 event, the 
Dashilar Platform has been considerably upgraded, both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms: from hiring the prestigious Japanese designer Kenya Hara 
to design its visual identity, to its presentation at the 2014 Venice Architecture 
Biennale. Guang’an Holdings and by implication the Xicheng district authorities 
have enthusiastically adopted the model of the art/creative led as its own. In 
essence, much of the work and stated purpose remain the same and are 
indeed based on the work done by the now defunct Dashila(b), with community 
building and art-led redevelopment remaining the key differentiating point of 
Dashilar in comparison to other Beijing hutongs. The cooperation with the 
private sector can in this light be seen as an exercise in which the municipality 
acquired the tools of governance needed for a culture-led redevelopment 
project meant to showcase the novelty, modernity and cultural acumen of 
Beijing’s central district. At the same time, neither the municipality nor the 
private partner were able to sustain the co-operative relationship beyond a 
pilot project, not only due to quotidian friction, but largely through the lack of a 
willingness by the state to devolve responsibility for any permanent spatial 
changes to a body outside of its control. Despite this however, the method or 
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concept used by Dashila(b) remains in favour, as evidenced though the 
municipality own, district-run endeavour. Looking at this from a general level, 
the form of the platform has emerged as a mode of operationalizing 
community-focused, culture-led redevelopment initiatives into the wider 
institutional network of Beijing’s central city authorities. By adopting an open, 
looser approach, the municipality was in the case of Dashila(b) able to engage 
the cultural and human ‘capital’ of the private sector while retaining ultimate 
control. At the same time, horizontal links through project-based work (such as 
with BJDW) have enabled the Dashilar Platform to transcend the narrow scope 
of the district, becoming one of the few Chinese exhibits at the Venice biennale 
in 2014. 
 
The parallels with the case of Treasure Hill (Chapter Three), offer an opportunity 
for an analysis of differing modes of governance, different approaches to the 
production of (creative) space in Taiwan and China. Although many of the given 
circumstances are similar (historical yet dilapidated housing, immigrant area, 
redevelopment through community organisation, the use of art/culture to spur 
the revival of the area), significant differences have emerged in the state as well 
as society response to the challenges of redeveloping fragile urban 
environments. Whereas Treasure Hill was originally a non-governmental (or 
even counter-governmental) initiative that had been integrated into the city 
cultural bureaucracy through a community of spatial professionals, the Dashilar 
Platform has its roots in a joint venture between a private firm, a state-owned 
holding company, and the municipal government. Even after the genuinely 
non-governmental partner had left however, Dashilar Platform has retained the 
outside appearance of a private-public partnership; the Xicheng district can be 
seen here both as the private investor (through its holding company) and 
regulator (as the municipal authority). In effect, the local cadres are wearing 
two hats at the same time, a situation mostly examined in the context of 
corruption (cf. Zhao et al. 2009; Burns, 1993; Kolenda, 1990), but which also 
has specific effect for the adaptation of the creative city discourse and culture-
led redevelopment. Unlike Taiwan, where the state has emulated and 
integrated private sector practices (be they for profit or not), the Xicheng 
District has activated an ‘in-house’ private actor through a temporary platform-
based cooperation with external, non-governmental practices. This is of utmost 
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importance in answering questions on the style of governance as well as the 
ability to do so; while open to the transfer of skills and practices from outside 
the state, the tendency in Xicheng (as well as in Caochangdi) has been to 
ultimately attempt to recreate the ‘template’ from within the expanded state, 
using its many guises and manifestations as actors to populate a public-private 
partnership. While Keane (2009b) outlines the search for a perfect model or 
template as a key idea in China, the question remains as to how the 
mechanism of transfer, of interaction between the non-state and state levels 
actually operates. The case of Dashila(b)/Dashilar Platform may be small, but it 
fits the criteria for the exploration of this mechanism, from joint venture to joint 
venture in name only.  
 
Lastly, any comparison of Dashilar with Treasure Hill or Hamasen in Kaohsiung 
cannot but pause at the question of heritage and its role in both art/culture-led 
redevelopment and the adoption of the creative city discourse in general. While 
all three cities have vastly differing historical heritage, all three have identified in 
this spatial heritage a cultural capital that can be utilised to promote or 
increase the city’s competitiveness, shifting heritage from a specialised field of 
preservation and conservation to the contested field of urban redevelopment. 
Despite this seeming universality of purpose however, both Taiwanese cases 
are distinguished by a highly politicised discourse on heritage and identity that 
is characteristic of the island nation’s political climate. Consequently, art, 
culture, and creativity strategies can be used to legitimate the preservation of 
heritage, draw in the political community and ultimately achieve state 
recognition (and funds). Conversely, the position of heritage preservation within 
the production of creative spaces in Beijing is almost reverse, as culture and 
creativity strategies present a way to make heritage preservation profitable: 
areas which have had the (mis)fortune of being placed under protection have a 
limited set of options for development, so culture-creative initiatives are fast 
becoming a viable policy alternative to tourism. How far such a ‘bohemian’ 
regeneration can lead is however a question this work cannot answer; 
certainly, the openness of local cadres and the level of engagement by 
municipal holding companies bode well for funding levels. On the other hand, it 
may be precisely this increased attention that stifles Beijing’s ‘hutong chic’ 
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through a combination of market and state phenomena such as gentrification 
or planned clustering. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
 
Although urban redevelopment in Beijing is as much a top-down state-led 
process as it is elsewhere, the practice of devolving practical responsibility to 
nominally private enterprises owned or co-owned by municipal bodies has 
become commonplace and has accelerated the commodification of space, as 
well as created an entrepreneurial approach to the production of urban spaces, 
i.e. one in which the state(s), businesses and NGOs all compete on the land 
market. The adoption of the neoliberal formulas of public-private partnership 
may serve to attract private capital in the form of joint ventures, but may 
equally serve as a vehicle for municipalities to capture profits from 
redevelopment projects and further their particular developmental goals as 
they engage in competition with each other. Following the success of 
Chaoyang District’s many creative clusters, 798 Art Zone being the foremost, 
both central districts (Xicheng and Dongcheng) have included goals of setting 
up culture-creative industry clusters in their own plans. Both are furthermore 
keen on using existing ‘cultural capital’ as a basis on which to promote place-
making projects, yet their commitment also seems periodic, with bursts of 
activity followed by long lulls. While the iteration of creativity in the plans and 
policies issued by them is clearly present, the institutional framework, the way 
of doing creativity seems to be in flux. To illustrate, both districts have also 
established private enterprises dedicated to the culture-creative industry which 
act as sources of investment and real-estate developers; yet the extent to 
which these enterprises are able to act as producers of creative spaces is 
contingent on the success or failure of attracting outside involvement (be it 
domestic or international) to compensate for the highly rigid, utilitarian view of 
culture-creative industries held by the municipal bodies. 
 
Secondly and in relation to the point made above, a question arises to what 
extent grassroots initiatives and organisations dealing with urban 
redevelopment, reuse and regeneration are participating in the districts’ stated 
intentions. While the vitality and sheer number of small initiatives, groups and 
nascent institutions dedicated to aspects of urban regeneration in central 
Beijing is remarkable, the interpenetration of state and society (or rather, this 
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segment of society) remains the exception rather than the rule. While the 
Taiwanese cases, and in particular Taipei, are distinguished by a high degree 
of co-operation, with many spatial professionals simultaneously serving as civil 
society leaders as well as municipal planners, employees or consultants, a 
more competitive configuration already seen in peripheral art clusters is likely 
to hamper such co-operation. While festival-type events, such as the Beijing 
Design Week, help to establish practical connections between the municipal, 
business and creative leaders, it remains to be seen what lasting effect they 
will have in altering already entrenched ways of treating urban space primarily 
as a source of income. At best, they provide a way for non-state actors to 
obtain access to the full support of the state for the duration of the event. After 
the spotlights are gone however, even the relatively successful pilot project in 
Dashilar has consistently had to address the ‘pressure to redevelop’, which 
emanates not only from the state or real estate groups, but is fuelled by the 
expectation of financial benefit by hutong residents eager to secure a lucrative 
resettlement deal as well. The commodification of space (not only ‘land’) has 
permeated down to the level of the hutong, making grassroots, community-led 
initiatives which incorporate some aspect of art or culture very difficult to 
organise. 
 
While many smaller actors such as HomeShop or even Caochangdi have for 
long remained ‘under the radar’ of a municipality used to dealing with 
hyperbolic projects such as the Olympics, the recent move towards the 
entrepreneurialization of creative space production may yet provide the 
municipal authorities with the tools to produce, manipulate and co-opt such 
smaller spaces. The entrepreneurial approach, based on an integration of the 
market as the mechanism of veridiction, has so far resulted in several 
strategies aimed at harnessing ‘creativity’ as an economic asset. At the lowest 
level of the state, an emulation and reproduction of village-level clusters such 
as Caochangdi has meant self-organised and peripheral creative spaces are 
being incorporated into the village’s developmental strategy: here, creative 
spaces can be understood as but another industrial sector or activity available 
to village enterprises. At the municipal level, the case of 798 Art Zone illustrates 
how state protection of creative spaces may subject them to commercializing 
pressures, while the cases of Beijing’s historical neighbourhoods highlight the 
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reinterpretation of heritage as capital via the introduction of a globalised 
discourse on creative strategies such as adaptive reuse, bohemian quarters 
and gentrification, all of which have fused with received wisdoms on 
redevelopment, clustering and creative zones. At this level, the use of creative 
strategies takes on an additional dimension as a part of a national effort to 
develop China’s cultural power. As such, it is analogous to the invocation of 
‘identity’ in Taiwan’s case, yet set aside by the market-based allocation of 
resources to the creative zones in question. Whereas the Taiwanese cases 
have exhibited a tendency towards institutionalization within the state (as a 
museum, as public infrastructure, as governmental bodies etc.), Beijing’s 
creative spaces are more akin to industrial clusters on one hand, and isolated 
enclaves on the other. As the example of Dashilar shows however, the 
entrepreneurial local state has of late begun incorporating the know-how and 
experience of smaller private initiatives; whether these in turn will influence the 
state however, remains to be seen. 
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Conclusion: Governing Creativity in a New 
Policy Field 
 
 
 
 
Governing between discourse and spatialization 
 
The operationalization of creativity in the selected case cities of Taiwan and 
China was examined through the optic of the production of space to better 
account for the many dispersed and often-invisible ways in which changing 
constellations of actors influenced urban space. These practices interrupted 
both the norms of statist planning and the long tradition of citizens ignoring 
them, and have found a clear expression in the production of creative spaces, 
which by definition involve a closer interaction of various state institutions with 
stakeholders such as artists, community organisers, elderly residents, 
shopkeepers and sometimes even unsavoury elements from the fringes of 
society. Being a new field of policy as well as a new set of solutions to long-
standing problems of urban blight, there was from the outset an expectation 
that some degree of institution building was under way. What was however not 
expected was the sheer number of ways and minute differences in which 
seemingly identical planning and policy solutions would find their spatial 
expression.  
 
Measured against a set of criteria such as scale, types of institutional links to 
the state, types of involvement with stakeholders and civil society groups, the 
level of business involvement, the presence of conflict, and the types of funding 
arrangements, it is indeed fair to say there are nearly as many ways of ‘doing 
creativity’ as there are sites. To an extent, this has presented a great obstacle 
to the analysis of the spaces in terms of the kind of repeatable, transferable 
findings that a political inquiry of this sort should produce. On the other hand, 
the contingency of the outcomes speaks volumes about the nature of the field; 
the cases are not so multifarious because the case selection was too loose, but 
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rather because the overarching policy discourse is vague, experimental, and 
contested. As a new and often ill-defined area of political action (understood 
here as action which determines the ways in which future action shall be taken), 
creative space production is subject to path-dependencies originating from 
several directions: received economic wisdom on clustering, the continued role 
of the state as mediator and infrastructure provider, the preoccupation with 
autonomy typical of Chinese artists and dependence on the state in Taiwan, or 
the influence and authority of epistemic communities of spatial professionals as 
they are integrated into the institutions of spatial production. All these have had 
to be taken into consideration when constructing an argument about which 
tendencies are emerging, which practices are proving to be more resilient, and 
which are addressing the widest number of local concerns. Through the 
empirical research conducted in the three cities, bewildering and somewhat 
contradictory results emerged; just as commonalities in the mentality and 
assumptions regarding creative spaces on the macro level piled up, so did 
evidence to the contrary on the micro level of inquiry, suggesting a large 
diversity of outcomes which defied neat categorization by political system and 
level of economic development (structure), or by the proficiency of civil society 
activists (agency).  
 
All of the cases examined in Chapters Three to Seven are to an extent 
characterised by this tension, suggesting an intermediary level of analysis may 
be an appropriate site to account for the apparent disconnect between a 
coherent discourse on creativity and the diverse spatialization (or 
implementation) of this very discourse. Throughout the examination of creative 
spaces in Taipei, Kaohsiung and Beijing, several themes have emerged around 
which this intermediate level can be conceptualised – state capacity, the ability 
of stakeholders to influence or ignore state activity, as well as the ways in 
which creative space policies have fared in the integration of marginal space 
into the city mainstream. This intermediate space of action cannot however be 
understood without either the apparent placid surface of macro-narratives or 
the ‘messiness’ of the micro-political activity of daily life; it emerges into view 
when understood relationally. Thus, while state capacity (a central theme of this 
research) is certainly dependent on the institutional framework or accrued 
know-how, it cannot easily be measured independently of the ability of the 
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targeted population to circumvent, ignore, adapt or participate in the projection 
of the state’s power. Faced with this problem, this chapter will firstly lay out the 
commonalities at the macro level, moving down to the multitude of micro-level 
outcomes, before outlining the argument for a typology to be constructed in the 
interspace between the two.  
 
 
Macro-level commonalities  
 
1. Coherence of creative city discourse 
While the notion of creativity has throughout been interrogated as a vague 
concept covering several modalities of implementation, there exists 
nevertheless a significant coherence across the three different case cities, 
spanning both the divide between China and Taiwan, as well as that between 
different levels and institutions of the state, such as central government 
ministries, municipal bureaux, village or township administrations, as well as 
public bodies such as museums, development agencies, or state-owned 
enterprises. At its most fundamental level, all of the state actors appear to have 
internalised to a certain extent the narrative of post-industrialism and its relation 
to the creative economy. Even when this concern is not overt, the tactics of 
stakeholders engaged in negotiations over urban redevelopment projects 
revealed the effectiveness of appeals to an overarching narrative about the 
economic value of creativity: Li Xiangqun’s proposals for the protection of the 
nascent creative community of 798 Art Zone in Beijing in Chapter Six, the ability 
to conflate historic preservation and creativity at Treasure Hill in Chapter Three, 
or the way in which the Takao Renaissance Association deftly reframed the 
debate on preservation in terms of policy concerns about Kaohsiung as a 
tourist destination. All these are examples of the successful framing of petitions 
and requests within the creative city discourse, which the regulating authorities 
had evidently agreed with.  
 
Another remarkable commonality found at the macro level is the paucity of 
canonical works informing the beliefs of many state actors responsible for the 
implementation of creative city policies. The overwhelming presence of two 
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names, Richard Florida and Charles Landry, was not evident only in interviews 
with local officials and planning experts, but could be inferred more or less 
directly from decisions taken at the highest levels of the city, which was most 
obvious in the case of Taipei’s choice of ‘creative city consultant’, where only 
the aforementioned authors were considered, and the latter eventually chosen 
due to concerns over the former’s fees. The influence of the creative city 
discourse is further seen in the way in which it had been transposed into local 
discussion on creativity, both inside and outside of policy circles. Just as 
China’s own creativity guru Li Wuwei adapted Florida’s ‘creative class’ into a 
‘creative society’, so municipal policy-speak also began using similar terms, as 
the Five Year Plans of Dongcheng District cited in Chapter Seven illustrate. The 
question that needs to be answered is not so much whether this coherence 
exists – ample proof for this has been documented in previous chapters – but 
also why it exists. The research locates this in two further commonalities found 
across the research sites: the introduction of free-market reforms in the sphere 
of urban planning and politics, and the opening up of urban politics to the 
influence of epistemic communities and stakeholders which were previously 
excluded.  
 
Marketization and competitiveness  
While the withdrawal of the state from comprehensive management of urban 
affairs in Taiwan and China is certainly one of the key macro-economic shifts 
affecting the distribution of resources in the city, the accompanying process of 
cultural and economic globalization has only accentuated the idea of 
competitiveness, which pervades much of the thinking on the use of creative 
city strategies. This is seen not only in the adoption of policies meant to 
improve the city’s economic or cultural standing, but also in the adoption of the 
methods of doing and measuring this standing. A point to make here, and one 
already discussed in Chapter Two, is that no matter what agency we may 
subscribe to leadership structures (e.g. ‘neoliberal reform only entered China 
because the Party allowed it’; ‘municipal authorities only use city rating 
schemes to attract investment’), the adoption of free market reforms and 
ensuing reliance on the market as a mechanism of distribution as well as a site 
of veridiction alters the ‘rules of the game’; in other words, adopting free market 
reforms is likely to alter the expectations and framing assumptions employed. A 
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relevant feature of this shift is the re-evaluation of culture and art as an 
economic activity, which has allowed creative city strategies to be pursued on 
a much greater scale, as well as having unleashed the consuming power of the 
citizenry, leading to an ever-greater demand also for cultural goods. In this 
positive feedback mechanism, when spaces made for consumption by newly 
interested citizenry are successful, they trigger yet more investment into 
cultural infrastructure, spurred on by the inflating value of the discourse on 
creativity as the lifeblood of the new economy. Whether this may result in 
‘culture bubbles’ ultimately bursting like the proverbial inflatable duck, is not a 
question this research can answer, yet it remains one of the motivations for 
further study of the ways in which creativity is being implemented.  
 
Necessity of negotiation 
Lastly, another common feature joins the three cases cities, as well as two 
countries: the necessity of negotiation. To a large extent, this can be seen as a 
function of free market reform; as the state withdraws from the provision of 
comprehensive services, so non-state actors become involved in areas 
previously firmly on the state’s turf. Yet this was found to be only one scenario. 
In all three cases, the dynamics of state-stakeholder relations were not 
unidirectional, as the state in fact ‘rolled-out’ as often as it rolled-back: the 
examples of 798 Art Zone, Huashan in Taipei, and Pier-2 Art Center in 
Kaohsiung all exemplify the state stepping in rather than stepping out. This 
dynamic necessitates negotiation with stakeholders, which may take the form 
of ad-hoc collaborations (such as a ‘platform’ or the hiring of consultants) or 
permanent bodies such as municipal committees. Here, the concept of 
‘expertise’ used by Miller and Rose (2008) is useful to identify agents with a 
particular social authority: planners, architects, urban scholars and consultants 
have already become the ‘go-to authorities’ in Taiwan, while their role in China 
is also moving in a similar direction, as cases such as Dashila(b) show. The 
opening up of urban policy to non-state groups is however accompanied by a 
renewed and extended interest of the state into the governance of 
communities, which differs from the high-modernist governing of society in 
many ways, though only one bears relevance at this point, the spatiality of 
community as opposed to the abstract plain of society. The ideas of 
community and creative space intersect especially in marginal urban spaces 
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under redevelopment. Here, in this contested field, groups such as residents’ 
committees (seen in Kaohsiung and Taipei, and in embryonic forms in Beijing), 
professional groups or loose and informal assemblages of actors all become 
potentially important in determining the outcomes of creative policy 
implementation, at the same time that they become the object of governmental 
interest. As such, determining their capacity, autonomy and strategies was a 
crucial line of inquiry in the construction of a typology of creative spaces.  
 
Micro-level diversity  
 
One of the more surprising and challenging findings of the research was 
doubtless the wealth and variation of ways to produce creative space. 
Seemingly defying received notions of categorization by size, political system, 
or class, the many practices encountered and documented during the research 
exhibit a contingent complexity. The variations and specific mixes that occur in 
the production of creative spaces, explored in the empirical chapters of this 
research, suggest negotiations and outcomes are as numerous as the number 
of projects themselves. Several questions were raised by this, the first of which 
relates to a possible mis-reading of the cause for complexity as ‘heroic agency’ 
of the actors involved. The discussion on the agency and autonomy of (elite) 
artists and groups in Beijing versus those in Taiwan has been discussed in 
Chapters Six and Seven as a potential cause for the emergence of more 
entrepreneurial and competitive approaches to creative space production in 
Beijing. However, this should not be taken as heroic agency, where a small 
number of actors is ascribed a disproportionately large policy shadow. When 
comparing the outcomes reached by actors such as Margaret Shiu in Taipei 
(see Chapters Three and Four), or Ai Weiwei in Beijing (see Chapters Six and 
particularly Seven), the commonalities pertaining to their relative autonomy and 
their shared antagonism toward the state fail to account for the divergent paths 
their models of creative space production are taking. While the former was 
instrumental in a state-stakeholder rapprochement and eventual 
institutionalization of practices of adaptive reuse, the other is to be found 
outside the state – although Caochangdi village has eagerly emulated, albeit in 
a simplified way, the practices of spatial production associated with the latter. 
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Clearly, there was need here to look at the interspace between spatial 
manifestations and arrangements at the micro level, and discourse and policy 
at the macro level.  
 
Moreover, the large number of creative space models which have already 
extinguished (the artist commune at Treasure Hill; the independent artists-
tenants of pre-2007 798 Art Zone) or face an uncertain future (such as some 
URS locations in Taipei, community-led initiatives in Kaohsiung, many of the 
yet unincorporated artist villages or hutong networks in Beijing), underline the 
need to look not only at the successes, but also attempts and failures to 
establish new ways of producing creative spaces. In essence, the investigation 
of success and failure is what Lawrence et al. call ‘institutional work’ i.e. 
creating, maintaining or disrupting institutions (Lawrence et al., 2011). An 
example illustrating how such processes were traced is the organizational 
pattern of the ‘platform’, the use of which has researched both in Taipei and 
Beijing, and where significant project-specific variations have been found. The 
URS platform was a transferal of non-state practices of a private art foundation 
into the realm of municipal action, wherein these practices were grafted onto 
previous institutional arrangements and used as an entry point for non-state 
initiatives to obtain public funding and support – a sort of ‘policy plug-in’. The 
Dashila(b) platform in Beijing was a joint project from the outset, yet the 
organizational pattern of the platform ultimately enabled the state-owned 
holding company to develop, via a transferal of skills and even personnel, the 
putative ‘private’ partner to which the production of creative space was 
entrusted. The institutional work of the discarded original private actor, though 
potentially considered as a failure, nevertheless provides the explanatory edge 
against which similar organizational patters can be judged not only in terms of 
that actor’s specific capacity, but also certain preferences of the state partner: 
in this case a preference to maintain a clear vertical flow of power. 
 
Another case, that of the intersections of creative space strategies and heritage 
preservation, similarly presented a larger than expected number of outcomes. 
While sites in all three cities were cast by the municipal actors in a similar 
fashion, emphasizing the cultural capital of historic architectural space and its 
importance to the construction of creative capital in line with the commonalities 
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outlined above, they nevertheless resulted in three hugely distinct ways of 
negotiating and ultimately producing this space. The museumification of 
Treasure Hill and historicization of Gongyuan Road in Kaohsiung present 
significantly different outcomes, as does the widespread use of ‘faux 
preservation’1 in Beijing. The particular mix of framing assumptions and 
stakeholders’ actions has also produced divergent results when the question of 
‘authenticity’ is concerned, which is especially interesting given the propensity 
of local actors to understand such changes as a process of gentrification, 
whether or not this is the case. As suggested in Chapter Five, the process of 
urban renewal in Kaohsiung has amounted more to a ‘deproletarization’ than a 
market-led demographic change, while the upgrading of hutongs in Beijing can 
be understood using ‘rent gap’ theory either as gentrification or a form of 
endogenous upgrading benefitting the extant residents. Thus, using classic 
heuristic tools (gentrification being a typical example) has not always yielded 
neat groups or cleavages, yet again underlining the need for a tailored 
approach.   
 
The profound diversity of the solutions and outcomes – some successful and 
other not – aligns well with notions of creative space production as a new field 
of policy. In simultaneously exhibiting path dependencies as well as 
unexpected ‘jumps’ in the evolution of the institutions of creative space 
production, it suggests the attention to failure is as important as success. In 
some cases, only the study of continuing experimentation as a fluid and 
continuous process can outline which solutions are being favoured by which 
constellations of actors, under what structural inertia. While a longer timeframe 
would no doubt allow an ‘autopsy’ of this process to identify successful and 
failed approaches, this research will once more refer to Lefebvre. In his call to 
move beyond an urban post-mortem characteristic of urban studies, he urges 
against the study of what he calls the ‘spectre’ of the town, i.e. both as spectral 
breaking down of space into its components, as well as the study of the ghostly 
remains of what was once vibrant urbanity (Lefebvre, 2014: 804).  A 
construction of a typology of approaches based on unexpected and fluid 
                                                
 
1 The use of faux Qing or Ming Dynasty architecture to supplant original buildings, 
mainly to provide increased floor area and avoid the costs associated with renovation 
of historic architecture.  
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outcomes was therefore constructed in the relational space between the 
commonalities of discourse and the complex variety of the spaces which 
inhabit the physical as well as organizational level.  
 
 
Interspace tendencies  
 
The idea of looking at the ‘space’ between the commonalities of policy and the 
diversity of outcomes is not novel in itself. What sets this research apart is 
perhaps the it does so with a new and yet unformed field of policy, where the 
relative strengths not only of the state apparatuses of Taiwan and China, but 
the relative strengths of stakeholder and activist networks can be compared. 
This sub-national comparative approach resulted in what is essential a study of 
the organizational patterns and their relation to the physical manifestations of 
creative space. The in-depth ethnographic survey of these spaces has lead to 
three fundamental positions being formed, on the basis of which a typology of 
creative space was then constructed: that state capacity and style of 
governance matter; that the models of stakeholder organization matter, and 
that the field of creative city and its manifestation in space intersects with older, 
settled areas of urban policy such as the redevelopment of marginal space.  
 
From these findings, a typology of different approaches to the production of 
creative space was developed; not to provide a definitive or endlessly 
replicable theoretical device, but as a heuristic device which highlighted certain 
trends within what was found to be a highly complex and uneven landscape of 
policy failures and successes, or rather, on-going attempts to forge lasting 
institutions and make legitimate claims on urban space. By focusing on the 
interspace found in the mid-level of practice, it has been possible to construct 
a tentative typology pointing at potential links between selected criteria and 
outcomes visible in urban space. It has done so by looking at how three cities 
with similar cultural backgrounds and a history of related high-modernist 
planning are developing technologies of governing creative spaces, proposing 
these can be divided into a scheme of corporative, normative, and 
entrepreneurial technologies or approaches.  
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Going back to the original puzzle, namely how to account for the great number 
of ways that policies and discourse on creative space are operationalised on 
the ground, the research has argued that this diversity is best understood 
through the examination first of all of the style of governance, i.e. the 
willingness as well as the ability to incorporate stakeholders to varying degrees, 
particularly so for the Beijing case. To summarise, the research on Taipei has 
uncovered that an institutionalization of creative space production is underway, 
tracing its evolution from Treasure Hill to a more formalised, repeatable and 
hybrid institution under the leadership of the Urban Regeneration Office. In 
Kaohsiung however, the continuing presence of a more bureaucratic, dirigiste 
way of producing creative space was documented and linked to the 
municipality’s capacity in pushing through its vision of creative Kaohsiung 
independently of various stakeholder groups. Lastly, Beijing presented a case 
of a disaggregated state acting in a competitive environment, punctuated by 
sporadic top-down interventions. Clearly all three share certain traits which are 
best understood as a developmental path-dependency, but were nuanced by 
the practice of grassroots stakeholders as well as overarching narratives.  
 
The differences in the grassroots practices of spatial production form the 
second set of findings, which again present a set of interlocking cleavages; 
while both Taiwanese cases were set aside by the financial dependence of 
stakeholders on the state, the Beijing case was characterised by a globalised, 
autonomous community of artists who, while politically muted, had managed to 
carve out patterns of organization which significantly influenced the approach 
of state actors. Yet, a similarly influential community of non-state actors in 
Taipei also shaped the trajectory of creative space from Treasure Hill onwards, 
suggesting financial independence is merely one of the forms of autonomy 
which determine the stakeholders’ power and influence; professional autonomy 
seems to work just as well. That the ‘platform’ as an organizational form 
appears in these two cities should therefore not come as a surprise, 
considering it is defined as temporary collaboration between various actors that 
all benefit from each other’s involvement, yet lack the formalised structures for 
their co-operation. In Kaohsiung however, where a lack of organised societal 
groups able to participate in such a mode of producing creative space has 
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been identified, it is the state that has been attempting to emulate societal 
engagement, as the case of Pier-2 Art Center’s struggle against messy urban 
landscapes in Chapter Five vividly illustrates.  
 
Lastly, the question of marginal space has allowed for a limited extent of theory 
testing, seeing how the redevelopment of these areas using creative city 
strategies has brought into clearer focus the abilities and willingness of the 
state and stakeholders to negotiate new ways of producing creative spaces as 
a solution to urban decay or related challenges. Three resulting processes or 
mechanisms deserve particular attention: museumification (the hybridization of 
marginal and creative space into a municipal institution), 
deproletarization/historicization (the supplanting of marginal space using 
creative space) and gentrification (the market-led demographic and spatial shift 
caused by a rent-gap). These solutions, emerging respectively in Taipei, 
Kaohsiung and Beijing, have already begun influencing future development. 
Museumification thus reveals the patterns and tendencies of co-operation 
under municipal lead, deproletarization and historicization reveal patterns of 
top-down, normative attempts to alter urban space, and gentrification reveals 
entrepreneurial patterns of creative space/strategies as both a spatial fix and 
opportunity for investment. In Taipei, these patterns have resulted in the 
continued and intensifying use of mixed, hybrid projects in historic areas. In 
Kaohsiung, a reaction to the city’s use of creative and cultural narratives has 
resulted in community groups fighting demolition and redevelopment using 
normative terms about the city’s identity, while Beijing has seen both a bottom-
up ‘self-gentrification’ in the hutongs, as well as a continued revalorization of 
architectural and spatial capital for economic development.  
 
At least in this early stage, under the general rubric of what was tried, what 
worked and what failed, this research cannot predict with absolute certainty 
whether these approaches will continue to dominate the production of creative 
space. While Taipei’s case appears firmly on track to develop a set of 
corporative institutions of creative space production, Kaohsiung may well 
follow in its footsteps provided a more organised and autonomous citizenry 
begins iterating demands for greater involvement. Beijing potentially presents 
the most complex case, not least due to the large number of actors, both state 
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and non-state, as well as the dynamic pace of change and wider political 
considerations. Clearly, an insufficiently long timeframe within which the cases 
were researched stands out as the main weakness of the research. Looking 
beyond the first and second hurdles to their adoption as the accepted ‘ways of 
doing creativity’, it would be necessary to trace how these ways and patterns 
fare once the policy field settles. Whether this proliferation of styles continues 
in its diversity or whether the number of models of operationalizing creative 
space shrinks, remains a question for further research.  
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Appendix – Interview list 
 
Note: Interviewees wishing to remains anonymous have been given names 
alphabetically from common Chinese surnames, e.g. “Mrs. Ai”, “Mr. Bai” etc.  
 
Interviewee Affiliation Date and location 
Chen, Zhenfang The Wall Pier-2 music venue, 
Manager 
2012/09/09, 
Kaohsiung 
2012/10/07, Taipei 
Lin Weihe Founder, Takao Renaissance 
Association 
2012/10/08, 
Kaohsiung 
2012/12/13, 
Kaohsiung 
Zheng Yaoxiang Member, Takao Renaissance 
Association 
2012/10/08, 
Kaohsiung 
Wang Chichuan Kaohsiung City Government 
Urban Development Bureau, 
Deputy Director General 
2012/10/09 
Wu Yizheng Councilor, Kaohsiung City 
Council 
2012/11/08, 
Kaohsiung 
Lo Chen-Yuan Urban Development Bureau 
(Kaohsiung), Unit Chief 
Architect 
2012/11/08, 
Kaohsiung 
Yang Yao-Jun Sin Pin Pier Absolutely Art 
Space gallery, Manager 
2012/11/09, 
Kaohsiung 
Jian Mei-ling Pier-2 Art Center, Director 2012/11/21, 
Kaohsiung 
Jiang Yaoxian Taiwan Art Development 
Association, Chairman 
2012/11/23, 
Kaohsiung 
Tsai Dongcheng Jiasheng Metalworks, owner 2012/12/14, 
Kaohsiung 
“Mrs. Ai” Former resident, Gongyuan Rd. 2012/12/14, 
Kaohsiung 
“Mr. Bai” Former resident,  
Gongyuan Rd.  
2012/12/15, 
Kaohsiung 
Jerome Lanche Member, Takao Renaissance 
Association 
2012/12/18, 
Kaohsiung 
Yang Pingyu Kaohsiung Chaishan 
Association 
2012/12/20, 
Kaohsiung 
Huang Liangcai 798 Times Space, Planning 
Director 
2013/02/24, Xiamen 
2013/06/05, Beijing 
“Mr. Chen” Resident at Treasure Hill 2013/03/17, Taipei 
Li Meng-shu Artist/resident at Treasure Hill 2013/03/17, Taipei 
“Ms. Deng” Artist at Treasure Hill 2013/03/17, Taipei 
Yang Xiao-qi Treasure Hill Artist Village, 
Program Officer 
2013/03/22, Taipei 
Peter Nelson Artist, resident at Treasure Hill 2013/04/16, Taipei 
Margaret Shiu Bamboospace, Director 2013/05/16, Taipei 
2014/03/28, London 
Lea Lin Yi-chen  JUT Foundation, Secretary 2013/06/13, Taipei 
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General 
Lin Yu-xiu Taipei City Urban Regeneration 
Office, Department Chief 
2013/04/16, Taipei 
Peter Nelson Artist, resident at Treasure Hill 2013/04/16, Taipei 
Xu Yan-xing (Hsu 
Yen-Hsing) 
Taipei City Urban Regeneration 
Office, Deputy Project Manager 
2013/04/30, Taipei 
Beatrice Leanza Creative Director, Beijing Design 
Week 
2013/06/19, Beijing 
Kong Yin Dashila(b) Project Manager 2013/06/03, Beijing 
Michael Eddy Founder, HomeShop Beijing 2013/06/03, Beijing 
Ai Weiwei Artist, Caochangdi 2013/06/04, Beijing 
“Mr. E”  Local business owner, 
Caochangdi 
2013/06/04, Beijing 
“Ms. Fang” Assistant, FAKE Studios 2013/06/04, Beijing 
Mary-Ann Ray BASEBeijing co-founder 2013/06/04, Beijing 
2014/04/20 [online] 
Vittorio Sun Co-ordinator, Beijing Design 
Week 
2013/06/05, Beijing 
Beatrice Leanza Creative Director, Beijing Design 
Week 
2013/06/19, Beijing 
Ben Chiu Taiwan Design Net, Executive 
Director 
2013/06/20, Taipei 
Rita Chang Yuan-
Chien 
Fubon Art Foundation, former 
art director;  
Asian Cultural Council Taipei, 
Director 
2013/06/24, Taipei 
Lin Hongzhang Associate Professor, Taipei 
National University for the Arts 
2013/10/09, [online] 
Zhang Shuoyin 
(Ting Tong Chang) 
Graffiti artist 2014/02/13, London 
 
 
 
 
